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Abstract 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that John Rawlss conception of social 
justice should be revised to include duties that will require individuals to 
uphold social equality. Social equality, as I describe it, is characterised by the 
values of, at a minimum, respect-for-persons, civility and toleration. Informal 
social equality occurs when these values are upheld outside of a legal or 
official institutional context, such as through personal choice and within civil 
society.  
 
Rawlss conception of justice, which focuses primarily on institutional justice, 
does not include fair personal choice as a requirement of justice. As choice, I 
will argue, affects the distribution of primary social goods such as the social 
basis of self-respect, if we want to describe a fair society, we should include a 
description of fair choice. If informal social equality is upheld, justice in 
choice will also be upheld. To correct the neglect of justice in choice, we can 
thus describe a fair society as one where (1) institutions would be fair and (2) 
individuals would fulfil duties of social equality. 
 
In the context of current debate on the role of individual behaviour in social 
justice, my thesis can be distinguished from what I refer to as the original 
personal choice argument. According to this argument, advocated by G. A. 
Cohen and Liam B. Murphy, for example, Rawlss principles of justice for 
institutions should be applied to individuals so that fair personal choice 
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becomes a requirement of distributive justice. Cohen and Murphys arguments 
are unconvincing, however, because (i) we could apply principles other than 
the institutional, for example, principles for individuals, to choice and (ii) we 
have good reason not to apply the institutional principles to choice, for 
example, because they do not properly address interferences with self-respect.  
 
Instead of applying the institutional principles of justice to individuals, I argue 
that Rawlss principles for individuals should be revised according to the 
values of social equality:  
1. the duty of mutual respect needs to be revised to include requirements for 
individuals and associations to comply with the demands of social equality, 
which are (i) respect-for-persons, (ii) civility and (iii) toleration; and 
2. the duty of justice should be adapted to specify that individuals are required 
to help establish and to uphold informal (not merely formal) justice, thus to 
uphold justice in personal choice.  
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Introduction 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
What is the relationship between justice and equality? Would a fair society 
also need to be an equal society? Among the many affirmations that justice 
undeniably requires equality, consensus is scarce as to what type of equality 
this would be: Among the competing items to be equalized are welfare, 
preference satisfaction, primary goods, economic resources, social status, 
political power, capacity for personal fulfilment, opportunity for welfare, and 
opportunity for scarce resources and social positions.1 The question then is 
rather what type of equality would a fair society require? 
 
John Rawlss conception of justice affirms the need for at least two types of 
equality expressed through his principles of justice.2 Rawls is concerned with 
social justice, or what I will refer to as broad distributive justice.3 This type of 
justice, Rawls emphasises, requires institutions to be designed and regulated 
according to (1) equal liberty, each person should be afforded an equal right 
to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties, and (2) fair 
equality of opportunity, those who are at the same level of talent and ability, 
                                                 
1 Louis P. Pojman and Robert Westmoreland (1997: 1-2). Equality of what?, as Amartya 
Sen (1997) put it, is a primary source of egalitarian conflict. 
2 My references to Rawls include numerous papers, collected in one edition by Samuel 
Freeman (2001b-k), and, in the order they were originally published, A theory of justice 
(1999; the revised edition) or what I will refer to as Theory, Political liberalism (1993), and 
Justice as fairness: a restatement (2001a). 
3 Broad distributive justice describes the way in which society needs to be organised in order 
for the primary social goods, including non-material goods such as rights and the social basis 
of self-respect, to be distributed fairly. It can be contrasted to what I refer to as narrow 
distributive justice which describes only the fair distribution of material or economic goods, 
such as income and wealth. See Rawls (1999: 78-79) for a description of the primary social 
goods.  
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and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of 
success regardless of their initial place in the social system.4 When it comes 
to the distribution of income and wealth, Rawls does not advocate strict 
equality as such: for justice, we do not require equality in material goods but 
we must give priority to the worst-off in society.5  
 
Is this sufficient for justice? Particularly, are these the only forms of equality 
required in a fair society? A fair society, understood in these terms, does not 
seem to be an ideally equal society. One conception of equality missing is 
social equality. If everyone in a society is genuinely treated as an equal, I 
think we should expect equality beyond institutionalised equal rights and 
opportunities; equality would be expressed in everyday behaviour, in private 
relationships, in peoples attitudes to each other. If Rawlss conception of 
justice does not include social equality, does this mean that there is something 
missing? 
 
A fair society and a society of equals are clearly not equivalent notions: what 
we would need to achieve a fair distribution of social goods is unlikely to be 
precisely the same as what we would need to achieve a society of equals.  
Equality thus in everyday behaviour, rather than institutionalised equality, 
could be dismissed as simply irrelevant to justice.  
 
                                                 
4 See Rawls (1999: 266) for the final statement of the principles of justice and for this 
description of equal liberty. For the description of fair equality of opportunity, see Rawls 
(1999: 63). 
5 For a statement of the difference principle, which claims that inequalities are only fair if 
they benefit the worst-off (and only if equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity, in that 
order, have been fulfilled), see Rawls (1999: 266).  
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Although admittedly there are differences, there are also important overlaps. I 
believe that social equality expresses not only what is required of a society of 
equals, but overlaps with an element of justice which is indeed missing from 
Rawlss conception, and thus I will argue that justice requires a form of 
equality in everyday individual behaviour (or what can be called personal 
choice).  
 
If justice only required the formal institutional equality which Rawls seems to 
advocate then a hypothetical country, with a pervasive hierarchy of social 
status which resulted in oppression and private discrimination, and which 
disadvantaged anyone who was not of the favoured race, gender or religion, 
and so on, could be classified as ideally fair because it had achieved perfect 
institutional justice. Calling a country like this fair, however, seems wrong. 
This thesis is an attempt to demonstrate why this seems wrong and to provide 
a solution for extending Rawlss conception of justice to compensate for this 
neglect. 
 
Rawls is concerned with how society would be organised to achieve a fair 
distribution of the primary social goods, including opportunities and the social 
basis of self-respect. I will argue that we cannot achieve a fair distribution of 
these goods through institutional justice alone, because their distribution is 
also determined by personal choice. Justice then, as G. A. Cohen has 
emphasised, requires justice in choice, not simply in institutional rules.6 If 
social equality in the informal, thus in everyday behaviour, in private 
                                                 
6 See Cohen (2000: 117-147). When I refer to Cohen in this thesis, I am referring to G. A. 
Cohen. When I refer to Joshua Cohen, I will specify, J. Cohen. 
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relationships, in civil society, in attitudes and conventions, is upheld, justice in 
choice will also (predominantly) be upheld. This is why, I argue, social 
equality should also be a requirement of Rawlss justice;7 it will address the 
justice of choice by expressing equality through everyday behaviour. My 
answer then to the question what type of equality would a fair society 
require? is that justice requires, among others, informal social equality. In 
summary, my thesis is that Rawlss conception of justice should include 
duties of social equality to address justice in choice.  
 
I defend this thesis in a line of argument that looks like this, broken down by 
chapter: 
 
I. The basic structure as the primary subject of justice 
The focus of Rawlss justice is the application of institutional principles of 
justice to the basic structure. In chapter I, The basic structure as the primary 
subject of justice, I analyse this notion of institutional justice, focusing on 
developing an understanding (1) of how the principles apply to the basic 
structure and what the basic structure is and (2) of the status of other 
subjects and principles of justice.  
 
Although it is clear that Rawls does describe subjects of justice besides the 
basic structure (such as individuals) and principles of justice besides the 
institutional (such as principles for individuals) it is open to interpretation how 
these subjects and principles fit into Rawlss justice. I consider two 
                                                 
7 For short, at times I will refer to Rawlss conception of justice as Rawlss justice. 
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interpretations of their status: (1) the exclusive and (2) the extensive views. 
According to the exclusive view, distributive justice, understood broadly to 
include the distribution of non-material goods, is a function only of the 
institutional principles (and their subsidiaries). According to the extensive 
view, principles of justice other than the institutional could be necessary to 
establish a fair distribution of social goods.  
 
An understanding of how the institutional principles of justice apply to the 
basic structure and what the basic structure is, will help us to determine 
whether Rawlss institutional justice does address the justice of personal 
choice. An understanding of the status of other principles and subjects of 
justice, will help us to determine how to revise Rawlss justice to incorporate 
justice in choice if it does not address this form of justice.  
 
II. Social Equality 
Why might institutional justice be insufficient for justice? In other words, why 
might it be necessary to include such things as personal choice within the 
scope of justice? A preliminary answer is to say that choice affects 
distribution. Although I believe this to be true, we will achieve a better 
understanding of how to address personal choice in Rawlss justice, if we 
examine justice in choice from a broader perspective, according to social 
equality.  
 
In chapter II, Social equality, I analyse the notion of social equality, 
focusing on (1) providing a description of social equality, (2) demonstrating 
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the distinction between social equality, formal equality and narrow 
distributive justice and (3) demonstrating the link between informal social 
equality and justice in personal choice.  
 
I claim that social equality includes the values of respect-for-persons, civility 
and toleration of difference. These values are often accommodated as part of 
theories of broad distributive justice in the form of (1) formal equality, 
equality through legislation, and (2) narrow distributive justice (what I will 
refer to as narrow distribution for short), the distribution of economic goods. 
Formal equality and narrow distribution, however, cannot fully 
accommodate social equality because they cannot accommodate informal 
social equality. Informal social equality occurs when respect-for-persons, 
civility and toleration are upheld in the informal, in the sphere of personal 
choice, the rule-making of associations, civil society and so on, thus outside 
the ambit of legislation and material distribution. If informal social equality is 
upheld, then justice in choice is also likely to be upheld because social 
equality is likely to result in a fair (informal) distribution of opportunities and 
the social basis of self-respect. What is missing then from descriptions of a 
fair society which include only institutional justice is the notion of an 
egalitarian ethos which would motivate informal social equality and justice in 
choice. 
 
III. Justice-as-fairness and violations of social equality 
After analysing Rawlss institutional justice and the notion of social equality, 
whether Rawlss justice accommodates social equality can be determined. In 
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other words, we could answer the question, would the application of the 
institutional principles of justice to the basic structure result in social 
equality?  
 
In chapter III, Justice-as-fairness and violations of social equality, I analyse 
the impact of Rawlss institutional justice on social equality arguing that this 
form of justice cannot address informal social equality because (1) the 
institutional principles do not apply to the informal and (2) Rawlss 
understanding of respect and self-respect does not accommodate respect-for-
persons expressed through informal behaviour. Thus if we recognise the 
importance of social equality and justice in choice, Rawlss institutional 
justice is insufficient as a description of a society of equals or of a fair society.  
 
IV. The personal choice argument 
If we want to accommodate justice in choice, how are we to do so? One 
solution is expressed through the personal choice argument (PCA). The PCA 
consists of 3 claims: (1) personal choice affects the distribution of social 
goods, (2) principles of justice should thus be applied to choice and (3) 
principles of justice that apply to institutions should also be applied to choice.  
 
In chapter IV, The personal choice argument, I analyse this argument, (1) 
claiming that it fails to provide a convincing solution because it applies the 
institutional principles to choice and (2) I propose a revised version which 
advocates applying principles of social equality to choice instead. If there are 
other measures to accommodate justice in choice, then the need to apply the 
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institutional principles to choice seems lacking. Furthermore, we should 
identify other measures because the institutional principles are designed to 
apply to institutions and thus can be self-defeating, for example, if applied to 
individuals. Also, they will not address violations of justice which hamper 
self-respect even if they are applied to individuals. Instead of advocating the 
application of the institutional principles, a revised personal choice argument 
would apply principles which uphold social equality to individuals, as social 
equality would lead to a fair(er) distribution of opportunities and the social 
basis of self-respect.   
 
V. Principles for individuals and the duties of social equality 
Applying institutional principles to choice is not the solution to the problem of 
justice in choice. Instead, the values of social equality, respect-for-persons, 
civility and toleration of difference, should also be applied to choice. How 
though are we to incorporate this type of solution into a Rawlsian framework 
of justice? What we need are principles that are designed to apply to 
individual behaviour and Rawls does provide such principles, the principles 
for individuals. Can these principles help us to revise Rawlss justice to 
include personal choice?  
 
In chapter V, Principles for individuals and the duties of social equality, I 
analyse Rawlss principles for individuals, arguing that although they do not 
address informal social equality, they could be adapted to express informal 
social equality, which would also express a requirement for justice in choice. I 
will argue that (1) the duty of mutual respect should be revised to incorporate 
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requirements for upholding respect-for-persons, civility and toleration, and (2) 
the duty of justice should be revised to include a requirement that individuals 
should establish informal justice if it does not exist and uphold informal 
justice if it does.  
 
Two caveats before I begin: 
 
(1) The form of my argument, criticising others for not taking some particular 
form of equality into account, may seem so common as to be frivolous, adding 
unnecessarily to an already cluttered and seemingly self-destructive debate:  
 
when one inquires what exactly should be equalized one may be 
bewildered by a plethora of competing conceptions  and arguments... 
One is sometimes tempted to apply Humes conclusion on competing 
theologies to competing egalitarian arguments: when they attack their 
rival, they seem completely successful, the result being mutual self-
destruction.8 
 
I suppose, however, that it is precisely because equality and justice are so 
complex and contentious that many different notions would be, but also need 
to be, explored and presented in order to develop greater conceptual clarity on 
what an ideally fair or equal society would be like. Furthermore, without 
being under any illusion about the practical influence of political philosophy, 
the extent of real-life human rights abuses, violence, discrimination, 
oppression and increasing inequalities between rich and poor provide 
                                                 
8 Louis P. Pojman and Robert Westmoreland (1997: 1-2). 
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justification for why understanding what we mean by justice and equality is of 
practical, not solely theoretical, concern.    
 
(2) Taking on Rawls is particularly risky. Rawlss conception of justice is an 
extensive and complex conception which has inspired abundant and diverse 
discussions, interpretations and criticisms. Facing the vastness of Rawls and 
his commentators work, it would be immensely arrogant of me to claim that I 
have somehow discovered the true meaning of Rawlss justice, which I 
definitely will not claim. Although I offer a particular understanding of 
Rawlss work, presented through textual evidence, I recognise that there are, 
and at times I even discuss, differing and often contradictory ways of 
interpreting Rawls. As such, I am tempted to reiterate H. L. A. Harts modest 
words:  
 
I am very conscious that I may have failed to keep constantly in view 
or in proper perspective all the arguments which Rawls, at different 
places in this long and complex work, concentrates on... I would not 
therefore be surprised if my interpretation could be corrected and my 
criticisms answered by some further explanation...9  
 
                                                 
9 Hart (1975: 231). It is an even more pertinent claim now because Hart was only referring to 
A theory of justice. 
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I. The basic structure as the primary subject of justice 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
It is true that the general idea that distributive justice must be 
promoted through the structural reform of society rather than 
individuals do-gooding is not new with Rawls; it has long been taken 
for granted by pretty much everyone with egalitarian sympathies. 
Likewise, Rawls is not the first philosopher to discuss the importance 
of social institutions. But Rawls offers a novel philosophical 
interpretation of the role of institutions For Rawls institutions are 
what normative political theory is all about.1  
 
Rawlss emphasis on the need to design and assess institutions according to 
principles of social justice, what we can call his institutionalism,2 provides a 
significant alternative to traditional conceptions of justice that define justice 
as a function of particular actions removed from their institutional context.3 
Rather than describing justice according to particular actions, Rawls believes 
that justice will result from the application of principles of justice, what I will 
refer to as the institutional principles, to the primary institutions of a society, 
or as he refers to them, the basic structure. This institutional emphasis is 
important because, as is now widely recognised, institutions cause systemic 
injustices which cannot be reformed by reforming particular actions. To say 
                                                 
1 Murphy (1998: 252). 
2 I am borrowing this term as a description of Rawls from Hugo Adam Bedau (1999: 91).  I 
take it to mean simply that justice requires just institutions and thus that justice cannot be a 
function merely of the rules governing individuals and particular cases. Bedau seems to take it 
that institutionalism means more than this, however. He claims, for example, that fundamental 
principles of justice must refer directly or explicitly to the structure of basic social 
institutions (92). 
3 See, for example, Thomas Nagel (2003: 63) and Liam B. Murphys (1998: 252) descriptions 
of Rawlss emphasis on the justice of institutions. 
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social justice requires fair institutions is uncontroversial. Whether this is all 
that social justice requires is more contentious.  
 
G. A. Cohen and Liam B. Murphy4 claim that social justice should not be 
reduced to formal institutional justice.5 The principles of justice that apply to 
institutions, they argue, should also be applied to personal choice as justice in 
choice, not merely fair institutional rules, is necessary for achieving justice in 
the distribution of social goods. These claims form part of what I have called 
the personal choice argument. To assess the personal choice argument, and 
thus also to assess the claim that fair institutions are not sufficient for social 
justice, we need to understand what we mean when we say that Rawls focuses 
on institutional justice. This chapter will analyse and interpret Rawlss notion 
of institutional justice.  
 
I aim to answer two primary questions in this chapter:  
1. What is the basic structure and how do the institutional principles apply to 
it?  
2. What is the status of the basic structure as a subject of justice and the status 
of the institutional principles as principles of justice?  
 
Within the greater context of this thesis the aim of answering these two 
questions is, firstly, to determine whether it is legitimate to claim that Rawls 
                                                 
4 Cohen (2000: 117-147), and Murphy (1998: 251-291). My treatment of the personal choice 
argument is brief here. In chapter IV, I will discuss Cohen and Murphys claims in more 
detail. 
5 Formal refers to legislation or policy. I say formal because Cohen is not necessarily against 
reducing justice to institutions. Cohen (2000: 136-140) questions the distinction drawn 
between institutions and individual behaviour. As such, as long as institutional justice 
includes individuals choices, institutional justice is probably sufficient.  
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does not accommodate personal choice (and social equality) and, if this is a 
legitimate claim, secondly, to establish the best way to accommodate personal 
choice in a Rawlsian framework.  
 
In section 1 of this chapter I will provide an introductory and preliminary 
reply to the question what is the basic structure?. To answer the question 
more fully, in sections 2 and 3, I analyse why Rawls considers the basic 
structure to be so central to his conception of justice and I contrast the basic 
structure as a subject of justice to other possible subjects. In section 4, I 
examine how the institutional principles are applied to the basic structure. 
This analysis helps us not only to understand what is meant when Rawls 
claims that the institutional principles should be applied to the basic structure 
but also to come to a clearer understanding of the basic structure. In section 5, 
I summarise the analysis of the basic structure and institutional principles.  
 
My discussion of the basic structure and the institutional principles does not 
aim merely to define or better describe these ideas. By highlighting why the 
basic structure is central to Rawlss justice, by examining the contrast drawn 
between the basic structure and other subjects of justice, and by clarifying the 
application of the institutional principles, I aim to analyse the status of the 
basic structure as a subject of justice and the status of the institutional 
principles. This also means analysing the status of other possible subjects and 
principles of justice. The reason why this is necessary is that in later sections 
it will help us to determine what the best solution is for accommodating 
personal choice in Rawlss justice: particularly, it will help us assess the claim 
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of the personal choice argument that the institutional principles should be 
applied to personal choice. In section 6 I draw together ideas about the status 
of subjects and principles of justice to identify two rival interpretations of 
what Rawls means when he claims that the basic structure is the primary 
subject of justice. These two interpretations will provide two different answers 
on how best to accommodate personal choice: the first interpretation, the 
exclusive view, necessitates using the institutional principles to evaluate 
personal choice, whereas the second interpretation, the extensive view, is able 
to accommodate personal choice through other principles of justice. In my 
conclusion, I demonstrate what implications our analysis of the basic structure 
and the institutional principles have for the personal choice argument.      
 
1. What is the basic structure?  
 
Rawls is concerned with how a society should be arranged in order to achieve 
a fair distribution of primary social goods.6 Primary goods are goods which 
any rational person would need and would want more of, rather than less of, 
regardless of her particular life plan.7 Rawls claims that these goods are 
rights, liberties, and opportunities, income and wealth and the social basis 
of self-respect.8 They are social goods because the way in which society is 
organised directly determines their distribution, as opposed to natural goods, 
                                                 
6 Rawls (1999: 78-81). 
7 Rawls (1999: 79). 
8 Rawls (1999: 54; 79). 
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such as intelligence and health, which are influenced by the organisation of 
society but are not so directly under its control.9   
 
So how should society be organised to achieve a fair distribution of these 
goods? According to Rawlss conception of justice, justice-as-fairness, fair 
distribution will occur when certain principles of justice are applied to what 
he calls the basic structure of society. These principles of justice, the 
institutional principles, are the principle of equal liberty, the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity and the difference principle, in order of their lexical 
priority.10 
 
What these principles apply to, the basic structure, Rawls describes with some 
variation, but this description taken from Justice as fairness is fairly common: 
the way in which the main political and social institutions of society fit 
together into one system of social cooperation and the way they assign basic 
rights and duties and regulate the division of advantages that arise from social 
cooperation over time.11 Firstly, note that the basic structure has to do with 
institutions. So when we consider how to arrange society as best to achieve 
justice the answer for Rawls is that it is institutions that we need to arrange 
according to the institutional principles of justice.12 Secondly, not all 
institutions are included in the basic structure, only what Rawls refers to as 
the main institutions of society. Typically Rawls claims that the institutions 
included as part of the basic structure are the constitution, aspects of private 
                                                 
9 Rawls (1999: 54). 
10 Rawls (1999: 266-7). 
11 Rawls (2001a: 9). See also Rawls (1999: 6-10; 1993: 11; 2001b: 256-258). 
12 At least, the partial answer. It is open to debate, and it is to this debate that I turn in section 
6, whether this provides us with the complete answer.  
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property and the economy, and the family.13 Thirdly, the basic structure is not 
equivalent to institutions: we cannot simply reduce the basic structure to its 
specific institutions because then we would be including too much: we do not 
thus apply the institutional principles to every aspect of the economy or the 
family. Rawlss concern is to determine how to organise society to achieve a 
fair distribution of social goods, thus when we consider how institutions are to 
be arranged, we need not consider every aspect of that institution but only the 
way in which the institution needs to be arranged according to its influence on 
the distribution of social goods.14  
 
In application to the  basic structure the principles of justice-as-fairness then 
apply (1) only to institutions, (2) only to certain institutions and (3) only to 
certain parts of these institutions, insofar as they determine broad 
distribution. What we can thus say, so far, is that in Rawlss justice, 
distribution is determined by certain parts of certain institutions, and that a fair 
distribution would occur if the institutional principles were applied to these 
parts of institutions.  
 
Clearly, however, this provides us with only a vague understanding of what 
the basic structure is and how the institutional principles might apply to it. 
Although Rawls claims that his delineation of the basic structure needs to be 
fairly vague, as a rigid delineation would jeopardise the adaptability of his 
theory of justice, we need to have a clearer understanding of the basic 
                                                 
13 Rawls (1999: 6; 1993: 258; 2001a: 10). Susan Moller Okin (1989: 89-109) and Cohen 
(2000: 137-140), for example, claim that the inclusion of the family in the basic structure has 
more radically egalitarian consequences than Rawls recognises. I will discuss problems with 
the familys inclusion in the basic structure in sections 4.2 and 4.4. 
14 Rawls (1999: 6). 
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structure than this if we are to analyse Rawlss institutionalism.15 To better 
understand the basic structure, we need to examine why Rawls believes that it 
is central to social justice and to compare it to other potential subjects of 
justice.  
 
2. Why is the basic structure the primary subject of justice? 
 
The basic structure is a subject of justice, meaning that it is to the basic 
structure that principles of justice apply. The basic structure is not merely a 
subject of justice, however, it is the primary subject of justice thus it has 
special significance in Rawlss conception of justice.16 What precisely it 
means that the basic structure is the primary subject of justice is not entirely 
clear. In section 6 I will discuss two possible understandings of the basic 
structure as the primary subject of justice based on two interpretations of the 
status of the institutional principles as principles of distributive justice. For the 
time being it is enough to say that the basic structure is central to Rawlss 
justice.  
 
Why is it so central? An immediate answer must be because it plays an 
important role in determining fair distribution: liberties and opportunities are 
defined by the rules of major institutions and the distribution of income and 
wealth is regulated by them.17 We can provide a more detailed answer, 
however, by examining why the basic structure has such an important 
influence on distribution. Rawls provides two main reasons why the basic 
                                                 
15 Rawls (1999: 8). 
16 Rawls (1999: 6; my emphasis). 
17 Rawls (1999: 79). 
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structure should be the primary subject of justice: (1) background justice will 
be achieved when the basic structure is regulated by the institutional 
principles over time and (2) because of the profound and pervasive influence 
on the persons who live under its institutions.18  
 
2.1. Background justice 
      
Lets say that I sell a piece of property. I do so entirely legally and freely, 
whatever this may mean, according to the rules of contract. This particular 
transaction thus seems fair. We may be tempted to claim that as long as all 
particular cases are fair in this way then justice will be achieved. Rawls 
claims, however, that this is not true.19 Justice is not merely a function of an 
aggregate of fair transactions. The social structure in which the rules are 
determined and in which transactions take place also needs to be fair and this 
fairness needs to be maintained over time for justice to ensue.  
 
The claim that justice will transpire as long as particular transactions are free 
and fair is what Rawls refers to as a traditional conception of justice. He 
associates this conception with John Locke.20 In contrast to this traditional 
view, Rawls claims that justice cannot be maintained solely by rules that 
govern particular transactions even if these rules guarantee that the 
                                                 
18 Rawls (2001a: 52). In Theory, Rawls (1999: 7) refers directly only to the profound and 
pervasive effects of the basic structure as the reason why the basic structure should be the 
primary subject of justice. In Justice as fairness (2001a: 52-7) he cites both background 
justice and the profound and pervasive effects of the basic structure as the two main reasons 
why the basic structure is primary. In Political liberalism (1993: 257-288) he seems to 
identify numerous reasons, including background justice and profound effects.  
19 See, for example, Rawlss discussion of background justice (1993: 265-269; 2001a: 52-
55).   
20 Rawls (2001a: 52-53). 
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transactions are free and fair. Transactions conducted without further 
procedures to secure justice will lead to injustices even if the individual 
transactions are initially just as the transactions could become unjust over time 
or the combined effect of these transactions will lead to injustices. For 
example, individuals could accumulate great wealth through free and fair 
agreements but this accumulated wealth, although fairly acquired, would 
interfere with equality of opportunity. What is needed, Rawls argues, is 
background justice: justice in the background structure or institutions of 
society which would ensure the basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity, 
and which would arrange social and economic inequalities to benefit the 
worst-off according to the demands of the difference principle. Background 
justice is achieved, Rawls claims, when the institutional principles are applied 
to the basic structure.  
 
As Thomas Pogge emphasises in an analogy drawn with a poker game, Rawls 
is concerned with the ground rules of a social system rather than with 
particular rules or interactions within that system: 
 
the question is not whether in an ongoing poker game those who have 
won a great deal shouldnt (be made to) give some of their winnings to 
those who have lost nearly all they had. The question is whether we 
ought not to play some other game that does not, time and again, 
produce destitute losers.21  
 
Rawls then draws a distinction between (1) institutional measures to achieve 
justice, i.e. the institutional principles applied to the basic structure to achieve 
                                                 
21 Pogge (1989: 26). 
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background justice, and (2) further, or non-institutional measures for justice, 
which in this case would be measures to regulate particular cases.22 In 
emphasising the importance of the institutional measures, Rawls aims to 
demonstrate that (1) non-institutional measures cannot achieve justice alone 
and (2) institutional measures are a necessary condition for social justice. This 
does not mean, however, that non-institutional measures are necessarily 
incompatible with justice-as-fairness nor does it necessarily imply that these 
measures are not also requirements of justice; it merely emphasises the 
importance of having the basic structure as a subject of justice.   
 
2.2. Profound and pervasive effects 
 
Besides the importance of background justice, the basic structure is the 
primary subject of justice because of its profound and pervasive influence on 
individuals within its framework. The reason why the basic structure has what 
Rawls calls a profound and pervasive influence is (1) because its effects are 
present from the start of an individuals life, and (2) because its effects 
include determining or shaping an individuals opportunities, abilities, goals, 
preferences and character.23 As an example consider injustices of racial 
discrimination. This discrimination, embedded in the basic structure, could 
affect an individuals opportunities in accessing sufficient education, 
healthcare and employment, shape her views of her life chances and her 
                                                 
22 Non-institutional measures or principles mean not the institutional principles. Non-
institutional does not mean that such principles have nothing to do with institutions. The 
principles of local justice, for example, which I discuss in section 3 have to do with the 
internal functioning of institutions, and thus with institutions, however, they are non-
institutional principles to distinguish them from the institutional principles.  
23 Rawls (1999: 7; 2001a: 10; 2001b: 257). 
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ability to take advantage of those life chances, and negatively influence her 
notion of self-worth. Thus injustices in the basic structure do not lead to 
sporadic and isolated harms: Rawls is claiming that such injustices pervade an 
individuals life. Like the claims made about background justice, the profound 
and pervasive effects of the basic structure provide reason for why the basic 
structure has to be at least a focus of justice.24 This does not then rule out 
other subjects of justice, unless the claim is that the basic structure alone has 
such profound and pervasive effects, and this is not a claim that Rawls makes.  
 
3. Why is the basic structure the primary subject of justice? 
 
To say that the basic structure is the primary subject of justice appears to 
imply that there are other subjects of justice, subjects which are thus 
secondary to justice. At least, claiming that the basic structure is a subject of 
justice implies that other conceptions of justice could identify subjects of 
justice besides the basic structure, whether or not these subjects can be 
considered to be further subjects of justice-as-fairness, and it is these other 
conceptions of justice to which Rawls contrasts justice-as-fairness.  
 
Rawls does explicitly acknowledge that there are subjects of justice besides 
the basic structure to which principles of justice besides the institutional 
principles do or could apply. However, he explicitly disassociates these 
subjects from the institutional principles, claiming that it is only to the  basic 
                                                 
24 See Philippe Van Parijs (2003: 228) for example:  a profound impact is by no means 
confined to what could readily be described as an institution. The dispositions that govern 
peoples behavioural responses to redistributive schemes would qualify just as easily as many 
components of the basic structure.   
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structure that the institutional principles apply, or at least that we cannot 
assume that the institutional principles will apply to any other subjects.25 
Although Rawls mentions various subjects of justice, I will focus on two that 
he distinguishes from the basic structure particularly and which are significant 
for understanding the difference between institutional and non-institutional 
principles for justice: these subjects are individuals and the subjects of local 
justice.  
 
3.1. Principles for individuals 
 
A significant distinction that Rawls draws between justice-as-fairness and 
utilitarianism is that justice-as-fairness distinguishes between different 
principles with application to different subjects, whereas utilitarianism does 
not. Rawlss claim is that utilitarianism has no specific subject of justice: it 
applies the principle of utility indiscriminately: 
 
The principle of utility applies equally to all social forms and to the 
actions of individuals; in addition, the assessment of character and 
dispositional traits, as well as the social practice of praising and 
blaming, are to be guided by it.26  
 
Rawls refers to this application of a principle of justice to an indiscriminate 
subject as a general theory of justice.27 This he contrasts to justice-as-fairness 
which applies particular principles to particular subjects. The primary 
                                                 
25 Rawls (1999: 7; 47). Why is it, though, that we would need different principles for 
different subjects? I consider answers to this question in chapter IV. 
26 Rawls (1993: 260). 
27 Rawls (1993: 13). 
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difference is that justice-as-fairness distinguishes between justice as applied to 
institutions and justice or morality as applied to individuals. The principle of 
utility is applied to both institutions and to individual motivation and 
behaviour, thus merging justice as a virtue for institutions with justice as a 
personal virtue. Justice-as-fairness, on the other hand, applies the principles of 
equal liberty, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle to the 
basic structure, and thus to institutions alone. As a result the institutional 
principles are explicitly disassociated from principles to be applied to 
individuals.  
 
Although Rawls makes this distinction, this does not necessarily mean that he 
believes that individuals do not constitute a feasible subject for justice: he is 
merely stating that they are not the subject of these particular principles of 
justice-as-fairness. Indeed, Rawls recognises the necessity of incorporating 
principles for individuals into a theory of justice and claims that principles for 
both the basic structure and individuals would be chosen in the original 
position.28 Thus Rawlss claim here seems not to be that it is inappropriate to 
include principles for individuals within the scope of a conception of justice 
but that these principles must be distinguished from principles that should 
apply to institutions.  
 
 
                                                 
28 These principles, Rawls (1999: 93) claims, would be necessary for a complete theory of 
right and they are an essential part of any theory of justice. The original position is the 
initial situation in which heads of families, under a veil of ignorance about their own 
circumstances, agree on which principles of justice should regulate society (Rawls 1999: 102-
168). We can call the original position a device that Rawls uses to demonstrate the fairness of 
his principles of justice: see, for example, Dworkin (1975: 16-53) on the original position as 
such a device. 
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3.2. The principles of local justice  
 
At times Rawls refers to the type of justice expressed by justice-as-fairness as 
domestic justice to distinguish it from what he refers to as local justice.29 
Local justice applies principles of justice directly to institutions and 
associations and thus regulates the internal functioning of institutions.30 The 
difference between the principles of justice-as-fairness and the principles of 
local justice expresses a distinction between the basic structure and 
institutions themselves. We noted that the basic structure cannot be reduced to 
institutions or even specific institutions: the basic structure is the way in which 
institutions are arranged and the way in which they distribute social benefits 
and burdens, rather than being equivalent to institutions. Local justice applies, 
as Rawls puts it, directly to institutions. Principles of local justice would 
regulate institutions internally. Rawls expressly denies the use of the 
institutional principles for local justice: Clearly the two principles of justice 
 with their political liberties are not supposed to regulate the internal 
organization of churches and universities. Nor is the difference principle to 
govern how parents are to treat their children or to allocate the familys wealth 
among them.31 This does not mean, however, that there is no relation 
between the principles of local justice and the principles of justice-as-fairness: 
                                                 
29 The distinction drawn is between domestic, local and global justice (Rawls 2001a: 11-12). 
Rawls thus also distinguishes the institutional principles from international or global justice 
where principles of justice would apply to international law. I am not going to discuss global 
justice as the distinction drawn between (1) principles for international law and (2) 
institutional principles internal to a specific society is not clearly relevant to analysing 
institutional and non-institutional measures for achieving social justice. 
30 Rawls (2001a: 11). 
31 Rawls (2001a: 14, fn. 8). 
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Rawls claims that as principles of local justice would function within the basic 
structure of society they would be limited by its principles, thus we can 
presume that this would mean that, where relevant, principles of local justice 
would have to be consistent with principles for the basic structure.  
 
Whereas the distinction drawn between principles for the basic structure and 
principles for individuals relies on a distinction between the structure of 
institutions and individual behaviour, the distinction drawn here is different. 
Both the institutional principles for justice and principles for local justice are 
applied to institutions, and both can be applied to the structure of institutions, 
although principles for local justice are likely also to be applied to individual 
behaviour. The difference then lies in which part of the institution the 
principles apply to: the institutional principles of justice apply to the 
arrangement of institutions and their distribution of social goods, thus the  
basic structure of an institution, whereas local justice would presumably 
apply to (1) the structure of an institution where that structure has no 
relevance to the overall arrangement of institutions in society and to the way 
in which the institution distributes social goods, and (2) to individual 
behaviour within that institution even if this does have an influence on 
distribution  
 
The basic structure, then, as the primary subject of justice is a distinct subject 
which can be contrasted to other potential subjects such as individuals. Each 
of these subjects, Rawls believes, has its own special principles which seem to 
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apply to that domain alone. The institutional principles apply to the basic 
structure and seemingly not to individuals or any other subjects.  
 
Is it true, however, that the institutional principles do not apply at all to these 
other subjects? Surely these principles must affect individuals on some level? 
Furthermore, we have still not established a more detailed description of the 
basic structure than our preliminary description. In order to understand 
whether the institutional principles apply in some way to other subjects and to 
understand what it is that they do apply to in the basic structure, in the next 
section I will analyse Rawlss descriptions of the application of the 
institutional principles. 
 
4. The application of the institutional principles  
 
Rawls claims that for a society to be fair, the institutional principles must 
determine and regulate the basic structure. To what precisely do these 
principles apply? In this section I will analyse the application of the 
institutional principles, by examining (1) background justice, (2) the problem 
of applying the institutional principles to the family, and (3) the 4-stage 
sequence of the application of the principles. In doing so, I will establish a 
more detailed understanding of the basic structure and the application of the 
institutional principles.  
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4.1. Background justice and the three applications of the institutional 
principles 
 
In section 2.1, we established that background justice draws a distinction 
between the rules for the background structure in which particular transactions 
occur and the rules that regulate those transactions. Rawls refers to this as a 
division of labour: (1) institutional principles are applied to the basic structure 
to achieve background justice and (2) further measures are applied to 
particular cases. Institutional measures to regulate background justice are 
essential for achieving social justice and are necessary no matter how fair 
other rules are. This does not mean, however, that non-institutional principles 
have no affect on other subjects or on other measures. Background justice 
establishes a just context in which particular cases occur and thus it constrains 
the rules that guide those cases. This implies two different applications of the 
institutional principles: (1) they apply directly to the basic structure and (2) 
they apply indirectly to particular cases through background justice. When 
Rawls thus claims that the institutional principles only apply to the basic 
structure he means that it is only to the basic structure that they apply directly.  
 
Rawls refers to background justice as an example of procedural justice: once 
the institutional principles are applied directly to the basic structure to 
establish background justice, thus creating a fair context in which individual 
transactions take place, and thus indirectly applying the institutional principles 
to individual transactions by constraining them, then justice is likely to ensue. 
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So, if a fair procedure is followed, justice will occur. This does not mean, 
however, that Rawls believes that we can rely entirely on the procedure of 
applying the institutional principles to ensure justice, and thus merely 
implementing background justice is not sufficient for achieving justice.  
 
The institutional principles determine fair procedures, but the outcome of 
these procedures also needs to be assessed: while a large element of pure 
procedural justice transfers to the principles of justice, these principles must 
nevertheless embody an ideal form for the basic structure in the light of which 
ongoing institutional processes are to be constrained and the accumulated 
results of individual transactions continually adjusted.32 Thus we can 
distinguish three applications of the institutional principles: (1) they are 
applied directly to the basic structure, (2) they apply indirectly to the rest of 
society (the direct application of the institutional principles determines fair 
background conditions which constrain civil society, individual behaviour and 
particular transactions), and (3) they apply as standards to assess whether 
justice has genuinely ensued from the first two applications.  
 
4.2. The problem of the family 
 
A problem with understanding how the institutional principles apply arises 
when we consider which institutions are part of the basic structure. The 
problem is particularly prominent when we consider the family.33 In Theory 
                                                 
32 Rawls (1993: 259). 
33 For interpretations and criticisms of the role that the family plays in Rawlss conception of 
justice, see, for example, Susan Moller Okin (1989: 89-109), Martha C. Nussbaum (2000: 
270-283) and Veronique Munoz-Dardè (1998: 335-352). More generally, for an explanation 
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Rawls unequivocally includes the family in the basic structure, however, he 
does not discuss how the institutional principles apply to the family. In 
Political liberalism he admits to omitting the family from his discussion of the 
application of principles but claims that he assumes that some form of the 
family is just.34 In Justice as fairness, he claims that the basic structure 
includes the family in some form.35  
 
If Rawls includes the major social institutions in the basic structure and if he 
is particularly concerned with the profound and pervasive effects of the 
basic structure, it would seem that he should include the family as part of the 
basic structure. Susan Moller Okin has emphasised this point:  
 
It would scarcely be possible to deny that different family structures, 
and different distributions of rights and duties within families, affect 
mens life prospects, what they can expect to be and how well they can 
hope to do, and even more difficult to deny their effects on the life 
prospects of women.36  
 
If the family is part of the basic structure, then as we have seen from our 
discussion of background justice, the institutional principles should apply to it 
directly. However, there is some confusion as to how these principles would 
apply to the family. If the institutional principles apply directly to the family it 
                                                                                                                               
of the family as a seat of injustice, see Nussbaums chapter Love, care and dignity, in 
Women and human development: the capabilities approach (2000: 241-297).  
34 Rawls (1993: xxxi). 
35 Rawls (2001a: 9). 
36 Okin (1989: 93). Okin (1989: 89-109) claims that Rawls is ambiguous about the role of the 
family in the  basic structure, arguing that even though the institutional principles could be 
used to challenge unfair gender structures, Rawls is silent about such challenges and the need 
for them. Rawls (2001a: 167-168) responds directly but very briefly to her claims in Justice 
as fairness. 
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would seem that the family should be organised in such a way that it would 
achieve the basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity and the difference 
principle and this would seem to imply that the behaviour of individuals 
within the family should be directed by these principles. Yet individual 
behaviour is not supposed to be included as part of the basic structure and thus 
the institutional principles should not apply to individual behaviour and the 
internal functioning of an institution. What does Rawls thus mean when he 
claims that the family is part of the basic structure? 
 
In an attempt to clarify the role of the family in the basic structure, Rawls 
discusses the application of the institutional principles to the family in Justice 
as fairness.37 His comments on the family, however, leave it unclear as to 
whether the family is actually part of the basic structure. Rawls begins his 
explanation of the familys relationship to the basic structure by explicitly 
insisting that the family is part of the basic structure because one of its 
essential roles is to establish the orderly production and reproduction of 
society and of its culture from one generation to the next.38 Most of the rest 
of the claims he makes about the family in the remaining section however 
confuse, and even contradict, the familys inclusion in the basic structure.  
 
He maintains that the principles of justice apply directly to the basic structure 
and yet they do not apply directly to the family, or at least not to the familys 
internal life.39 He compares the family to other associations such as 
churches and universities, associations that he has claimed are definitely not 
                                                 
37 Rawls (2001a: 162-168). 
38 Rawls (2001a: 162). 
39 Rawls (2001a: 162). 
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part of the basic structure, arguing that the principles of justice apply in the 
same way to all of these associations, only indirectly: 
 
Firms and labor unions, churches, universities, and the family are 
bound by constraints arising from the principles of justice, but these 
constraints arise indirectly from just background conditions within 
which the associations and groups exist, and by which the conduct of 
their members is restricted. For example, while churches can 
excommunicate heretics, they cannot burn them; this constraint is to 
secure liberty of conscience. Universities cannot discriminate in 
certain ways: this constraint is to help establish fair equality of 
opportunity.40 
 
Thus it seems that as equal citizens in a fair state the members of a family, 
like any other citizens, are guaranteed rights, liberties and fair opportunities; 
the institutional principles impose essential constraints on the family as an 
institution but do not apply as they would to the basic structure.41  
 
To understand whether the family is part of the basic structure, we need to 
deepen our understanding of the basic structure and to examine in more detail 
how the institutional principles apply to it.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Rawls (2001a: 10; my emphasis). 
41 Rawls (2001a: 164). 
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4.3. The 4-stage sequence 
 
Rawls describes the application of the institutional principles according to a 4-
stage sequence to simplify explaining their application:42 
 
1. In the first stage, the institutional principles are chosen as the most 
appropriate principles of justice in the original position.  
2. The parties of the original position move to a constitutional convention 
where the institutional principles guide the choice of political form and 
constitution.  
3. In the legislative stage, laws and policies are chosen which must satisfy the 
institutional principles and the constitution. 
4. In the last stage, the rules that guide decisions and behaviour for particular 
cases and for citizens are determined. 
 
The second and the third stages represent the direct application of the 
institutional principles to the basic structure understood as political form, the 
constitution and legislation. The subject of the fourth stage is not part of the 
basic structure: it seems to include anything not covered by the basic structure 
such as individuals, associations and the internal functioning of institutions, 
subjects which Rawls has clearly distinguished from the basic structure. How 
the institutional principles apply to this fourth stage is not clear if we focus 
only on the explanation of the 4-stage sequence. We can infer, however, from 
                                                 
42 Rawls describes the 4-stage sequence in Theory (1999: 171-176). He makes it clear that it 
is not supposed to be a description of how constitutions and legislation are actually derived 
empirically, merely a simplified model of how the principles of justice are applied to establish 
a fair state.  
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the claims made about background justice that the application of the 
institutional principles to the fourth stage is only indirect and that the rules 
that guide particular cases and individual behaviour directly would be the 
principles of local justice and principles for individuals.  
 
Through analysing Rawlss discussion of background justice we determined 
that there are three applications of the institutional principles: the first, direct 
application, the second, indirect application and the third, ongoing assessment 
of the outcomes of the direct and indirect application. Only the direct 
application of the principles to the basic structure (applied according to the 4-
stage sequence, at the second and third stage to the basic structure) and the 
indirect application to anything beyond the basic structure (applied at the 
fourth stage) are covered by the 4-stage sequence. The ongoing assessment of 
the outcomes of direct and indirect application implies that we should add a 
fifth stage to the sequence: at this last stage institutional principles would be 
used as an ideal standard to judge the results of stages 2 to 4 and to adjust the 
laws and rules that issue from these stages if they are found to result in 
injustice.  
 
When we refer back to our original description of the basic structure and our 
description of the application of the institutional principles to achieve 
background justice, we find that these descriptions do not match the 
description of the application of the institutional principles to the basic 
structure provided by the 4-stage sequence. The basic structure is (1) the 
arrangement of major social and political institutions in society and (2) the 
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way in which institutions assign rights and distribute social goods. We noted 
that this means that the basic structure includes only institutions, only certain 
institutions (the major social and political institutions) and only certain parts 
of these institutions (the parts that determine how they are arranged and how 
they assign rights and distribute social goods). In analysing background 
justice, we find that the institutional principles apply directly only to the basic 
structure, thus only directly to the way in which the major social and political 
institutions are arranged and the way in which they assign rights and distribute 
social goods. In the 4-stage sequence, however, the institutional principles 
seem to apply only directly to political form, the constitution and legislation. 
If it is only to these that the principles apply directly, we need to modify our 
original description of the basic structure in a way which will help us to better 
understand what is meant by the basic structure.  
 
If we merge the original description of the basic structure with the 
implications for the basic structure from the 4-stage sequence, we could say 
that the basic structure is (1) the arrangement of political form, the 
constitution and legislation and (2) the way in which these institutions 
determine the distribution of social goods. Thus the institutional principles 
apply only directly to these institutions, and only to their arrangement and 
the way in which they determine the distribution of social goods. The 
emphasis on the influence of these on distribution is important. It seems that 
aspects of the constitution or of legislation which have no bearing on 
distribution (including the assignment of rights) will not be determined or 
regulated by institutional principles. So, for example, legislation concerning 
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access to education could be determined by the institutional principles 
because this access will influence the distribution of opportunities. Food and 
beverage licensing laws, for example, however, would not be subject to the 
principles (unless of course these licensing laws could be shown to have an 
affect on the distribution of the primary social goods). 
 
Associations, particular cases, particular laws which do not concern the 
distribution of the primary social goods, individual behaviour and any other 
institutions, seemingly are not part of the basic structure because the 
institutional principles do not apply directly to them. There is an overlap 
though between the basic structure and the non-basic structure. The direct 
application of the principles to the basic structure limits non-basic structure: 
this is what is meant when we say that there is an indirect application of the 
institutional principles to non-basic structure. The institutional principles are 
not applied directly to individual behaviour or associations such as firms for 
example, but there are aspects of individual behaviour and associations which 
are regulated by the law and the constitution, which, in turn, are regulated by 
the institutional principles.  
 
Even when it comes to their indirect application, the institutional principles do 
not apply to all aspects of non-basic structure. We can say that they only apply 
to the public rules of the non-basic structure. Rawls defines an institution as 
a public system of rules which specifies certain forms of action as 
permissible, others as forbidden; and [provides] for certain penalties and 
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defenses, and so on, when violations occur.43 When the institutional 
principles are applied indirectly to the non-basic structure, they apply to the 
public rules which limit and regulate the non-basic structure: through the 
constitution and legislation, associations and individuals are subject to legally 
coercive rules which specify permissible and impermissible actions.  
 
So, for example, through the application of the first institutional principle (the 
principle of equal liberty) to the constitution and to legislation, public rules 
are created which guarantee all citizens equal political and legal liberties and 
which specify punishment if these liberties are violated. It is only, however, 
through these public rules that there is a relationship between the institutional 
principles and the non-basic structure. The contrast drawn here is between a 
public and non-public realm; the non-public, Rawls claims, consists of (1) 
background culture, the culture of churches and associations and 
institutions of learning and (2) non-public political culture in the form of the 
media.44 The non-public should also include personal choice: behaviour which 
is not subject to legally coercive rules and which is thus left up to the 
individual. The institutional principles, then, have nothing to say about actions 
and informal rules within associations or the media or of individual behaviour, 
beyond where they are subject to public rules. 
 
Emphasising that the institutional principles apply to the public rules of non-  
basic structure, and to those rules alone, will help to clarify the relationship 
between specific institutions and the institutional principles; particularly it 
                                                 
43 Rawls (1999: 47-8). 
44 Rawls (2001g: 576, fn. 13). 
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will help to clarify the familys connection to the basic structure and the 
institutional principles.  
 
4.4. The 4-stage sequence, public rules and the family 
 
Initially, it would seem that the 4-stage sequence compounds the problem of 
the family. Although the 4-stage sequence provides an explanation of how the 
principles of justice apply, it does not include an explanation of how the 
principles apply to all institutions typically included as part of the basic 
structure: two significant aspects of the basic structure are missing. The first 
of these is the economic system and the second is the family.  
 
Although this is not explicit in the description of the 4-stage sequence, Rawls 
makes it clear that only certain forms of government combined with certain 
economic systems are compatible with the principles of justice: laissez-faire 
capitalism and communism, for example, conflict with justice-as-fairness, 
whereas either property-owning democracy or liberal socialism (social 
democracy) are consistent with the institutional principles as it is only these 
two political and economic systems that can secure the basic liberties.45 
Applying the institutional principles to the economic system could be 
included in stage 2 of the sequence: in the second stage the institutional 
principles would be used to determine political form, the economic system 
and the constitution. Although Rawls does not include economic system here, 
this seems to be merely an omission rather than a problem posed for the 4-
                                                 
45 Rawls (2001a: 136-138). 
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stage sequence. The application of the institutional principles to the economic 
system is probably implied in mention of the form of government, constitution 
and legislation. We can say something similar about other institutions which 
Rawls lists as part of the basic structure, such as the (independence of the) 
judiciary, private property and the organization of the economy: including 
these in the basic structure can be seen to be implicit in the arrangement of 
political form, economic system, legislation and constitution, as it is through 
these that the judiciary and aspects of the economy would be determined and 
regulated.46  
 
The situation is more complicated when it comes to the omission of the 
family. Although we can surmise the inclusion of the economic system and 
perhaps other formal institutions as a part of the basic structure, as a separate 
institution, the family does not tally with the 4-stage sequence. We noted that 
there is some confusion with the inclusion of the family as part of the basic 
structure. Rawls claims that the family is part of the basic structure. The 
institutional principles, however, apply directly to the basic structure and yet 
Rawls denies that these principles apply directly to the family so it would 
seem that the family is not part of the basic structure.  
 
The 4-stage sequence seems to demonstrate that the family is not part of the 
basic structure because it is not included as a separate institution to which the 
institutional principles apply directly. So is the family part of the basic 
structure? The answer to this question lies in our modified description of the 
                                                 
46 Rawls (2001a: 10) claims, for example, that The political constitution with an 
independent judiciary belongs to the basic structure.  
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basic structure: the institutional principles apply directly only to political 
form, the economic system, the constitution and legislation, and indirectly 
only to the public rules of other institutions, associations or behaviours. The 
family, thus, is not part of the basic structure as a separate institution in its 
entirety: only its public rules are subject to the principles of justice. The 
institutional principles thus do not apply to the family as such but apply to the 
constitutional and legislative structure underpinning the family: for example, 
the institutional principles determine that each (adult) member of the family 
has the same equal basic rights and liberties but it does not regulate individual 
behaviour in the family, whether or not it has distributive implications, at least 
where that behaviour does not violate its public rules. Besides the public rules 
of the family, the institutional principles do not apply to any aspect of the 
family whether directly or indirectly.  
 
Although answering the question, is the family part of the basic structure? 
by saying only the public rules of the family overlap with the basic structure 
alleviates some of the confusion over the familys role in the basic structure, it 
remains misleading for Rawls to claim that the family is part of the basic 
structure. When Rawls mentions which institutions are included in the basic 
structure he includes and makes no distinction between, for example, the 
constitution and the family. This is misleading because it implies that the 
institutional principles apply directly to both the constitution and the family 
but they do not. They seem to apply to the family only by applying to the 
constitution and legislation. By drawing attention to the family Rawls implies 
that it has a role in the basic structure that is different to other institutions or 
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associations such as firms, churches and universities. However, the public 
rules of universities, churches and other associations and institutions are also 
part of the basic structure. What Rawls should be saying is that the family is 
included only in the same way that other non-basic structure institutions are: 
they are determined by the  basic structure only according to the way in which 
their public rules determine how social goods are distributed including how 
rights are assigned; any other aspects of these institutions, such as their 
internal functioning and personal choice, are not governed by the institutional 
principles and are seemingly instead governed directly by other rules, such as 
the principles of local justice or principles for individuals.  
 
5. Clarifying the basic structure and the application of the 
institutional principles 
 
By combining information garnered from the original description of the basic 
structure, from the application of the institutional principles to background 
justice and from the 4-stage sequence, we are now able to devise a more 
thorough description of the application of the institutional principles and of 
the basic structure. We can describe the application of the institutional 
principles according to a 3-step process.  
 
5.1. The 3-step application of the institutional principles 
 
1. Direct application of the institutional principles to the basic 
structure: 
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1.1. Direct application of institutional principles to political 
form and economic system; 
1.2. Direct application of institutional principles to 
constitution; 
1.3. Direct application to legislation.47 
 
2. Indirect application of institutional principles to non-basic structure 
(by applying to its public rules). 
 
3. Application of institutional principles to the evaluation of the 
outcome of steps 1 to 2. 
 
Step 1 describes the direct application of the institutional principles to the 
basic structure. This consists of 3 stages, where each stage leads to and helps 
to determine the next. In the first stage (1.1) the institutional principles 
determine the political form and economic system most compatible with the 
institutional principles. The second stage (1.2), determining the constitution, 
follows from the first stage as the first stage will establish the need for a 
constitution and the need to enshrine elements of the political form and 
economic system in the constitution. The constitution is determined both (1) 
directly through an application of the institutional principles and (2) through 
constraints determined by the choice of political form and economic system in 
                                                 
47 Note, the institutional principles seemingly only apply directly to these institutions where 
they are relevant to the distribution of primary social goods, thus even elements of these 
institutions which do not directly influence this distribution are included as part of non-basic 
structure, not the basic structure. 
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the first stage. Laws and policies which affect distribution are determined in 
the third stage (1.3) by the institutional principles and the constitution.  
 
In the second step, the institutional principles apply indirectly to subjects 
outside of the basic structure. This step is not an independent step but leads 
from and is determined by the first step. It is not so much that the institutional 
principles are actually applied to subjects besides the basic structure. Rather, 
by applying the institutional principles to the basic structure a fair context 
(background justice) is set up which constrains individual behaviour and the 
internal functioning of institutions. Thus individual behaviour according to 
this step does not need to live up to the institutional principles, however, the 
institutional principles through the constitution and through legislation 
determine public rules which limit what individuals and associations are able 
to do. 
 
In the last step, step 3, the institutional principles are used to evaluate the 
fairness of the outcomes of steps 1 and 2. Although we are likely to achieve 
fair outcomes by following the procedure of step 1 (which would necessarily 
imply step 2), we would need to monitor whether the application of the 
institutional principles to the basic structure (and thus indirectly to the non-
basic structure) does result in outcomes that are genuinely fair. If these 
outcomes were found to be unjust, they would need to be modified so that 
they would genuinely live up to the ideal demanded by the institutional 
principles.  
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5.2. The basic structure 
 
The basic structure seems to consist of the institutions of political form, the 
economic system, the constitution and legislation. These institutions are fair if 
the ways in which they assign rights and distribute social goods are regulated 
by the institutional principles. Other institutions, specific policies and laws, 
associations and behaviours such as the family, firms and universities are only 
included in or affected by the  basic structure in so much as the public rules 
applicable to them are determined and regulated by the application of the 
institutional principles to the institutions of the basic structure. The 
institutional principles thus only apply to the public rules of these institutions.   
 
As Rawls is purposefully vague in his description of the basic structure and as 
there are inconsistencies with what is and what is not included as part of the 
basic structure, I would not claim that this description of the basic structure is 
definitive. Thus I would agree that there are other convincing ways of 
describing the basic structure.48 However, this description of the basic 
structure is feasible as it seems to follow logically from our analysis of 
background justice, the 4-stage sequence and the problem of the family.  
 
Admittedly even this description remains rather vague, however. I do not 
think that it is clear, for example, precisely what the public rules of an 
institution are, or how other institutions I have mentioned as implicitly part of 
the basic structure, such as the judiciary fit into the 3-step process. Most 
                                                 
48 Examine Cohens description (1997: 18, fn.36 and 2000: 136-140) of the ambiguity of the 
basic structure defined coercively or noncoercively, or Pogges claims (1989: 22-25) that the 
basic structure can be understood widely or narrowly. 
 51 
important for the purposes of this thesis, however, is not establishing an exact 
definition of the basic structure but a better understanding of whether personal 
choice is included as part of the basic structure. As we have seen, personal 
choice does not seem to be determined or evaluated by the institutional 
principles either directly or indirectly. It is not evaluated directly as it is not 
part of the basic structure. However, even when it comes to the indirect 
application of the institutional principles to individual behaviour, the 
principles apply to the public rules of an institution and thus seemingly not to 
personal choice. 
 
6. Why is the basic structure the primary subject of justice? 
The status of principles and subjects of justice 
 
Thus far I have avoided considering what it means when Rawls refers to the 
basic structure as the primary subject of justice except that it is clearly central 
to his conception of justice. At times, Rawls will refer to the basic structure as 
the first subject and to the institutional principles as the first principles of 
justice-as-fairness. What do primary and first mean here? Answering this 
question means determining the status of the basic structure as a subject of 
justice and the status of the institutional principles as principles of justice, and 
thus also the status of any other subjects and other principles of justice. If the 
institutional principles are primary or first it seems that there are other 
principles of justice. The same can be said about the basic structure and 
subjects of justice. What are these other, perhaps secondary, subjects and 
principles of justice? Perhaps the secondary subjects of justice are the indirect 
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subjects of the principles. Or perhaps individual behaviour and other non-
basic structure subjects are direct subjects of non-institutional principles of 
justice. These two alternatives form the basis of two interpretations of the 
status of the principles and subjects of justice. In this section I will identify 
and analyse these two views: (1) the exclusive view of the principles of 
justice49 and (2) the extensive view of the principles of justice. This analysis 
will provide us not only with a better understanding of the  basic structure and 
the institutional principles but it also provides a starting point for determining 
different solutions to how to accommodate personal choice in a Rawlsian 
conception of justice. 
 
6.1. The exclusive view: the institutional principles as the only principles 
of distributive justice 
 
According to the first interpretation, the exclusive view: 
 the institutional principles of justice are the only principles of justice-
as-fairness; 
 the basic structure is the only direct subject of the institutional 
principles of justice, making it the primary subject of justice-as-
fairness; 
 other subjects such as individuals are only indirect subjects of the 
institutional principles, meaning they are limited by the application of 
these principles to their direct subject, the basic structure; 
                                                 
49 There is no relationship between this view and the exclusive view of public reason which 
Rawls discusses in Political liberalism (1993: 247-8). 
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 the fair distribution of the primary social goods is captured exclusively 
by justice-as-fairness and thus distributive justice is established 
through the application of only the institutional principles of justice; 
 other principles of justice are not directly responsible for distributive 
justice and are not principles of justice-as-fairness but are principles of  
something else, such as rightness-as-fairness.    
 
According to the exclusive view the institutional principles are the only 
principles of broad distributive justice. This view claims that when Rawls 
calls the basic structure the primary subject of justice, he means that it is the 
primary subject of distributive justice. It is primary because it is the only 
direct subject of the institutional principles. Individuals, associations and any 
other subjects are secondary subjects of justice, meaning that they are only 
subjects indirectly as they are constrained by principles of justice only through 
their application to the basic structure.  
 
What do I mean when I claim that the exclusive view recognises only the 
institutional principles as principles of distributive justice? How then do other 
principles and subjects seemingly recognised by Rawls fit into his conception 
of justice? After all, for example, although Rawls may not always be clear 
about how principles for individuals do fit into his conception of justice, he 
does claim that such principles are an essential part of any theory of 
justice.50  
 
                                                 
50 Rawls (1999: 93). 
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To explain these principles, the exclusive view relies on a distinction drawn 
between the principles and subjects of distributive justice and those of some 
broader conception of justice or of morality such as the distinction Rawls 
draws between what he calls justice-as-fairness and rightness-as-fairness.51 
Justice-as-fairness is a theory of a restricted conception of justice; rightness-
as-fairness is a theory of a general conception of justice or of morality more 
broadly. Rawls contrasts the restricted nature of justice-as-fairness to the 
broader moral theory, claiming that his aim is to focus almost primarily on the 
narrow conception: 
 
Justice as fairness is not a complete contract theory. For it is clear that 
the contractarian idea can be extended to the choice of more or less an 
entire ethical system, that is, to a system including principles for all 
the virtues and not only for justice. Now for the most part I shall 
consider only principles of justice and others closely related to them; I 
make no attempt to discuss the virtues in a systematic way. Obviously 
if justice as fairness succeeds reasonably well, a next step would be to 
study the more general view suggested by the name rightness as 
fairness.52 
 
The institutional principles, the exclusive view could argue, are the only 
principles of justice-as-fairness and the basic structure is the primary subject 
of justice-as-fairness. Other principles, such as principles for individuals, and 
other subjects belong to rightness-as-fairness.  
 
                                                 
51 See Rawls (1999: 95-6) for his discussion of rightness-as-fairness. 
52 Rawls (1999: 15). 
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What difference does this distinction make? The central issue is that the 
exclusive view considers distributive justice to be captured solely by justice-
as-fairness. When it comes to the central question with which Rawls is 
concerned, how to arrange society in order to achieve a fair distribution of 
social goods, the answer according to the exclusive view comes from justice-
as-fairness, not rightness-as-fairness, or at least not directly. Distributive 
justice fundamentally becomes a function of the 3-step application of the 
institutional principles (1) directly to the basic structure, (2) indirectly to 
everything besides the basic structure such as individuals and associations and 
(3) as an evaluation of the outcome of steps 1 and 2. The institutional 
principles thus are the only principles of distributive justice and the basic 
structure, as their primary subject, is their direct subject.  
 
Any other principles of justice, such as ones which apply directly to 
individuals and associations are not principles of distributive justice, as 
individuals and associations according to this view only affect distribution 
through their compliance with just institutions. The principles and direct 
subjects of rightness-as-fairness thus appear to have no direct relationship to 
distributive justice and are thus not responsible for determining how social 
goods such as the social basis of self-respect or opportunities are distributed.53 
Rather such principles aim to describe such things as political obligation, for 
                                                 
53 I admit that it is not clear what it is supposed to mean that rightness-as-fairness is not 
directly responsible for distribution and what its precise relationship is to distribution. 
However, it is not my aim to present a comprehensive version of the exclusive view but rather 
to highlight what I believe are its primary claims. Furthermore, I believe it is likely that we 
would struggle to capture the exclusive view precisely, at least on the basis of Rawlss texts, 
because it is not the only possible interpretation of Rawls. It is thus Rawlss ambiguity that 
may lead to some confusion over the exact nature of this view (something similar can be said 
about the alternative interpretation, the extensive view). What is important, rather than the 
exact nature of this view, is that something like this view can be identified in Rawls and, as I 
will argue, is in fact implicit in many analyses of Rawls. 
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example, without which one could argue there could not be a fair distribution 
of goods but which does not directly determine that distribution.  
 
For my purposes, it is not really necessary for anyone to actually accept the 
exclusive view: my main purpose in discussing the exclusive view, and in 
comparing it to the extensive view, which I will discuss in the next section, is 
to show there are at least two feasible, if ambiguous, ways to interpret the 
different principles and subjects of justice that Rawls identifies. At times, 
however, something like the exclusive view is explicitly stated: 
 
we must keep sharply distinct  our subject, how the ground rules of 
a social system ought to be assessed/designed, from the (secondary) 
subject of how actors (individuals, associations, the government) may 
and should act within an ongoing scheme whose terms are taken as 
fixed. The former of these subjects, justice, is concerned with the 
moral assessment and justification of social institutions; the latter, 
morality, with the assessment of conduct and character.54 
 
This explicit reference is quite rare. I believe, however, that a similar view is 
often implicit in analyses of Rawlss conception of justice by both his 
proponents and critics. I have three reasons for claiming that this view is 
implicit:  
1. When Rawlss conception of justice is discussed the focus is primarily on 
the institutional principles and their application to the basic structure as 
opposed to any other subjects or principles. 
                                                 
54 Pogge (1989: 17). 
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2. When principles besides the institutional are discussed, they tend to be 
discussed outside of the context of distribution. 
3. When individual behaviour is considered to influence distribution, it is 
discussed within the context of the application of the institutional principles to 
the basic structure. 
 
Firstly, when Rawlss conception of justice is discussed in terms of principles 
and subjects of justice the focus is usually on the institutional principles of 
justice as applied to the basic structure, whereas any other principles or 
subjects of justice Rawls has identified seem to be discussed much more 
sparingly. This is in of itself neither problematic nor particularly noteworthy: 
it is clear that Rawlss central concern is the application of the institutional 
principles to the basic structure so it seems only reasonable that this should be 
a central concern of discussions of his justice. The implication, however, 
seems to be that this is all there is to Rawlss conception of justice, at least as 
concerns principles and subjects of justice. Examine Samuel Freemans 
description: These principles apply in the first instance to decide the justice 
of the institutions that constitute the basic structure of society. Individuals and 
their actions are just insofar as they conform to the demands of just 
institutions.55 This seems a perfectly fitting description of the application of 
the institutional principles, however, it echoes the exclusive view because it 
seems to assume that justice is only a function of the institutional principles 
and that all that we can say about individual behaviour is that such behaviour 
needs to conform to fair institutions. 
                                                 
55 Freeman (2003: 3).  
 58 
 
The second reason why I claim that the exclusive view is implicit is that when 
principles besides the institutional are discussed, they are primarily discussed 
outside of the context of distribution. Other principles, such as principles for 
individuals, are not discussed according to any direct part they could play in 
determining the distribution of social goods. For example, the duty of justice, 
one of the principles of justice for individuals, is often discussed in relation to 
political obligation, i.e. why the individual has a duty to recognise the 
authority of the state.56 I do not know of an example of where this duty or any 
of the other principles for individuals are discussed in relation to distribution, 
even where distribution is regarded broadly to include such goods as 
opportunities and the social basis of self-respect. I am not claiming that there 
are no such examples, but if there are they seem to be exceptional. This 
implies that principles besides the institutional are recognised as having 
nothing or little to do with determining distribution, which is what the 
exclusive view claims.  
 
The last reason I have to defend the claim that the exclusive view is implicit is 
that when individual behaviour is considered as a potential subject of 
distributive justice as part of a Rawlsian framework of justice, it is discussed 
according to the application of the institutional principles to the basic 
structure. What I mean by this is that when questions such as does personal 
behaviour influence distribution? are asked, they seem automatically to be 
correlated to questions such as should the institutional principles apply to 
                                                 
56 See, for example, John Horton (1992: 102-108) on Rawls and the duty of uphold just 
institutions. 
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personal behaviour? or is personal behaviour part of the  basic structure? 
Philippe Van Parijs, Cohen and Murphy, for example, consider whether the 
institutional principles should be used to judge personal behaviour.57 They do 
not consider, however, whether other principles should be used to judge the 
influence of personal behaviour on distribution. The implication seems to be 
that if distribution is affected by personal behaviour, and if we then believe 
that this means that this behaviour should be evaluated by principles of 
justice, then we should necessarily be using the institutional principles to 
evaluate it. This ties in with the exclusive view which recognises only the 
institutional principles as principles of distributive justice and associates any 
alternative Rawlsian principles with something like the broader ethical theory, 
rightness-as-fairness.  
 
These three reasons provide evidence for my claim that the exclusive view 
often underlies analyses of Rawls. The upshot is often more than merely a 
neglect of the role of any non-institutional principles or non-basic structure 
subjects of justice: Rawlss conception of justice is often simply assumed to 
be incompatible with including anything beyond the institutional. Rawlss 
institutionalism is taken not only to mean that institutions play a central role in 
his conception of justice but that they play the only role. Institutionalism is 
thus taken to be necessarily antithetical to including any other types of 
subjects and principles for justice.  
 
                                                 
57 Van Parijs (1999), Cohen (2000) and Murphy (1999).  
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The distinction that Rawls draws between the public and private when he 
emphasises that it is to public rules that the institutional principles apply, is 
taken to mean that the private is necessarily divorced from social justice. Take 
Thomas Nagel as an example: 
 
The special demands of equal respect for the interests of all that justice 
imposes apply to the sphere of collectively sustained institutions, not 
to personal life. So liberalism involves a division of the moral territory 
and leaves individuals free to instantiate a great plurality of forms of 
life58 
 
What seems to add weight to this view is the distinction that Rawls draws 
between a political conception of justice on one hand, and general and 
comprehensive conceptions of justice, on the other.59 Rawls claims that 
justice-as-fairness is a political conception of justice, which means it is 
justified according to reasons which would be acceptable to everyone, no 
matter what their conception of the good or their personal religious and moral 
commitments. A comprehensive conception, however, is justified by a 
comprehensive moral or philosophical doctrine, such as liberal autonomy, for 
example. Political conceptions are not contrasted to comprehensive 
conceptions alone. A political conception of justice is also defined according 
to its limited range: it has a specific subject, the basic structure, to which its 
principles apply. A conception of justice which does not specify the basic 
structure as its subject, and which has a more extensive range of subjects than 
the political conception, Rawls refers to as a general conception of justice. 
                                                 
58 Nagel (2003: 82). 
59 See, for example, Rawls (1993: 131-172; 2001e: 479-484). 
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This means that the distinction between the principles and subject of justice-
as-fairness and the principles and subjects of rightness-as-fairness could be 
justified as a distinction between a political conception of justice and a 
comprehensive or general conception, respectively.60  
 
Despite the popularity of the exclusive view, and certainly much evidence 
within Rawlss texts for this view, it is not the only way to understand the 
status of principles and subjects of justice. The alternative is what I refer to as 
the extensive view. 
 
6.2. The extensive view: institutional and non-institutional measures for 
distributive justice  
 
According to an alternative view, the extensive view: 
 the institutional principles are not necessarily the only principles of 
distributive justice; 
 thus principles besides the institutional could be used to evaluate or 
determine distribution; 
 thus the basic structure need not be the only direct subject of 
distributive justice. 
 
The difference between the extensive view and the exclusive view centres on 
the status of institutional and non-institutional principles, with implications 
                                                 
60 In chapter V, I consider the difference between political conceptions and general 
conceptions of justice, and the relevance of this distinction for the personal choice argument 
in greater detail. 
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for the subjects to which they apply, when it comes to distributive justice. 
Whereas the distinguishing feature of the exclusive view is that the 
institutional principles are the only principles of distribution, the extensive 
view recognises that principles other than the institutional could have a direct 
influence on broad distribution. So, for example, according to the exclusive 
view, personal choice within the family such as the division of household 
labour is not evaluated by any principles of distributive justice, but if it could 
be evaluated according to justice, it would be evaluated by the institutional 
principles. According to the extensive view it could be evaluated directly by 
principles other than the institutional principles.  
 
Although the extensive view can agree with the exclusive views claim that 
the basic structure is the only direct subject of the institutional principles of 
justice, it claims that the basic structure should be seen as only one subject of 
justice and the institutional principles of justice are only one set of principles 
for achieving distributive justice. The institutional principles apply only 
indirectly to individuals but there are other principles or measures for justice 
which could apply to individuals. This means that principles for individuals, 
for example, could be used to judge the influence of personal behaviour on 
distribution.  
 
The extensive view is a feasible interpretation of Rawlss justice because (1) 
although Rawls distinguishes subjects other than the  basic structure from the 
institutional principles, this means that we should not directly apply the 
institutional principles to other subjects, not that we should not apply any 
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principles of distributive justice to individuals. (2) We also noted that the 
reasons why the basic structure is so central to justice-as-fairness, background 
justice and the profound and pervasive effects of the basic structure, do not 
rule out measures beyond the institutional principles. The reasons why the 
basic structure needs especially to be regulated merely demonstrate that other 
measures are not sufficient for justice and that institutional measures are 
necessary for justice: thus they do not demonstrate that other measures are 
unnecessary or that the institutional principles are sufficient. Thus we could 
say that according to the extensive view, justice-as-fairness is compatible with 
establishing distributive justice (1) through the institutional principles applied 
to the basic structure and through the indirect application of these principles to 
other subjects, and (2) through further non-institutional principles.61  
 
Additional evidence for this view can be found in Rawlss discussion of how 
justice-as-fairness differs from utilitarianism.62 Rawls claims that 
utilitarianism would be problematic even if it recognised a distinction between 
different subjects of justice. This is because it applies the same principle of 
justice universally: even if it recognised the need to distinguish between 
institutions and individuals, it applies the principles of utility to both. The 
problem with utilitarianism then seems to be not that it applies principles of 
justice to more than merely the basic structure but that it does not give the 
                                                 
61 When I say that other principles could be compatible with justice-as-fairness, I am not 
saying that such principles, whatever they may be, will necessarily be compatible with 
justice-as-fairness. Of course, the content of such principles would have to be examined to 
determine if they truly are compatible. Furthermore, one could argue that identifying any 
other fundamental principles of justice would necessarily be incompatible with Rawlss 
justice because of their potential to conflict with the institutional principles. I will address this 
objection in chapter V. For the moment, let us say that the extensive view is prima facie 
compatible with justice-as-fairness, but it still needs to demonstrated that it is indeed so. 
62 Rawls (1993: 259-262). 
 64 
basic structure a unique role with its own specific principles of justice. The 
institutional principles of justice-as-fairness, unlike the principle of utility, are 
special first principles  required for the basic structure.63 Thus they are 
not the only principles of justice, although they could be the only principles 
applied to the basic structure as the the first subject of justice.64  
 
I claimed that for the exclusive view, what Rawls means when he refers to the 
basic structure as the primary or first subject of justice is that it is the only 
direct subject of the only principles of distributive justice, the institutional 
principles. For the extensive view, this cannot be the same interpretation: 
there could be subjects of justice besides the basic structure and there can be 
principles of justice besides the institutional principles. Primary, according 
to the extensive view, would rather mean something like a starting point, 
hence Rawls uses first interchangeably with primary. Rawls thus chooses 
to begin developing a theory of distributive justice with the application of the 
institutional principles to the basic structure, clearly because institutional 
structure has such an important influence on how fair a society can be, but this 
is not necessarily where such a conception of distributive justice ends as well: 
starting with the basic structure and then developing other principles 
sequentially, gives justice as fairness a distinctive character.65 Why start here 
though? It is not an arbitrary choice. Rawls begins with the basic structure 
because, as he explains when he discusses why the basic structure is the 
                                                 
63 Rawls (1993: 262; my emphasis). 
64 Rawls (1993: 257).  
65 Rawls (1993: 259-260; my emphasis). Note also: There is no attempt to formulate first 
principles that apply equally to all subjects. Rather, on this view, a theory must develop 
principles for the relevant subjects step by step in some appropriate sequence (Rawls 1993: 
258). 
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primary subject of justice, (1) justice requires background justice, and (2) 
injustices in the basic structure have such profound and pervasive effects on 
individuals lives.  
 
The extensive view is not necessarily at odds with Rawlss institutionalism: it 
does not deny the necessity of fair institutions. It does not, however, limit 
justice to institutions (understood to exclude personal choice and associations) 
and more particularly it does not exclude the possibility of demands of 
distributive justice on individuals (besides the indirect application of the 
institutional principles).    
 
I have identified two interpretations of Rawls: the exclusive view which limits 
distributive justice to the application of the institutional principles, and the 
extensive view which does not limit distributive justice in this way and thus 
recognises that distributive justice could include more than merely this 
application. Which interpretation then is correct? I believe it is possible to 
read Rawls according to either view. However, because either view is 
possible, both are somewhat vague and contain inconsistencies. I think it is 
difficult for the exclusive view, for example, to explain precisely what the 
distinction is between rightness-as-fairness and justice-as-fairness and how 
these two theories interact. On the other hand, Rawls makes comments, such 
as this one, which seem to contradict the extensive views claim that subjects 
other than the basic structure could be appropriate for social and distributive 
justice: 
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Many different kinds of things are said to be just and unjust: not only 
laws, institutions, and social systems, but also particular actions of 
many kinds, including decisions, judgments, and imputations. We also 
call the attitudes and dispositions of persons and persons themselves, 
just and unjust. Our topic, however, is that of social justice66   
 
Although either interpretation is possible, albeit with inconsistencies, which 
view is adopted has important implications for the personal choice argument, 
as I will explain in the conclusion, and, besides helping to clarify the basic 
structure further by providing an understanding of what is meant by primary 
subject, it is because of these implications that I have chosen to identify these 
interpretations.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In the introduction I stated that there were two primary questions that this 
chapter aimed to answer: 
(1) What is the basic structure and how do the institutional principles apply?  
(2) What is the status of the basic structure as a subject of justice and the 
status of the institutional principles of justice as principles of justice?  
 
In answer to (1) we have established that the basic structure seems to include 
only political form, the economic system, the constitution and legislation 
where these have distributive implications, and thus it only includes the public 
rules governing individual behaviour and non-basic structure institutions and 
                                                 
66 Rawls (1999: 6; my emphasis). 
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associations, such as the family. The institutional principles, according to this 
analysis, apply (i) directly to the basic structure, (ii) indirectly to other 
subjects of justice (through the application to the basic structure), and (iii) to 
the evaluation of the outcomes of steps (i) and (ii). 
 
In answer to (2), I identified two possible interpretations of the status of 
principles and subjects of justice. The exclusive view claims that the 
institutional principles are the only principles of distributive justice, while the 
extensive view recognises that there could be principles of distributive justice 
other than the institutional.  
 
The purpose of investigating what Rawls has to say about the basic structure 
and the institutional principles is to help us to assess the personal choice 
argument. The implications of this analysis for the personal choice argument 
are:   
 
1. Rawls explicitly claims that the institutional principles do not apply to 
individual behaviour and thus to personal choice.  
 
2. The basic structure seems to exclude personal choice. This is consistent 
with claim 1 above as the institutional principles are only supposed to apply 
directly to the basic structure and thus if Rawls maintains that they do not 
apply to individual behaviour then this implies that personal choice cannot be 
part of the basic structure. Furthermore, from our analysis of the 4-stage 
sequence and the problem of the family we found that the institutional 
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principles only apply to individual behaviour indirectly by setting limitations 
through the basic structure. Personal choice, however, does not seem to be 
affected by even this indirect application because personal choice is by 
definition choice that is left open by the law and yet the institutional principles 
apply only to the public rules of individual behaviour through such institutions 
as legislation and the constitution.  
 
3. Rawls acknowledges and briefly discusses other principles, such as 
principles for individuals and the principles of local justice, which could apply 
directly to personal choice. 
 
4. The two interpretations of the status of principles and subjects of justice, 
the exclusive and the extensive views, provide different frameworks for 
understanding the role of principles which could be applied to personal 
choice. According to the exclusive view, the only distributive principles of 
justice are the institutional principles. Thus if the reason why we would want 
to include personal choice as part of a conception of social justice is because it 
affects distribution, it seems that we would have to apply the institutional 
principles to personal choice. According to the extensive view, in contrast, 
other principles of distribution could be applied to personal choice. 
 
In the introduction I claimed that the aim of answering these two questions is 
(1) to determine whether it is legitimate to claim that Rawls does not 
accommodate personal choice within his conception of justice and, if this is a 
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legitimate claim, (2) to establish the best way to accommodate personal 
choice in a Rawlsian framework. 
 
In addressing (1), it seems thus that according to Rawls personal choice is not 
part of the basic structure and the institutional principles do not apply to it 
directly or indirectly. I do not think that we can come to a conclusive answer 
yet, however, as to whether Rawls does or does not accommodate personal 
choice. In chapter III I will examine in more detail whether the justice of 
personal choice might still be addressed when the institutional principles are 
applied to the basic structure.  
 
In addressing (2), the two interpretations of the status of the principles and 
subjects of justice provide us with a starting point for establishing two 
possible alternatives to accommodating personal choice in Rawlss justice. If 
we adopt the exclusive view, as this excludes any principles other than the 
institutional as distributive, we would have to include personal choice as part 
of the basic structure. According to the extensive view it is possible to apply 
principles other than the institutional to personal choice. In chapters IV and V, 
I will assess these alternatives and argue that adopting the extensive view is 
best.  
 
Whichever view we adopt, however, we have not demonstrated why personal 
choice should be included in a conception of justice. According to the 
personal choice argument, justice requires fair personal choice because 
personal choice influences distribution. I agree that personal choice has direct 
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distributive implications and thus as Cohen points out, if we care about 
distribution, we should care about personal choice.67 Although I agree with 
Cohens overall justification, I will, however, take a somewhat different route 
in establishing the need to include personal choice in a conception of justice. 
The pressing reason why personal choice should be included as part of a 
conception of justice is that informal social equality cannot be achieved 
without fair personal choice. Social equality is, I will argue, a necessary 
component of justice but it is not equivalent to justice and cannot be reduced 
to it. In the next chapter, by constructing a detailed conception of social 
equality, I will provide a justification for why we need more than merely the 
application of the institutional principles to achieve justice and why the 
personal choice argument is right in its claim that we need to include fair 
personal choice as a requirement for justice.   
 
 
 
                                                 
67 Cohen (2000: 140). 
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II. Social equality 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
Equality, as it is more commonly understood, is not, in the first 
instance, a distributive ideal, and its aim is not to compensate for 
misfortune. It is, instead, a moral ideal governing the relations in 
which people stand to one another. Instead of focusing attention on the 
differing contingencies of each persons traits, abilities, and other 
circumstances, this ideal abstracts from the undeniable differences 
among people. It claims that human relations must be conducted on 
the basis of an assumption that everyones life is equally important, 
and that all members of society have equal standing.1 
 
Liberal theories of justice have frequently been criticised for focusing almost 
exclusively on justice defined in terms of the law, rights and the public 
domain. Karl Marx, for example, claimed that liberalisms attempts to ensure 
political emancipation through legal rights fails to achieve true emancipation, 
what he referred to as human emancipation, because it ignores inequalities in 
social and economic position which determine or interfere with legal and 
political status.2 Also, many feminists have criticised liberals for drawing a 
distinction between the public and the private which ignores the need for 
justice even in personal relations.3 This chapter follows a similar thread: I 
argue that private, or what I will refer to as informal social inequalities, 
which are often neglected, should be addressed by theories of social and 
                                                 
1 Samuel Scheffler (2003: 21-2). 
2 See Marx (2000: 46-64). 
3 For a description of feminist views on the public/private distinction, see Anita Allen (2000: 
456-465). 
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distributive justice. My aim in this chapter is to identify and describe a notion 
of social equality which, I will argue, has value independent of formal 
equality and of the fair distribution of material goods but which nevertheless 
should be a requirement not only of a society of equals but of distributive 
justice. In this sense my claims tie in with similar notions put forward by 
proponents of the personal choice argument: both Cohen, for example, and I 
claim that fair personal choice is a requirement of distributive justice, 
however, my slant differs from Cohens because I focus on the more general 
notion of equality, social equality, which I believe helps to explain why 
justice in personal choice is a significant concern.  
 
I aim to answer two primary questions: 
1. What is social equality? 
2. How is social equality distinguishable from two aspects of distributive 
justice, formal equality and the fair distribution of material goods? 
 
Within the greater context of this thesis, this chapter serves to identify a 
notion of equality which, I will argue, should be but is not addressed by 
Rawlss justice. The demands of social equality which I identify, respect-for-
persons, civility and toleration of difference, provide the basis for what we 
would need to add to Rawlss conception of justice in order to address this 
neglect. 
 
There are 5 sections to this chapter. In the first section I describe social 
equality. I claim that social equality includes the values of respect-for-
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persons, civility, and toleration of difference. As the fundamental value, I 
concentrate on describing respect-for-persons, which entails two negative 
components: (1) an opposition to arbitrary hierarchies of value and (2) an 
opposition to dehumanisation.  In the second section I explore the distinctions 
between social equality and two other aspects of justice: the fair distribution 
of material goods (what I will refer to for short as narrow distribution) and 
formal equality. I will argue that narrow distribution and formal equality 
neither fully constitute social equality nor can be relied on to fully cause it. In 
the third section I claim that what is missing from our descriptions of fair 
societies is the notion of an egalitarian ethos which motivates behaviour to 
comply with the demands of social equality. In the last two sections I reiterate 
why social equality is significant and address objections that social equality 
should not be a requirement of distributive justice.  
 
1. What is social equality? 
 
Determining social equality means determining what society would be like if 
people were genuinely treated as equals. A way of answering this question 
and the way in which I will answer it is by focusing on what attitudes people 
would have towards each other if they considered each other to be equals, in 
other words I identify which values would underlie behaviour or policy for 
people to be treated as equals. I will identify three values that I consider are 
minimum requirements for social equality (1) respect-for-persons, (2) civility 
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and (3) toleration of difference.4 The most fundamental value of these is 
respect-for-persons, a type of respect which demands that all people should be 
respected simply because they are people. It would be difficult to find an 
egalitarian who would shake her head in disapproval at the claim that people 
should be treated with respect, but, of course, however intuitively appealing 
this claim is, it provides us with little. What does it mean that people must be 
respected according to social equality? I am going to explain respect-for-
persons as two minimum requirements of (negative) treatment. Respect-for-
persons means (i) not treating people according to arbitrary hierarchies of 
value and (ii) not dehumanising. 
 
1.1. Respect-for persons 
 
In seeking the construction of a community of equals, [social] equality 
integrates principles of distribution with the expressive demands of 
equal respect.5 
 
In his article Equality and Justice, David Miller drew particular attention to 
the notion of social equality, arguing that it is an important yet seldom 
                                                 
4 I am only providing a description of the minimum requirements for social equality because 
my aim is not to provide an account of a society of equals generally but to demonstrate the 
importance of the overlap between social equality and justice in personal choice. A fuller 
description of social equality would (1) provide a more detailed description and possibly 
include even more extensive requirements for the aspects of social equality I have identified. 
For example, my description of toleration is very brief and it is also negative, i.e. I refer to 
toleration as something that requires a lack of interference. It could be argued that the notion 
of toleration required by a society of equals would be positive, i.e. a requirement to encourage 
diversity or allow it to flourish (see Susan Mendus [1989: 15-6], for example, for a 
description of positive and negative toleration). Furthermore, (2) such a fuller description may 
include other requirements, such as a notion of affiliation or solidarity, something like a 
special commitment we share with others, to one another and to a common life (I have 
borrowed this description of such a special commitment from Michael Walzer (1983: 62). See 
also, for example Nussbaums description (2000: 79; affiliation part A) of the capability of 
affiliation.  
5 Anderson (1999: 289). Anderson refers to it as democratic equality. 
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acknowledged form of equality which can be distinguished from distributive 
equality and the demands of distributive justice.6 Since then, Elizabeth 
Anderson and Samuel Scheffler have used social equality to criticise luck-
egalitarianism: they claim that luck-egalitarians do not have the right 
understanding of equality. Equality is not, they argue, primarily to do with 
luck, or even with distribution but rather to do with relationships between 
people.7 I am going to use some of the ideas put forward by Miller, Anderson 
and Scheffler as a starting point for describing the most important value 
underlying social equality, respect-for-persons.  
 
1.1.1. Respect-for-persons: an opposition to hierarchies of value 
 
A common thread among their ideas is that social equality is opposed to what 
Scheffler refers to as hierarchies of social status.8 Miller describes a society 
of equals as one that is not marked by status divisions such that one can place 
different people in hierarchically ranked categories, in different classes for 
instance.9 Anderson describes inegalitarianism as a commitment to basing a 
social order on a hierarchy of human beings ranked according to intrinsic 
worth.10 An opposition to ranking people according to hierarchies of social 
status appears to be a central tenet of social equality. But what exactly does it 
mean to be opposed to hierarchies of social status? Why are we opposed to 
them, or to put it another way, what harm do they do? Furthermore, are we 
                                                 
6 Miller (1998: 21- 36). 
7 Anderson (1999: 287-337) and Scheffler (2003: 5-39). 
8 Scheffler (2003: 22). 
9 Miller (1998: 23). 
10 Anderson (1999: 312). 
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opposed to all hierarchies of status or only some of them? What would be the 
distinction? To begin, let us consider the question why.  
 
i. The harm of hierarchies of value 
Hierarchies of social status are hierarchies of value. People are ranked within 
these hierarchies according to how much value we attach to them. A first 
problem with these hierarchies is that they hold that some people are worth 
less than others; some are treated as inferior to others. The defining feature of 
inequality for Anderson, for example, is not a problem of the distribution of 
material goods but of social relationships in which people are unfairly 
regarded and treated as inferior.11  
 
Think of the traditional status of aristocrat and worker. The worker, born into 
the lower social class, according to this social hierarchy, is a lesser person 
than the aristocrat, and can (and should) thus be treated as, and is also 
expected to behave as, an inferior. The aristocrat, born into the upper 
classes, possesses an elevated status as a natural entitlement and it is for her 
that the privileges of wealth, power and respect are reserved. It is to 
inequalities of status such as this and their associated privileged or degrading 
treatment that social equality is opposed: This is the lively hope named by 
the word equality: no more bowing and scraping, fawning and toadying; no 
more fearful trembling; no more high-and-mightiness; no more masters, no 
more slaves.12  
 
                                                 
11 Inequality referred not so much to distributions of goods as to relations between superior 
and inferior persons (Anderson 1999: 312).  
12 Walzer (1983: xiii). 
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Although it is possible to have (somewhat) personal hierarchies of value, the 
hierarchies I am referring to here are publicly acknowledged. When we ask 
who is doing the valuing, the answer is a social group or community or 
society, not an individual or isolated groups of individuals. The answer is the 
same when it comes to who is being valued. Neutral observers would be able 
to recognise and agree on the hierarchies in place, although usually members 
even of the society concerned should be able to recognise these hierarchies. 
Extreme examples would be the caste system in India, the system of racial 
classification in apartheid South Africa and the hierarchy of slaves, metics 
(resident aliens) and citizens in Ancient Greece,13 although hierarchies of 
value need not be legally coded and coercively enforced; they are often part of 
the social structure of a society without necessarily being part of its legal 
structure.  
 
When someone is treated as a lesser person, the treatment consists of both (1) 
a mode of valuing and (2) a mode of expression which degrades or 
disadvantages. In our aristocrat/ worker case, (1) the worker is valued less 
than the aristocrat, meaning she is considered to be a lesser person, and (2) 
this valuation is expressed in expectations, behaviour or through policy; for 
example, our worker is expected to bow, scrape and fawn in the presence 
of her superiors. Generally, the way in which this treatment could be 
expressed is manifold. It could also include: 
                                                 
13 For an explanation and history of the caste system see Susan Bayly (1999). For a history of 
apartheid, see Eric Louw (2004) and Sampie Terreblanche (2003). Terreblanche claims that 
racial segregation in South Africa has developed into a strict class hierarchy. See Walzer 
(1983: 53-5) on how the resident aliens of Ancient Athens, the metics, were often treated with 
contempt and denied political and welfare rights. For a more general description of male 
citizenship, womens roles, residence and slavery in Ancient Greece see Oswyn Murray 
(1991: 244-265). 
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 lack of access to and opportunity for jobs, education and services (for 
example, not allowing women access to university education);  
 denial of civil rights and liberties (denying blacks the vote);   
 denial of equal income, and exploitation (paying impoverished 
workers, who are desperate for income, less than the minimum wage);  
 stigmatisation, marginalization or exclusion (not representing the 
views and interests of the aged in the media); 
 biased stereotyping (portraying welfare claimants as lazy);  
 discrimination (denying a Muslim a job interview because she is 
Muslim);  
 cultural imperialism (imposing dress codes in the workplace which 
prohibit minority religious dress);  
 humiliation, hate-speech or the use of derogatory language (using 
racially derogatory insults);  
 harassment or intimidation (sexual harassment); 
 physical or emotional abuse, assault or violence (anti-gay hate 
crimes).14 
 
                                                 
14 I found Nancy Frasers (1997: 22) description of the harms of cultural racism useful in 
compiling this list. Cultural racism, she claims is expressed in a range of harms: including 
demeaning stereotypical depictions in the media violence, harassment, and dissing in all 
spheres of everyday life; subjection to Eurocentric norms in relation to which people of color 
appear lesser or deviant and that work to disadvantage them; attitudinal discrimination; 
exclusion from and/or marginalization in public spheres and deliberative bodies; and denial of 
full legal rights and equal protections. Frasers (1997; 2003) conception of misrecognition 
shares important similarities with social equality, however, she aims to distinguish 
misrecognition from the distribution of economic goods, whereas my focus is on the 
relationship between broad distributive justice and social equality. 
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The problem, of course, with treating people as lesser is that it is harmful. 
Different expressions of this treatment constitute or can cause different harms. 
For example, violence, assault and physical abuse constitute actual physical 
harm. Exploitation, the denial of equal income and a lack of access to 
opportunities and services can lead to deprivation and poverty. Often the type 
of harm caused is dependent on context and how prevalent this treatment is. 
However, this type of treatment tends to lead to certain characteristic harms:  
 
(1) The first harm is that devaluing people is a violation of equal moral worth. 
What is often said to underlie both contemporary political theory and the 
reality of politics in contemporary liberal and social democracies is the ideal 
of equal moral worth. According to this ideal, all people have equal intrinsic 
moral worth and this means that they should be treated as equals and thus with 
equal respect and concern: no person matters more intrinsically than anyone 
else.  
 
Ronald Dworkin has suggested that despite the conflicting conceptions of 
justice and equality expressed by contemporary political theories, what they 
have in common is a commitment to this ideal.15 Although, as Will Kymlicka 
suggests, this ideal is so abstract that it can be seen to be reflected in a variety 
of, and often conflicting, notions of equality, from Nozicks libertarianism 
to Marxs communism, any political theory that explicitly denies the ideal 
of equal moral worth would be rejected out of hand.16 Thus even if one 
disagrees that all current political theories can correctly be described as being 
                                                 
15 Kymlicka (2002: 3). 
16 Kymlicka (2002: 4). 
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based on the ideal of equal worth, they are all expected to assume this ideal. 
[A]s a principle regulating how societies should treat their citizens, Anne 
Phillips claims, equal worth has achieved almost foundational status.17 
Violation of this ideal is considered to be intrinsically wrong: that treatment 
is morally wrong regardless of the gravity of its effects. It represents a failure 
to show the moral respect due the recipient, a failure which is by itself 
sufficient to be judged immoral.18  
 
(2) A second harm, and one that is also intrinsic, is that treating someone as 
lesser is often a violation of rights. This is clear when it comes to, for 
example, the denial of civil liberties, assault and violence, which are in of 
themselves violations of rights (the denial of civil liberties may not be a 
violation of a legal right, as there is no legal right to violate, but the denial of 
basic civil liberties, is a violation of the moral right to the full complement of 
basic human rights and freedoms owed to all people).  
 
Besides these direct violations of rights, one could also claim that treating 
people as lesser is in of itself the violation of a moral right; perhaps we can 
say that people have a right not to be treated as inferior. Or we could claim 
that treating someone as lesser is a violation of some other right, such as the 
right to dignity, which is often understood to reflect something similar to the 
                                                 
17 Phillips (1999: 2). 
18 Larry Alexander (1992: 159). In the extended quote, Alexander claims that people can be 
incorrectly judged as having lesser worth, implying that they could also be correctly described 
as having lesser worth. My description of human worth implies that intrinsic worth is a 
feature of any and all human beings and thus no-one can be categorised as having lesser 
worth. I recognise though that in cases of extreme moral abhorrence, my description may be 
deemed controversial. 
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ideal of equal intrinsic worth. One could call the right to dignity the legal 
expression of the moral ideal of equal worth as dignity is taken to mean 
worth: Dignity means Worth or Worthiness in some absolute, autonomized 
and objectivized, as it were featural sense.19 Moreover, rights generally can 
be understood as an expression of the notion of intrinsic worth; providing 
people with rights confirms their worth: Though people differ in their virtues 
and abilities, the idea of rights attaches an unconditional worth to the 
existence of each person, irrespective of her particular value to others.20  
 
(3) Treating as lesser is also harmful because it damages self-worth and thus 
can lead to a loss of or a lack of self-respect. Self-respect has to do with how 
much we value ourselves, what we believe to be our own worth.21 Self-respect 
is considered to be an essential component of the good life: John Rawls, for 
example, refers to the social basis of self-respect as one of the primary 
goods, goods that all people need in order to fulfil their conceptions of the 
good life, no matter how diverse those conceptions may be.22 Self-respect is 
not, however, something that develops in the individual in isolation: our self-
respect is dependent on how we are treated by social and political institutions; 
this is why Rawls refers to it as a social good.23 Rather than emphasising 
institutional relationships, Axel Honneth focuses on the impact of 
intersubjective relationships on self-respect.24 Institutions and other people 
seem to be the primary source for our recognition of our own worth. If 
                                                 
19 Aurel Kolnai (1995: 54).  
20 Jeremy Waldron (1993b: 582). 
21 See, for example, Stephen L. Darwall (1977), Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (1995) and Laurence 
Thomas (1995). 
22 Rawls (1999: 79).  
23 Rawls (1999: 477).  
24 Honneth (1992: 187-201). 
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institutions treat us as second-class citizens or we are demeaned and 
stereotyped by others, or both, for example, this devalued notion of worth 
could be reflected in a lack of self-respect. Similarly, but described more 
broadly than merely recognition of own worth, oppression and discrimination 
can be said to distort their targets identities:  
 
The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its 
absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or 
group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or 
society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or 
contemptible picture of themselves.25  
 
(4) A further but similar harm is that treating someone as lesser can interfere 
with her formation of her preferences or her conception of the good. When 
people are treated as inferior it is not merely the case that their self-respect 
could be undermined. How they form their life-plans, their expectations, their 
preferences and which opportunities they believe are open to them can be 
shaped by how others treat them. If they are treated in such a way as to expect 
little from their lives, it is not so much that their self-respect has been 
undermined, but rather that their conception of the good has been shaped by 
devaluation. For example, a black man in a society which systematically 
devalues blacks might have grown up believing that he would not be capable 
as a lawyer or a doctor or a politician because he is black.  
 
This, Andrew Kernohan argues, is one of the primary harms of what he refers 
to as cultural oppression: This is the harm of interfering with one of an 
                                                 
25 Taylor (1994: 25). 
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individuals most important interests: her interest in forming a conception of 
what is meaningful and valuable in her life.26 Kernohan claims that it is from 
our cultural environment that we learn what is meaningful and valuable. If our 
cultural environment is imbued with inegalitarian beliefs and attitudes which 
treat some as having less value than others, then those who are devalued could 
develop distorted conceptions of the good (this would probably also be true of 
those who are over-valued).  
 
(5) A further harm of treating people as inferior is that it interferes with their 
life-chances and opportunities. Often this harm results from a lack of self-
respect or through interference in the formation of a conception of the good, 
where a persons sense of worth or their aspirations are so undermined that 
they are unable to recognise the range of options in life-chances available to 
them. However, this harm can occur more directly. Take the case of a girl who 
grows up in a family where women are treated as inferior to men. Such a child 
may be denied the same access to education as her male siblings, and thus she 
will be denied the opportunity both for education and for developing the skills 
or learning the knowledge necessary for many jobs. In this case it is possible 
that her conception of the good is also distorted but what is important to note 
is it is not merely her conception of the options open to her which may be 
distorted: she is prevented from or hindered in taking up opportunities which 
should be open to her and which are open to others.  
 
                                                 
26 Kernohan (1998: viii). This is similar to the notion of adaptive preferences: people shape 
what they want based on what they can get. See Elster (1983), for example, for an explanation 
of adaptive preferences. 
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(6) Inequalities of status have been shown to lead to poor health and lower 
life-expectancy rates through stress and depression. Richard Wilkinson, for 
example, claims that inequalities of status and income, rather than merely 
poverty, are a leading cause of poor health.27 As evidence, Wilkinson points 
out that societies which are poorer overall but which have fewer inequalities 
are likely to have a higher average life expectancy, than countries which are 
richer but have greater inequalities: Greece and the United States respectively, 
for example. The stress and depression caused by the disrespect and lack of 
esteem associated with being on the lowest rungs of status hierarchies, he 
argues, lead to heart disease and premature birth.28  
 
(7) All the harms that have been discussed so far are harms to the individual, 
but a last harm of treating people as inferior is social. When some are treated 
as having special value and others are devalued, co-operation is impaired.29 
To some extent it is the deep divisions drawn between groups of people which 
impairs co-operation: instead of emphasising mutuality and a need to work to 
a common good, groups are pushed apart. It is not so much, however, the 
emphasis on difference itself that I believe impairs co-operation: it is that 
some are treated as if they are not the equals of others and are marginalised or 
excluded from full participation that diminishes co-operation. Additionally, 
the distrust and suspicion encouraged between social groups further impedes 
co-operation: tyranny and privilege, R. H. Tawney argued, create a spirit of 
domination and servility, which produces callousness in those who profit by 
                                                 
27 See Toynbees (2005) book review of Wilkinson. 
28 See also, for example, research by Cherkas et al (2006), which claims that low social 
status seems to speed up the ageing process. 
29 See, for example, Richard Norman (1987: 71-88) on co-operation as justification for 
equality. 
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them, and resentment in those who do not, and suspicion and contention in 
both.30  
 
The extent of the harms caused by these hierarchies is often proportional to 
how widespread the treatment is. Although individual examples of treating 
someone as inferior can be harmful, the greatest harm often occurs when 
groups of people suffer from pervasive structural injustices and they are 
systematically treated as inferior. The reason why social equality is such an 
important issue is because of the prevalence of hierarchies which have 
deemed, and still do deem, many social groups as lesser. Although new 
groups of those devalued could be identified and new groups could come to be 
devalued, there are certain social categories which are typically expressed in 
terms of hierarchies of worth: race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality, 
socio-economic status, class, ability and age. Which types within these 
categories, or whether these types, have been devalued and overvalued often 
depends on historical and cultural context. However, there are certain global 
trends: women, for example, have been treated as lesser people across cultural 
contexts although the degree and the manner to which they are treated as such 
differ.31 
 
So the problem with hierarchies of social status is that they devalue people. Of 
course, devaluing some means attaching special value to others: there is 
always a group/ individual who is privileged or treated as the superior of those 
                                                 
30 Tawney (1964: 90). 
31 See, for example, Janet Radcliffe Richards (1980) on discrimination against women. 
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who are inferior.32 Besides ranking women as having less worth than men, the 
pattern in what are now liberal and social democracies has been and/or is to 
favour whites over non-whites, Christians over non-Christians, heterosexuals 
over gays and lesbians, the able-bodied over the disabled, the young over the 
aged, the rich over the poor, and the aristocratic over the working classes.33  
 
A hierarchy which treated some as having less worth than others would 
necessarily treat others as having greater value, as in our original example of 
the aristocrat and worker, so it would seem that not only is devaluing a 
problem, treating someone as better is also wrong. Like treating someone as 
inferior, treating as superior, is also (1) a mode of valuing and (2) a mode of 
expression, but in this case it is a mode of valuing someone more and a mode 
of expression that reveres or privileges those valued as superior, or at least 
treats them better than those who are devalued. Like with devaluing, 
overvaluing could be expressed in different ways. It could take the form of: 
 
 snobbery or elitism (giving preference, in university selection 
procedures, to students from public schools); 
 treating those overvalued as if they are above norms, rules or the law 
(allowing the rich to buy their way out of punishment for legal 
violations); 
                                                 
32 Although I believe that it is likely that there will always be a privileged group this does not 
mean that there is always a group directly oppressing the disadvantaged.  
33 Nancy Fraser (1997) refers to these as cultural injustices, claiming that they take two 
primary forms: firstly, the systematic privileging of the characteristics of one social group and 
secondly, the systematic devaluation and disparagement of a corresponding social group. 
Taking race as an example, this would mean firstly, eurocentrism, the systematic privileging 
of whiteness, and secondly, cultural racism, the systematic devaluation and disparagement 
of things coded black, brown, and yellow (22). 
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 giving greater weight to members of certain groups interests and 
preferences (giving greater weight to the employment interests of the 
young over the aged) 
 
When I say that some are valued more and others less this does not 
necessarily imply that those valued more are treated very well or that those 
valued less are necessarily severely disadvantaged. The point, when I refer to 
hierarchies of social status, is the arbitrariness of the inequality not the 
absolute level of treatment. So, it is not that those devalued are necessarily 
treated badly or that those valued are treated well: they should be treated as 
equals. Women, for example, in levels of management in the corporate world 
might be paid less than their male counterparts, and we can view this as a 
violation of social equality. These particular women, however, are often not 
seriously economically disadvantaged as they tend to earn an above average 
income. This inequality is still wrong, however, for there seems to be no 
reason for such inequality except an arbitrary assignation of value based on 
gender: it is no excuse to say that they are being treated reasonably well. This 
is not to say that social equality is not concerned with the treatment itself, 
however, this is not the primary problem with hierarchies of social status, 
which are necessarily comparative. In the second part of this section, I will 
address how people are actually treated.   
 
The harm that valuing more does is clearly that it leads to someone else being 
treated as lesser. Does this mean, however, that treating-as-better is harmful 
only because it implies treating-as-lesser? Could those being treated as better 
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be harmed themselves? I do not think that the harm that results from 
hierarchies of worth only harms those deemed to have lower worth. A morally 
distorted social system which falsely deems some to have lesser worth and 
others greater, is likely to harm not only the disadvantaged but also those it 
privileges.34 Think of South Africa under apartheid. The harm that apartheid 
did to black people is evident. However, one could argue that whites were also 
harmed, albeit clearly not in the same way or to even nearly the same extent 
as blacks. The constant tension or the threat of conflict between races, the 
demonisation of blacks and the tenuousness of apartheids purported 
justifications for a racial hierarchy, I believe, fostered fear, suspicion, cruelty 
and aggression in many whites, which would influence not only their 
interactions with other races, but could permeate any of their relationships.35  
 
Moreover, superior treatment is likely to create pressure to meet unrealistic or 
elevated expectations, and this pressure or the failure to meet these 
expectations is often harmful. Think of traditional norms of masculinity which 
demand that men must remain strong and in control, and must provide for 
their families. The pressure men may feel to meet these expectations or the 
failure they experience if they do not meet them could be linked to emotional 
                                                 
34 Or potentially any third parties who are part of that society but who are neither over- nor 
under-valued. 
35 For a description of the harm of apartheid on all races, see Desmond Tutu (1999) on his 
experience as chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: This 
vicious system has had far more victims than anyone had ever thought possible, because it is 
no exaggeration to say that we have all in different ways been wounded by apartheid In one 
way or another, as a supporter, a perpetrator, a victim, or one who opposed the ghastly 
system, something happened to our humanity Those who were privileged lost as they 
became more uncaring, less compassionate, less humane and therefore less human. Those 
who opposed apartheid could also end up becoming like what they most abhorred (154-
5). 
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breakdowns, stress-related illnesses and even aggression and violence.36 It 
seems that being treated-as-better is not necessarily good for you (or those 
around you).  
 
Before I move on to the next part of this section, let me briefly mention why I 
have chosen to state this problem of social equality in terms of treating some 
as lesser and some as better, devaluing some, while valuing or overvaluing 
others. Often problems associated with social equality such as discrimination 
are described in terms of differential treatment: the claim is that what is wrong 
with discrimination, for example, is that it treats people differently in a 
morally arbitrary way. Mainly there is no substantial difference between these 
descriptions: when we devalue someone we are treating them differently to 
those we privilege, in a morally arbitrary way. However, I have chosen to 
refer to this aspect of social equality according to rankings of value rather than 
merely differential treatment for two reasons.  
 
The first is that differential treatment seems not to be descriptive enough: it 
does not get to the root of the problem. It is not merely that we are treating 
people differently but that in our differential treatment we are treating some 
worse than others. After all, we can treat people differently without treating 
them as if they have less value. Secondly, sometimes it is treating people as if 
they are all the same that is the problem, and it is a form of differential 
treatment that is needed. This is a problem associated particularly with one of 
the expressions of inferior treatment: cultural imperialism. Cultural 
                                                 
36 See, for example, Rosalind Miles (1991) on the relationship between violence and 
masculinity. 
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imperialism occurs when the conventions and experiences of one social or 
cultural group are accepted as the norm and other groups are expected to 
conform to this norm. Here the problem is that people are being treated as if 
they are the same but they are not. Take a country where holidays from work 
and school are based on Christian holidays. If, for example, Jews are not able 
to take time off for Jewish holidays, they could justifiably feel aggrieved 
because their interests have not been taken into account. Of course, we can 
describe this situation as one of differential treatment: the problem is that 
Jews are being treated differently in the sense that they are not accorded equal 
concern. Although this is something of a mere terminological difference, I 
believe though that inferior treatment or devaluation is a more accurate 
description: it is not merely that Jews are being treated differently, they are 
being treated worse which is the problem.37   
 
ii. Morally unacceptable value hierarchies 
So the problem with hierarchies of social status is that they value some less 
and some more. Does this mean, however, that social equality is opposed to 
any social hierarchies? Could hierarchies of value be justifiable in certain 
circumstances? It seems that a blanket ban on these hierarchies would not 
make sense. In life, we do value certain people more and certain less in ways 
which do not seem morally objectionable. Take technical skill as an example. 
                                                 
37 Moreover, the use of arbitrary can be misleading because it implies that discrimination is 
random, whereas it is systemic and systematic. Consider Arnesons (2002) claims about the 
difference in harm between random discrimination and discrimination based on social group 
membership: Although whimsical hiring violates formal equality of opportunity just as much 
as discrimination against some applicants done because the applicant is a member of a 
socially disfavored group, the latter is evidently a more serious violation of formal equality of 
opportunity. Whereas being the object of discrimination because one is a group that has been 
targeted for oppressive treatment in the past is likely to be a wound to ones sense of dignity 
and self-respect, being the victim of whimsical or idiosyncratic hiring practices is less likely 
to inflict a significant psychic wound over and above the loss of the job itself. 
 91 
It seems perfectly reasonable and fair for me to consult a doctor who I know 
to have superior medical skills to her rival.38 In fact at the risk of behaving 
irrationally if I do not (as long as I have no other reasons for using the inferior 
doctor such as that she is my friend), I should consult the doctor with superior 
skills. In this example we have a type of hierarchy of technical skill: I value 
the doctor with superior skills more than her rival and act on this valuation by 
giving the superior doctor my business. However, my valuation and the way 
in which I express this valuation is not a violation of social equality. In this 
example I am thus not treating the inferior doctor as inferior or at least not in 
the requisite way for it to be a violation of social equality. So it seems that 
there are reasons for valuing someone less and acting on that valuation which 
seem acceptable: in this case it seems acceptable due to skill.  
 
Even if my preference is morally justifiable, this does not mean that any way 
in which I treat the inferior doctor is justifiable. I can choose not to do 
business with her and I can choose to take my business to her competitor. But 
just because I have reason to believe that the inferior doctor is inferior skill-
wise does not justify any manner in which I treat her: I should not exploit her, 
or force her into another profession which I believe to be more suitable for 
her, or simply treat her as if all she is her inferior medical skill.39 It seems that 
her inferior skills do not justify certain forms of treatment.  
 
                                                 
38 Miller (1998: 32-3) uses the example of how we treat better or worse doctors in his 
discussion of social equality. He claims that better doctors should only be treated differently 
to worse doctors where it is relevant to that skill and not in any other sphere of interaction.  
39 I am assuming here she is a capable doctor, just not very good at it. Obviously if she was 
very bad at it, she could justifiably be struck off, perhaps condemned in the press, and so on. 
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So there seem to be two things to say here: (1) there are reasons for justifiably 
valuing someone less and I am justified in expressing that valuation by acting 
on those reasons and (2) even though I may be justified in valuing someone 
less than someone else, this does not justify treating that person in any way I 
choose. In relation to point (1) the answer to the question do all hierarchies of 
value violate social equality? is no. What we need to determine then is which 
hierarchies are acceptable and which are not, and more importantly why this is 
so. In relation to point (2) we need to determine why even acceptable 
hierarchies only justify certain treatment. Lets start with the first point and I 
will address the second point in the next part of this section.  
 
When it comes to the example we have looked at, a type of hierarchy which 
seems to be acceptable is a hierarchy which has to do with the ability to 
perform a task or fulfil a role such as the ability to be a good doctor. It is 
acceptable to talk about someone being a more skilful doctor than someone 
else. Similar examples would be the ability to sing well or to be a successful 
lawyer or to be a good gardener. When we examined what it means to treat 
someone as inferior, I highlighted certain hierarchies which are typical 
violations of social equality: judging someone to be better according to their 
gender, race, class, religion, whether or not they have a disability, and so on. 
What then is the difference between saying one doctor is better than another in 
comparison to saying that someone who is white is better than someone who 
is black? Why is it acceptable to favour one class of doctors over the other but 
unacceptable to favour one race over another? 
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To start, certain hierarchies necessarily violate social equality because they 
treat some people as having less worth as people than others. In the case of the 
doctors, we are not saying, or at least should not be saying, that the superior 
doctor is a better person than the inferior doctor; we are merely saying that 
she is a better doctor. Whereas if we said that a white person is better than a 
black person we are not comparing any sort of specific ability but rather we 
are comparing them as human beings and judging the white person to be a 
superior person and the black person to be inferior. These types of hierarchies 
cannot but violate social equality which accepts as a starting point that no 
human being is a better human being than the other, that no-one has more 
intrinsic worth than the other. Hierarchies of intrinsic worth are necessarily 
harmful.  
 
So can we leave our answer at that? Acceptable hierarchies do not violate 
intrinsic worth; unacceptable hierarchies do. No, we cannot. This distinction 
does not prove to be sufficient: few people or institutions justify their 
prejudices or discriminatory behaviour or unfair policies on a direct claim of 
lesser intrinsic worth or something similar:  
 
Few can be found who will explain their practice merely by saying, 
But theyre black: and it is my moral principle to treat black men 
differently from others. If any reasons are given at all, they will be 
reasons that seek to correlate the fact of blackness with certain other 
considerations which are at least candidates for relevance to the 
question of how such a man should be treated.40 
 
                                                 
40 Williams (1997: 467). 
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The problem is that those who would justify differential treatment claim that 
the acceptable and unacceptable hierarchies overlap. Our categories of gender, 
race, and so on, are said to overlap with the ability to perform a task or fulfil a 
role: the claim is that women make inferior scientists or that black people are 
less successful skilled workers. Furthermore, the criteria for determining what 
it takes to perform a task or fulfil a role properly or well are not morally 
neutral: think of what it takes to be a good mother or a good father. What 
makes one successful at these social roles is laden with values and norms 
associated with particular genders. Hierarchies of worth often underlie biases 
in decisions, behaviour or policy but they are not always referred to explicitly 
or directly (often they are not even consciously recognised), and they are often 
linked with our expectations of social roles or our criteria for ability. Few 
people justify their preferences for one person or one group over another by 
simply saying, theyre inferior therefore we should treat them differently. As 
John Baker explains, Instead they propound a similar but more sophisticated 
theory: that the pyramid of wealth and power is also a pyramid of intelligence, 
industry, skill and culture.41  
 
So where a violation of the ideal of intrinsic worth is not sufficient to counter 
justifications for devaluation, we need to establish further criteria for why 
certain preferences are acceptable and others are not.  Why is it that if I say 
that I dont want to consult an inferior doctor I am not violating social 
equality but if I said that I didnt want to be treated by a doctor because she is 
black, I am?  
                                                 
41 Baker (1987: 28). 
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We could start here by saying that in order not to violate social equality I need 
a reason for favouring the superior doctor and that reason is inferior medical 
skill.42 However, having a reason for favouring cant be the distinguishing 
factor as hes black is also a reason. So the next step would be to say we 
need a relevant reason for favouring one person over another. The criterion for 
whether we should favour one doctor over another is medical skill, or even a 
bedside manner, not race, so race is an irrelevant reason. This still proves 
insufficient however because what is relevant and what is irrelevant is often 
what is under debate: labelling a trait on which discrimination is based as 
irrelevant begs the question of what makes the trait irrelevant.43 I could 
claim that the reason why being black is a relevant reason for favouring one 
doctor over another is because I believe that black people are more likely to 
have lesser medical skills than whites. The problem is that often oppression 
and discrimination have been defended with so-called relevant reasons, often 
with the backing of seemingly scientific evidence, which purported to prove 
the inferiority or something similar of women, blacks, gays, and so on, and 
which thus supposedly justified hierarchies of status and worth.44 If we used 
                                                 
42 In the following section, the discussion owes much to Bernard Williams analysis of 
equality in The Idea of Equality (1997) and Larry Alexanders taxonomy of discriminatory 
preferences in What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? (1992). Williams claims that 
we need socially operative and relevant reasons to justify inequalities. Alexander claims that 
it is the disadvantaged status of a group which distinguishes unfair from fair discrimination. 
Neither one of them is dealing with precisely the same topic as I am. Williams is referring to 
equality generally, not to a specific form of equality, such as the social. Alexander, on the 
other hand, is talking about something more specific than social inequality, i.e. 
discrimination.  
43 Alexander (1992: 151). 
44 See, for example, Gunnar Myrdal (2000), who traces the development of the notion of 
blacks inferiority in the United States and Stephen Jay Gould (1997) who demonstrates how 
prejudice has frequently informed and driven science.  
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only this criterion, we would be likely to justify too much treatment which is 
actually morally objectionable.  
 
There is, however, a further guide we can use to help determine whether 
reasons provided are relevant or not, or to determine whether the criteria set 
for which reasons can be provided are themselves fair: whether the preference 
is made against someone of disadvantaged status. We can examine the 
historical and contemporary standing of the social groups to which those 
disfavoured and favoured by the preference belong. The implication here is 
that if the person disfavoured belongs to a disadvantaged group, and if the 
person favoured belongs to a traditionally privileged group, we might have 
reason to be suspicious of this disfavour. Using the disadvantaged status of 
social groups as an indicator of the fairness of preferential or differential 
treatment may seem, like the issue of relevance, to be begging the question 
because one could argue that it is precisely the status of these groups that is 
under debate. I do not think that this is true in this case, however. If we 
compare the status of the two social groups in question in our example, 
inferior doctors and black people, we can see a clear difference in the way in 
which these groups have been (and are) treated. Unlike black people, inferior 
doctors, as a group, have not been subject to slavery and colonisation; they 
have never been denied civil liberties; they have never been systematically 
stereotyped, disadvantaged and oppressed. Society should not be arranged so 
that what goods you get is primarily dependent on being black or on whether 
you make a better or worse doctor, or gardener, or card player, but the 
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difference is that society has been arranged in such a way that being black 
does make a pervasive difference.45  
 
The systematic disadvantage that groups have suffered or continue to suffer is 
an indication to us that disfavouring them is often part of that systematic 
disadvantage. Furthermore, although it is open to debate how disadvantage 
should be measured, this does not mean it cannot be measured: levels of 
education, income, political representation and legal rights, and so on, can be 
used as an empirical basis for establishing disadvantage.  
 
There are two ways in which disadvantaged status can provide us with a guide 
to whether an unacceptable hierarchy of value is in place, and thus whether 
social equality has been violated: 
 
(1) if a preference is justified by the characteristic of devaluation;  
(2) if a preference is justified by a biased system which rules out the 
disadvantaged. 
 
(1) Social equality has not been violated simply because someone from a 
valued group has been favoured over someone from a devalued group. 
Evidently I can choose a white doctor over a black doctor without violating 
social equality. Where it becomes likely that social equality has been violated 
                                                 
45 See, for example, Anderson (1999: 317) on justice and poor card players: Democratic 
equality thus aims for equality across a wide range of capabilities. But it does not support 
comprehensive equality in the space of capabilities. Being a poor card player does not make 
one oppressed. More precisely, the social order can and should be arranged so that ones skill 
at cards does not determine ones status in civil society. Nor is being a good card player 
necessary for functioning as a citizen. Society therefore has no obligation to provide free card 
lessons to citizens.  
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is when my reason for preferring the white doctor is because she is white or 
the reason why I disprefer the black doctor is because she is black, or both as, 
for example, I might believe that whites make better doctors than blacks. It is 
thus when I use the characteristic of devaluation or over-valuation as the 
reason for my preference that the preference is likely to violate social equality. 
It is when I disprefer, for example, blacks or women or Muslims, or 
whomever may be disadvantaged in a particular society, because they are 
black or because they are women or because they are Muslim that my 
preference is suspicious because it appears to have been made on the basis of 
a hierarchy of value which reflects a pervasive pattern of undesirable and 
inaccurate biases or stereotypes. 
 
(2) Often the problem is not so simple: it is not clear that anyone is being 
subjected to an unfair hierarchy of value, because the hierarchy is built into 
the reasons that are supposedly relevant to the preference, or the devaluation 
is built into institutions which hamper or make it impossible for people of 
certain groups to meet the conditions set. Disadvantaged status here is a guide 
to examining the fairness of the criteria set for achieving certain positions: 
 
(i) Often bias against certain disadvantaged groups is built into the reasons 
which supposedly justify preferences. Kymlicka uses the following example: 
fire-fighters are often chosen according to criteria such as height and weight 
which rule out most women.46 These criteria, however, are not actually 
relevant so much to being a fire-fighter as it is to the expectation that men will 
                                                 
46 Kymlicka (2002: 379-380). 
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be fire-fighters and thus the equipment fire-fighters use are made for men. So 
in this case it would seem that women cannot be fire-fighters for relevant 
reasons but those reasons reflect gender biases which have nothing to do with 
the ability to be a fire-fighter and are thus seemingly unfair. In this case it 
seems it is not the particular preference, a preference for male fire-fighters, 
that should be revised but rather the institutional expectations and 
mechanisms which lead to women being unfairly precluded.  
 
(ii) Often reasons why someone is denied a particular position seem perfectly 
justifiable. The conditions for the job, for example, are a bachelors degree 
and a number of years experience. It seems fair that if candidates cannot meet 
these conditions, they should not be considered for the job. Of course, where 
disadvantage is expressed at least partially in terms of a lack of education and 
training opportunities, these conditions no longer seem fair: certain groups of 
people are precluded from the job because they are unable to achieve the 
education or experience or talents or even traits required because they are 
devalued and not treated as the equals of others in society. We can borrow 
Richard Arnesons example of gender socialisation as an illustration. He asks 
us to imagine a society where:  
 
overwhelmingly boys develop the ambition to pursue challenging and 
lucrative careers and girls overwhelmingly do not. The explanation is 
that boys and girls alike are subjected to a rigid form of socialization 
which instils ambition in boys and quashes it in girls. In this case one 
might say that even though EFO [fair equality of opportunity] is not 
violated when Sam and Ben become lawyers and doctors and Sally 
and Samantha, equally talented as Ben and Sam but far less ambitious, 
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become homemakers and check-out clerks in convenience stores, 
genuine substantive equality of opportunity has not yet been achieved. 
In the society with rigid sex-stereotyped socialization, Sally and 
Samantha have not had a fair opportunity to develop the ambition that 
Ben and Sam have developed because only the latter benefited from 
the good luck of receiving favorable socialization.47  
  
To explain the problem in this case we can borrow the term background 
justice from Rawls:48 patterns of injustice are ingrained within institutions 
and within cultural values, and in order to remedy these injustices, we cannot 
remedy particular cases but need to reform the institutions and structures of 
value which cause the injustices.49 So the solution is not necessarily to change 
the conditions set for jobs, for example, but to improve the opportunities of 
those disadvantaged to help them to be able to meet these conditions.    
 
Although we can use disadvantage as a guide to judge whether particular 
preferences are wrongful or whether the criteria which justify preferences are 
fair, disadvantaged status does not provide us with some sort of golden 
standard to determine the moral status of preferences and the status of 
hierarchies of value which underlie these preferences. Firstly, if we rely on 
historical disadvantage to help determine wrongful discrimination we may 
ignore the devaluation of newly identified disadvantages or newly 
                                                 
47 Arneson (2002). 
48 Note, Arneson uses the above example, among others, to demonstrate defects in Rawlss 
fair equality of opportunity (see also Arneson 1999b). Arneson claims that Rawls would not 
be able to classify this seemingly unfair socialisation in terms of fair equality of opportunity. 
Although I agree that this example problematises Rawlss justice, I am using it to demonstrate 
that a notion of social equality will help explain why such socialisation is wrong. I will 
discuss Rawlss fair equality of opportunity and its relationship to social equality in more 
detail in the next chapter.  
49 Rawls would probably simply say institutions. I use the term values to cover personal 
choice as well as institutions. 
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disadvantaged groups. Secondly, certain forms or particular examples of 
discrimination against disadvantaged groups which use race or religion, or 
whatever the characteristic of devaluation may be, as the reason for 
discrimination could still be justifiable. Larry Alexander has provided a useful 
taxonomy of different forms of discrimination judged as innocent or wrongful 
according to whether they are intrinsically immoral, irrational or whether they 
have undesirable social consequences.50 Certain forms of proxy 
discrimination, for example, are acceptable he claims, even if they 
discriminate against disadvantaged groups or discriminate seemingly 
arbitrarily according to such characteristics as race or gender.51  
 
Proxy discrimination means justifying a preference on a trait which is not the 
directly relevant trait but a proxy for some other correlated trait. This form of 
discrimination, Alexander argues, can be morally unacceptable if it is based 
on inaccurate and usually bias-driven stereotyping but it can also be 
acceptable.52 An example of an acceptable case would be, lets say, a position 
in the military which requires such exceptional strength that virtually no 
women and most men would not be able meet its strength conditions. In this 
case it seems reasonable to consider only applications from men, as although 
gender is not the directly relevant trait, it serves as an accurate proxy for the 
relevant trait, strength. In this case, a disadvantaged group may be 
discriminated against according to the characteristic of devaluation but it 
seems a justifiable discrimination. 
 
                                                 
50 Alexander (1992: 149-219). 
51 Alexander (1992: 149-219). 
52 Alexander (1992: 193). 
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Thus although disadvantaged status provides us with some guide for 
determining what makes certain forms of discrimination wrong and thus 
which hierarchies of value that motivate discrimination are unacceptable, it 
does not provide us with a foolproof formula. Such a formula, though, seems 
impossible to find. At times, establishing whether a preference is wrongful 
may require an analysis of particular cases and the circumstances surrounding 
them which cannot always be translated into set criteria for moral 
acceptability. This means that although we can say that hierarchies of value 
which violate the notion of equal intrinsic worth or which cannot provide 
relevant reasons for discrimination (when taking account of disadvantaged 
status) are unacceptable, we cannot identify the criteria for relevant reasons 
perfectly.  
 
1.1.2. Respect-for-persons: an opposition to dehumanisation 
 
Social equality, then, is an opposition to unacceptable hierarchies of value, 
where unacceptable means that they are (1) hierarchies of intrinsic worth, or 
that they reflect (2) preferences which cannot be justified because they violate 
intrinsic worth or because they are not justified by relevant reasons.53 
However social equality is not purely comparative; it is not merely a question 
of how we value one person in comparison to another. It is concerned with 
how we value people full-stop.  
 
                                                 
53 Cannot here does not mean that it is not possible to justify such a preference but that the 
reason that the person in question has for this preference does not justify it.  
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In the previous section when we looked at the example of the inferior doctor I 
claimed that there were two things we could say about treatment of the doctor. 
The first was that there are certain instances where it is morally justifiable to 
value one person less than the other for particular purposes and to act on this 
valuation. In the previous section we established what reasons might make 
this justifiable. The second claim was that even if we are justified in valuing 
one person less this does not mean we can treat them in any way we choose. 
Although I am justified in favouring the superior doctor over the inferior 
doctor by taking my business to the superior doctor, I cannot treat the inferior 
doctor any way I choose. What I want to explore in this section is this idea 
that no matter what justification we have for valuing one person over another, 
certain treatments are necessarily violations of social equality.  
 
Certain forms of treatment, such as exploitation or treating people according 
to false biases or stereotypes, denying someone the right to make their own 
autonomous choices or deciding on their own conceptions of the good,54 
violence, violating basic freedoms and rights, slavery and torture, seem wrong 
whether or not they are comparative. The unfairness, in these cases, is not 
whether we are exploiting some people and not others, but that we are 
exploiting some. Whereas certain hierarchies of value can be justified for 
particular purposes, certain forms of treatment cannot be or cannot be except 
under extreme circumstances, and thus whether or not you are morally 
justified in valuing some people more than others, you are not morally 
justified in treating them in certain ways. Instead of the problem discussed in 
                                                 
54 As long as these choices or conceptions of the good are just and legal. 
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the previous section where the focus was on treating people as lesser, meaning 
we are treating people badly in comparison to others, in this case, we can 
describe the situation as one where we are treating people as less than people, 
as if they werent people: we are dehumanising them. This implies that there 
is a certain minimum standard of treatment that people deserve simply 
because they are people. The harm that a violation of this minimum standard 
does is similar to the harms identified in the previous section. Like, treating 
people according to unacceptable hierarchies, dehumanisation devalues people 
and harms them by, for example, violating rights, undermining self-respect, 
interfering with their formation of the good, interfering with their life-chances 
and equality of opportunity or undermining co-operation, or a combination of 
these. When it comes to the ideal of equal worth, the emphasis when we 
condemn treating people as inferior is that all people have equal intrinsic 
worth and thus cannot be treated as if they have lesser worth. When it comes 
to dehumanisation, the emphasis is rather that all people have intrinsic worth 
and thus cannot be treated in certain ways.  
 
Devaluing some and attaching special value to others is directly a problem of 
inequality. The problem with dehumanising seems not so much related with 
inequality; it is primarily a problem of sufficient treatment (although it can be 
expressed in terms of equality in that all people should be respected as people 
and thus not dehumanised).  
 
To illustrate the difference lets compare two societies. In the first society, 
women are expected to raise children and fulfil all other domestic duties, 
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whereas men are expected to provide for the family through their careers. In 
this society, childrearing and domestic labour have low social status and are 
not paid, whereas having a career has high social status and is paid. Here we 
can talk about an unacceptable social hierarchy which violates womens 
equality and treats them as lesser by relegating them to low status and 
financial dependence.  
 
Compare this to our second society. In this society, women are also expected 
to raise children and fulfil all other domestic duties, and men are also 
expected to pursue careers. However, let us also imagine that in this society 
household duties have no lower social status than a career, that household 
duties are paid and let us say that the reason why women are expected to fulfil 
all the domestic duties is not because they are considered to be inferior in 
some way to men but for some other reason which neither devalues women 
nor attaches special value to men. Let us also say that in this hypothetical 
society, women have never been discriminated against or oppressed. In our 
second society, men and women are equals: both genders are forced into fixed 
social roles and neither role is considered to be more favourable. Thus here it 
seems inappropriate to describe the situation as a problem of relations 
between inferiors and superiors: there is no hierarchy. However, this does not 
mean that this is an acceptable state of affairs. We can say that our second 
case is an example of dehumanisation because individuals are subject to fixed 
social roles which discount their own interests and aspirations. One gender is 
not favoured over the other but members of both genders are devalued as their 
individual conceptions of the good and autonomous choices are violated.  
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The relationship between a stipulation that people should not be dehumanised 
and social equality may not yet seem entirely clear. The example of both 
genders forced into fixed social roles seems as if it is unconcerned with issues 
of equality; it is rather concerned with a sufficient level treatment. However, 
that we should not dehumanise people is an essential part of a society of 
equals. We said in the previous section that not devaluing people means that 
we assume that one person does not matter intrinsically more than another 
thus that people should be treated as having equal intrinsic worth. This, 
however, means very little without the added assumption that people have 
some worth. We are not merely saying with social equality that people should 
be treated equally which could mean that they are treated equally badly: they 
should all be treated as having worth as well as having equal worth. 
Furthermore, as I pointed out earlier it is possible to refer to an opposition to 
dehumanisation in terms of equality: people should be treated as equals which 
means, in this case, that they should all be treated according to a basic 
standard of treatment (thus forbidding certain forms of treatment).55 An 
opposition to dehumanisation helps to guard social equality from a popular 
objection to egalitarian theories: the levelling-down objection.  
 
Sufficientarians and prioritarians have criticised egalitarians by arguing that 
we should not be concerned with equality per se but with how much of some 
                                                 
55 Which forms of treatment would be forbidden is open to some debate. I cannot identify 
and defend all forms of dehumanising treatment here. It is enough for the purposes of my 
argument to accept that there simply are ways in which we should not treat people if we 
recognise that they have moral worth. 
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good individuals receive.56 Derek Parfit claims that a concern with inequality 
itself is open to the levelling down objection: if inequality is the injustice, 
then in circumstances where the lot of the worst-off cannot be improved, 
egalitarians should be in favour of levelling down, i.e. making the better-off as 
badly off as the worst-off, in order to eliminate the inequality. Levelling 
down, Parfit believes, is an unacceptable yet seemingly unavoidable 
consequence of a certain form of egalitarianism (Parfit refers to it as telic 
egalitarianism).57 So in terms of social equality, the levelling-down objection 
would claim that if our concern were merely with equality, disrespecting those 
whom are currently overvalued by hierarchies of social status, to bring them 
down to the level of those devalued, would be an acceptable solution because 
equality would be achieved.58 However, if social equality demands both that 
people are treated equally in comparison to one another as well as equally in 
terms of having some form of worth, then the levelling-down objection no 
longer holds so strongly because levelling down is likely to violate the ban on 
dehumanising.  
 
                                                 
56 For an explanation of the sufficientarian critique of equality, see Harry Frankfurt (1997) 
and for the prioritarian critique, see Parfit (1998).  
57 See Parfit (1998: 3-7) for an explanation of the difference between telic and deontic 
egalitarianism. Telic (teleological) egalitarians believe It is in of itself bad if some people are 
worse off than others (4). As inequality is intrinsically wrong, according to their view, 
levelling down could be acceptable as a means to bring about equality (9-10).  
58 The levelling-down objection seems to have slightly less force against social equality than 
it does against narrow distributive equality because in reality it is highly unlikely that a 
situation would ever come to pass where it would be necessary to respect some less instead of 
respecting others more to achieve equality. Money, material goods and services are limited, 
thus taking away from some to give to others may be necessary. But with social equality there 
would be no shortage and thus no need to level down. This however does not mean that we 
should not be wary of this objection: it is after all hypothetically possible, even if it is not 
realistically necessary or likely, to level down in order to achieve social equality. Thus we do 
need to explain the difference between equality achieved by levelling up and that achieved by 
levelling down, and to explain why the former is preferable to the latter.  
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Thus far we can say that social equality is two things: an opposition to 
unacceptable social hierarchies (which unfairly devalue some and which 
attach special value to others) and an opposition to dehumanising treatment. 
Whereas the first demands that people should not be subject to unfair social 
inequalities, in the second case we aim to look beyond inequalities and 
differences. The problem with the gender example, where neither gender is 
valued more than the other, is that men and women are defined solely 
according to their gender and this forces them into set social roles. When we 
say this is wrong we are partially saying that people should not be defined 
solely according to certain traits, such as their gender. Similarly the inferior 
doctor is not merely an inferior doctor, and should not be defined and treated 
as if this is all she is. She is more than merely her skills. What this aspect of 
social equality is saying is we need to look beyond job-titles, abilities, traits 
and social group membership and recognise that we are all people, no matter 
what our differences, inequalities, successes and failures are, and as such we 
deserve to be treated in ways which are not dehumanising. This claim is 
similar to what Bernard Williams refers to as the human approach in his 
analysis of equality:  
 
the titles which [the human approach] urges us to look behind are the 
conspicuous bearers of social, political and technical inequality, 
whether they refer to achievement or to social roles It enjoins us 
not to let our fundamental attitudes to men be dictated by the criteria 
of technical success or social position, and not to take them at the 
value carried by these titles and by the structures in which these titles 
place them each man is owed the effort of understanding, and that in 
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achieving it, each man is to be (as it were) abstracted from certain 
conspicuous structures of inequality in which we find him.59 
 
These two aspects of social equality help us to establish which inequalities are 
acceptable, and once these inequalities have been established, they urge us not 
to treat people as merely their inequalities. The different values we attach to 
different jobs provide an important example. Compare a doctor to a cleaner. 
We attach more value to being a doctor than being a cleaner. This value is 
economic and it is also value expressed in terms of status and prestige. Now 
according to the first stipulation of social equality, that we should not unfairly 
treat people as lesser or better, the special value we accord being a doctor and 
the lack of value we accord being a cleaner is suspect if it is associated with a 
hierarchy of lesser worth, for example if cleaners are considered to be lesser 
people and suffer from inferior treatment. This does not mean, however, that 
any inequalities between cleaners and doctors are necessarily problematic. 
Perhaps we can provide relevant reasons for valuing doctors more than 
cleaners. Perhaps due to the essential nature of their services, we need to 
encourage people to become doctors, and that incentive is expressed in terms 
of higher salaries or prestige. However, even if certain inequalities between 
doctors and cleaners are justified, our second stipulation for social equality, 
not dehumanising people, comes into play and despite the job of cleaner 
possibly being justifiably deemed less valuable than the job of doctor, we still 
                                                 
59 Williams (1997: 469). 
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need to see past this difference in value and not dehumanise cleaners by 
stereotyping or exploiting them.60  
 
There may seem to be some conflict within social equality when we focus on 
the value we place on jobs. If we find that certain groups of disadvantaged 
people tend to do the least valuable jobs in society, we seem to have two 
choices. On the one hand, we can revalue the jobs, adopting the attitude that 
the reason why the job is devalued is because people who are unfairly 
devalued do these jobs. On the other hand, we can adopt the attitude that it is 
because people are unfairly devalued that they tend to do the least valuable 
jobs and thus, for example, through fair equality of opportunity applied to 
education and employment procedures, aim at getting more disadvantaged 
people doing more valuable jobs. This implies conflict because according to 
the first claim we want to increase the value attached to these jobs and 
according to the second claim we are admitting that these types of jobs have 
less value.  
 
This type of conflict is often associated with womens work, such as carer 
roles, where appeals are made (1) to increase the pay or to have some form of 
pay for this type of work and (2) to lift restrictions which prevent or 
discourage women from being able to take up other types of work. 61 I do not 
think that this is a genuine conflict, however, if we view it according to both 
requirements for social equality. The reason why we may need to revalue jobs 
                                                 
60 One could perhaps argue, however, that by nature of the work, cleaning up after someone 
else is necessarily demeaning but my argument would hold for a comparison of other types of 
jobs which have different status.  
61 For an analysis of the devaluation of womens work see, for example, Janet Radcliffe 
Richards (1980: 157-180). Although Richards admits that the devaluation of womens work is 
arbitrary, she claims that womens work is often inherently degrading, (179).  
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is that we should not unfairly devalue people. If our devaluation of women 
has led to a devaluation of the types of jobs that they often do then we need to 
revalue these jobs. No matter how valuable a job is deemed to be, however, 
we should not expect or force people to fulfil certain roles merely on the basis 
of their gender. Thus even though we may consider carer roles to be more 
valuable, we should still be suspicious if women are expected to fulfil only 
these roles and are hindered from pursuing others. 
 
1.1.3. Respect-for-persons: recognition respect 
 
We can summarise the negative requirements of social equality, an opposition 
to unfairly devaluing people and an opposition to dehumanisation, as a 
manifestation of respect-for-persons. When we talk about respecting someone 
or something, we can mean different things. Respect-for-persons is a 
particular form of what has been called recognition respect. Stephen Darwall 
has made an influential distinction between two forms of respect which can 
help us to understand what we mean by respect-for-persons.62 He 
distinguishes appraisal respect from recognition respect. When we say that we 
respect someone for his or her achievements or talents we are referring to 
appraisal respect. This type of respect means that we evaluate something or 
someone or someones actions or traits positively. When we talk about owing 
everyone respect solely because they are human beings, respect-for-persons, 
we are referring to recognition respect. This is respect that results from the 
recognition that a person, object, institutional role or institution deserves 
respect simply because of what it is. For example, respect for your countrys 
                                                 
62 Darwall (1977: 36-49). 
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flag is a form of recognition respect for an object. Recognition respect thus 
includes but is not limited to respect-for-persons.  
 
So when we refer to respect-for-persons, we are not referring to respect earned 
as is the case with appraisal respect; recognition respect has nothing to do 
with someones characteristics or merits or talents. If we go back to my 
example of the two doctors, we can say that when we judge the better doctor 
to be superior we are giving her something akin to appraisal respect: even if 
we dont so much respect her, we appraise her positively. The inferior doctor 
is appraised negatively. There is nothing morally objectionable about this. 
However when we appraise someone negatively as a person, thus applying 
appraisal respect to personhood as if some people are worth more intrinsically 
than others, we are denying them recognition respect but for reasons which 
confuse recognition respect with appraisal respect. According to social 
equality, all people deserve recognition respect, no matter their particular 
talents or traits or, particularly, group membership.  
 
Respect-for-persons though, at least as I have described it here, remains a 
negative description of social equality. Although we can say that social 
equality demands respect-for-persons, what respect-for-persons means here is 
that we should not devalue people or dehumanise them. Is there something 
positive that we can say that social equality requires? Does social equality 
merely tell us not to act in certain ways or are there certain ways in which it 
requires us to act?  
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It is much more difficult to establish a positive description of social equality. 
It seems reasonably uncontroversial to talk about requirements not to devalue 
people but as soon as we talk about requirements to value people or to treat 
them well in order to achieve social equality we seem to defy commonsense: 
we should not be forced to like or have affection for people simply because 
they are people. Furthermore positive emotions and attitudes such as love, 
desire and care seem to become meaningless if applied to everyone; it is 
partially through their exclusivity that these emotions and attitudes are 
significant.  
 
Our reason for respect-for-persons is simply because people are people and 
there is only so much we can get out of the idea. It might provide us with 
reason not to treat people badly but once we start considering why we treat 
people well, mainly we find our reasons for doing so are because they are 
more than merely people to us. We attach special value to people, and thus 
treat them in certain positive ways, primarily because we know them (we tend 
to value and have more concern for people we know in comparison to people 
we do not know), or because we have a special relationship with them (family 
or loved ones for example), or simply because we like them or appraise them 
positively (a confident speaker or a talented athlete). It seems impossible for 
social equality to demand of us that we treat all people as if they have special 
value to us. This means that there does not seem to be too much that social 
equality can demand from us.  
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However, I do believe that there are at least two positive requirements for 
social equality, besides the requirement of respect-for-persons: these are 
civility and toleration. The reasons why I believe that these are important 
aspects of social equality will not be presented in the form so much of an 
argument but rather as an appeal to a notion of what a society of equals would 
be like: if we want to live in a society in which people are truly treated as 
equals, I believe that not only would respect-for-persons be essential, but also 
the values of civility and toleration. I will discuss civility first.  
 
1.2. Civility 
 
Civility means extending basic courtesies, such as listening and providing an 
opportunity for others to present their views, to everyone. Civility, Kymlicka 
claims, is the logical extension of non-discrimination: 
 
The norms of non-discrimination also entail that it is impermissible for 
businesses to ignore their black customers, or treat them rudely 
Businesses must in effect make blacks feel welcome, just as if they 
were whites. Blacks must, in short, be treated with civility. The same 
applies to the way citizens treat each other in schools or recreational 
associations, even in private clubs.63  
 
A primary reason why social equality would require civility is we cannot 
claim that we treat people as equals if we extend civility only to certain social 
groups and not to others: this would be an expression of wrongly devaluing 
some and attaching special value to others. This, of course, is subject to 
                                                 
63 Kymlicka (2002: 301). 
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levelling down: what if I treated everyone uncivilly? If the problem is equality 
of treatment it would seem that as long as I did not extend civility to all 
people, I would not be violating social equality. Admittedly, the main problem 
with being uncivil in its relationship to social equality is that people are 
unequally civil: whites are smiled at, blacks are scowled at; whites are not 
kept waiting, blacks are, and so on. However, being equally uncivil to 
everyone does not seem to fit comfortably with the notion of a society of 
equals.  
 
Treating people rudely seems difficult to reconcile with the notion of a society 
which recognises everyone as equals and demands respect and equal concern. 
Perhaps here the relationship to equality is that the person who is uncivil 
seems to be making exceptions for herself. For example, if I keep someone 
waiting by being late for no good reason this can be interpreted as an 
indication that I value my own time more than I value other peoples. Also 
communication would be impossible in a society in which nobody listens 
properly to anyone else, thus if I dont listen properly to others, I would still 
probably expect them to listen to me. So my lack of civility, rather than being 
a form of equality, marks me out to be special. A society of equals would then 
require equality of civility, and not merely equality of incivility. 
 
Furthermore, we can claim that incivility can cause harm, although it is most 
likely to cause harm when there is an inequality in the civility and lack of it 
shown to particular social groups. It is likely that incivility will cause harm if 
it is part of a pattern of behaviour perpetrated against the devalued. Of the 
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harms caused by violations of respect-for-persons, incivility is likely to 
interfere with the development of self-respect and with social co-operation. 
Being pervasively scowled at, kept waiting, not listened to, and so on, could 
contribute to a lowered or lack of sense of self-worth. When it comes to co-
operation, where one group in society is treated better, through among others, 
civility, while the other is devalued through a lack of civility, it is likely to 
create or reaffirm social tensions and exclusion which could hamper co-
operation. 
 
Civility cannot be an unconditional requirement of social equality however. 
Respect-for-persons is, I believe, unconditional: it is always wrong to treat 
people according to unacceptable hierarchies or to dehumanise them. Being 
uncivil however is not always wrong and it is likely that it is subject to 
reciprocity. I do not see any reason why social equality should demand that 
people should be civil towards people who are uncivil towards them. More 
importantly, however, requiring people to be civil under certain circumstances 
seems wrong. If respect-for-persons is not fulfilled, civility should not be 
required from those wronged. For example, a black worker exploited by her 
white employer should not be required to be civil to her employer. Indeed it 
would be wrong to expect civility from her. Civility can too easily be 
expected as a form of subservience which only reinforces hierarchies of 
intrinsic worth.  
 
Moreover, incivility could actually be an acceptable form of behaviour as a 
means to demonstrate disapproval for violations of respect-for-persons. While 
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rational debate is clearly the ideal, how do you deal with a defiant racist who 
refuses to argue reasonably? Resorting to incivility could be a form of 
sanction for demonstrating condemnation for violations of respect-for-
persons.64 Furthermore, civility should also not be over-emphasised by the 
privileged, as if being civil to those who are disadvantaged compensates for 
disadvantaged treatment. Civility should thus never be seen as a substitute for 
the genuine reform of discriminatory and oppressive practices and social 
systems. To use the typical example, the solution to slavery is clearly not that 
slave-owners should be nicer to their slaves, but rather that slavery should be 
abolished. Thus although civility is a requirement of social equality, respect-
for-persons takes precedence if these values clash, and no amount of civility 
counterbalances violations of respect-for-persons. 
 
1.3. Toleration of difference  
 
Respect-for-persons is an opposition to arbitrary overvaluation or devaluation 
and to dehumanisation. It is not opposed to all hierarchies of value, however, 
and it does not demand that we appraise all things and people equally or 
positively: such uniform appraisal is neither possible nor desirable. In a 
society of equals there will thus be   beliefs, conceptions of the good, 
characteristics, and many other kinds of differences which some people will 
dislike, disapprove of, or perhaps even find abhorrent.  
                                                 
64 I admit that drawing the line here between incivility and disrespect can be difficult to 
determine. It seems intuitively acceptable to ignore a racist in a conversation in which she is 
being racist, for example, but how far can one go? Is it acceptable, from the viewpoint of 
social equality, that racists should be ridiculed in the press or be barred from associations or 
be refused the right to publicly express their racist views? When does incivility become a 
violation of respect-for-persons? This would require a more nuanced study of these concepts.    
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How would people in a society of equals react to things of which they 
disapprove? With toleration seems to be the answer here.65 A lack of 
toleration would mean trying to prevent or inhibit things of which we 
disapprove. To take an example: a Christian fundamentalist who believes that 
gay sex is a sin could try to prevent or inhibit gay sex by condemning it in 
public, or campaigning to withhold certain rights from gays, or by 
encouraging violence against gays. It is often groups who have been 
discriminated against or oppressed who suffer from attempts to negate their 
characteristics, beliefs and lifestyles, while the characteristics, beliefs and 
lifestyles of the privileged in society are encouraged or revered or accepted as 
the norm. Preventing or inhibiting what we disapprove of seems clearly 
inappropriate in a society of equals where all people are deemed equals and 
need to be treated as such: if we try to restrict ways of life or characteristics, 
we are not treating the people who practice those ways of life or who have 
those characteristics with respect as if they are our equals.  
 
Furthermore, intolerance causes harm: (1) it could interfere with rights, and by 
devaluing and thwarting choices (2) it could interfere with self-respect, (3) the 
formation of a conception of the good and (4) opportunities. Moreover, 
pervasive intolerance which is directed against specific social groups becomes 
a violation of respect-for-persons because certain groups choices and 
differences are devalued due to their group membership while others are 
                                                 
65 I am going to use Iain Hampsher-Monks (1999) description of how the circumstances of 
toleration are often understood. Toleration occurs when we voluntarily accept attitudes 
and/or actions of which we seriously disapprove and which we could prevent or inhibit if 
we chose (18). Hampsher-Monk claims that toleration actually requires a stronger definition 
than this traditional understanding (19).  
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privileged, and by denying the expression of autonomous choices, intolerance 
can be interpreted as a form of dehumanisation.   
 
An alternate response would be to tolerate differences by refraining from 
trying to negate them even though we dislike or disapprove of them; we thus 
allow difference to exist without interfering.66 Toleration has (1) an objection 
component, we disapprove, and (2) an acceptance component, which 
overrides the objection component.67 Toleration of difference would be the 
appropriate response in a society of equals; instead of punishing people for 
their differences or trying to suppress those differences, they are respected 
despite our disapproval. Rainer Forst calls this type of toleration, a respect 
conception of toleration: 
 
the parties tolerating each other respect one another on moral 
grounds they regard themselves and others as citizens of a state in 
which members of all groups should have equal legal and political 
status. Even though they hold incompatible ethical beliefs about the 
good and right way of life, and differ greatly in their cultural practices, 
they respect each other as moral-political equals.68  
 
Precisely because respect is the more fundamental value, respect overrides 
toleration when the two values clash. Conceptions of the good, for example, 
which violate respect-for-persons, should not be tolerated. This prioritising of 
respect is similar to the priority placed on the right over the good in the liberal 
                                                 
66 As I am using both the terms dislike and disapproval, my understanding of toleration is 
what Mendus (1989), using Mary Warnocks phrase, refers to as a wide interpretation of 
toleration. See Menduss (1989: 9-18) discussion of the scope of toleration and whether it 
should be defined only as a response to moral disapproval or if it should include dislike. 
67 Forst (2003: 72). Forst borrows these terms from Preston King. 
68 Forst (2003: 74). 
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egalitarian conception of social justice, which rules out conceptions of the 
good that violate justice. This is how Dworkin describes the restriction that 
justice places on toleration: 
 
liberal equality cannot be neutral toward ethical ideals that directly 
challenge its theory of justice. So its version of ethical tolerance is not 
compromised when a thief is punished who claims to believe that theft 
is central to a good life. Or when a racist is thwarted who claims that 
his lifes mission is to promote white superiority.69 
  
As is the case with social justice, the requirement of toleration only applies if 
those conceptions do not violate social equality. This is the reason why I not 
only do not have to, but should not, tolerate the Ku Kluk Klan or a neo-Nazis 
conception of the good, at least where that conception of the good is related to 
respect-for-persons. This means that respect-for-persons takes precedence 
over toleration, just as it does over civility. 
 
To summarise: social equality then includes (at least) three values. (1) 
Respect-for-persons, which has two negative components, we should not 
subject people to unacceptable hierarchies of value and we should not 
dehumanise people; (2) civility; and (3) toleration of difference.  
 
                                                 
69 Dworkin c.f. Kernohan (1998: 4). 
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2. What distinguishes social equality? Distinguishing social 
equality from narrow distribution and formal equality 
 
Emphasising the values of social equality, at least within a framework of 
liberal egalitarian philosophy, is not particularly controversial. If anything, 
emphasising these values seems banal. Where debate would lie, however, is 
(1) whether social equality captures something unique and (2) what its 
relationship is with distributive justice.  
 
One could agree that something like social equality needs to be achieved 
without agreeing that we need social equality as a requirement of an equal 
society. The equal provision of rights and liberties, opportunities for education 
and jobs, and an adequate income, some could argue, will result in a society of 
equals; social equality seemingly adds nothing new. Furthermore, even if the 
distinctiveness of social equality is recognised, whether social equality should 
be a concern of distributive justice is likely to lead to dispute. In the rest of 
this chapter I will argue that social equality is and should be a distinctive 
concern of distributive justice, although clearly it is also a concern of more 
than justice.  
 
Social equality, I have said, expresses an ideal of what society would be like if 
people were genuinely treated as equals. A society of equals and a fair society 
are not precisely the same notions but there would clearly be ample 
correlation. Social equality would demand rights and freedoms guaranteed by 
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the law (formal equality) and a fair distribution of material goods (narrow 
distribution): how can we say that people are respected, are treated as equals, 
if they are unprotected by the law or they are impoverished?70 Achieving 
broad distributive justice seems then to be a means of achieving a society of 
equals. Formal equality and narrow distribution can only go so far in 
achieving social equality, however. Moreover, formal equality and narrow 
distribution can only go so far in even achieving distributive justice.  
 
Social equality does not distinguish between whom or what should treat 
people as equals: governments, institutions, people in their private capacities, 
can uphold or violate respect-for-persons; social equality requires respect-for-
persons from all of these. Social equality is thus required both in the formal 
realm of rights, the law and institutional rules but also in the informal realm of 
personal choice and associations of civil society, and so on.71 As I will argue, 
informal social equality would not be addressed, at least not in full, by formal 
equality or narrow distribution. If we adopt Rawlss notion of the primary 
social goods, thus to include opportunities and the social basis of self-respect, 
we could argue that distributive justice should also include an informal realm 
because associations or individuals behaviour could interfere with the fair 
distribution of opportunities and the social basis of self-respect.72 Thus 
distributive justice, like equality, is also required in both the formal and 
                                                 
70 Violations of rights and impoverishment, I take it, would both be ruled out as 
dehumanisation. 
71 We could include as part of the informal also the family, social structure generally, norms, 
the media and the market (where this is not regulated). I will often simply refer to this as the 
informal, or to personal choice and associations, although this is not an exhaustive list of what 
might be included under the informal.  
72 I do not expect readers to accept this claim merely because I assert it; by distinguishing 
social equality from formal equality and narrow distribution, and through arguments and 
examples in chapters III and IV, I aim to provide convincing reasons for accepting that justice 
requires informal justice, and thus justice in personal choice. 
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informal realms. Informal equality and informal justice would both occur if 
informal social equality is upheld. Among the harms of violations of social 
equality are interferences with self-respect and opportunities, and as I will 
argue below, these harms occur when social equality is violated in the 
informal or the formal, thus if respect-for-persons, civility and toleration are 
practised in the informal (and the demands of institutional justice are fulfilled) 
a fair(er) distribution of opportunities and self-respect would ensue. This is 
the relationship between justice in personal choice and social equality. 
   
To understand what we mean by social equality and to understand what is 
missing from broad distributive justice, it will be useful to distinguish it from 
(1) formal equality and (2) narrow distribution. It is important to note that the 
distinctions I will be drawing between social equality, formal equality and 
narrow distribution are not meant to be rigid: there will be some, frequently 
much, overlap between them. Speaking about these forms of equality and 
distribution as if they are entirely distinct is problematic, and yet it is not the 
purpose of this chapter to encourage the understanding that social equality is 
entirely self-sufficient. Despite this qualification, however, there is need to 
make some distinction, partially precisely because we find that certain forms 
of equality are neglected either because no distinction is made or because 
distinctions have been drawn too rigidly. Liberal egalitarians, for example, 
have been accused of focusing almost entirely on narrow distribution and 
economic equality, and thus of ignoring capabilities and social inequalities,73 
whereas multiculturists and some feminists, among others, have been accused 
                                                 
73 See Anderson (1999), Sen (1997) and Scheffler (2003), for examples of such criticisms. 
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of the opposite, of disregarding material conditions in favour of highlighting 
recognition as the essential feature of equality and justice.74 Debates about 
equality have too often become, as Fraser has pointed out, a case of either/or, 
as if a commitment to one form of equality makes a commitment to any other 
impossible:  While one side insists in retrograde accents that its the 
economy, stupid, the other retorts in hypersophisticated tones that its the 
culture, stupid.75  
 
Although the focus of this chapter is social equality, and the reason I am 
focusing on this form of equality is because it is often neglected while other 
forms of equality or aspects of distribution are touted as the genuine and only 
subject matter of political philosophy, I am not advocating sacrificing a 
concern with narrow distribution or formal equality. Although I will be 
drawing a link between social equality and broad distributive justice, this does 
not mean that I believe that if social equality is achieved this will be sufficient 
for justice.76 Also, the inter-relatedness of these forms of equality and 
distributive justice means that although social equality, as I will be arguing, 
                                                 
74 See Frasers (1997: 2-3; 11-39) description of the divide between recognition and 
redistribution; a decoupling of cultural politics from social politics, and the relative eclipse 
of the latter by the former (2). See also Phillips (1999: 1-16) on how focusing on equality has 
become primarily a concern with political equality, while economic equality is seldom 
considered seriously. 
75 Fraser (1997: 3). 
76 Richard Arneson (1999a) criticises Andersons notion of democratic equality claiming it is 
insufficient for justice. He claims that democratic equality fails to provide us with answers to 
dilemmas in which the worst-off should be benefited: Suppose that society faces an issue, 
say a choice of tax policy, where the interests of those who are far above the basic capability 
threshold (and thus on the average high in well-being) are starkly opposed to the interests of 
those who are just above the threshold (and thus on average significantly lower in well-
being) Democratic equality says that the issue is a don't care from the standpoint of 
justice. I disagree. I am not claiming, however, that when it comes to justice our only 
standard should be social equality. How different standards could be reconciled and what to 
do when they conflict are causes for concern, and in chapter V I do consider conflict between 
social equality and the difference principle, but I do not believe that social equality should be 
dismissed because it cannot provide an answer to all the problems of distributive justice and I 
do not pretend that it can. 
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has independent value, we also require formal equality and certain fair 
schemes of narrow distribution to be realised in order to achieve (among 
others) social equality.  
 
2.1. Formal equality and narrow distribution 
 
A broad conception of distributive justice could recognise at least two primary 
components: a notion of formal equality and a notion of the fair distribution of 
material goods (narrow distribution). Formal equality is composed of both 
legal and political equality. This type of equality aims to establish equality of 
democratic citizenship through the constitution and through legislation and 
would include basic rights and freedoms (such as those of expression and 
religion) and the equal right to participate in politics by voting and standing 
for elections.77  
 
Narrow distribution is concerned with how material goods, such as income 
and wealth, should be distributed. It is narrow because a broader 
understanding of distributive justice would include the distribution of non-
material goods such as the rights and freedoms covered by formal equality. 
Those sceptical of the substance of social equality could claim that social 
equality is not an independent form of equality but is constituted by either 
formal equality or narrow distribution or both, and thus that theories of 
distributive justice which include adequate understandings of these 
components are not neglecting or undermining social equality. It is my 
                                                 
77 See, for example, Arneson (1993: 489). 
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contention, however, that social equality cannot be reduced to formal equality 
or narrow distribution.  
 
2.2. The difference between narrow distribution and social equality 
 
Social equality and narrow distribution are interdependent. When people do 
not receive an adequate income and do not receive adequate welfare benefits, 
for example, we can say that social equality has been violated because poverty 
and deprivation are inconsistent with respect-for-persons; they fall below the 
minimum standard of how people should be treated if they are to be treated as 
equals. Furthermore, often low social status is not merely accompanied by, 
but determined by, how much money you earn. Moreover, although economic 
inequalities are often accepted as a necessary part of a productive and healthy 
economy, those inequalities become unacceptable when they form part of the 
pervasive disadvantage and devaluation suffered by groups who are oppressed 
and discriminated against.78 
 
This does not mean, however, that social equality is merely a lack of adequate 
resources. A primary difference between narrow distribution and social 
equality is that each deals with different types of goods. Narrow distribution 
is concerned with material goods such as income and wealth. It thus closely 
resembles a model of everyday distribution, such as the distribution of goods 
from retailers to the public, as in both cases a stock of goods can be divided 
                                                 
78 See, for example, Phillips (1999) who claims that although economic equality has become 
an unpopular notion, this form of equality is necessary between social groups; economic 
inequalities between different types of jobs may be acceptable but inequalities between what 
blacks and whites earn, for example, are not.  
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up and allocated for consumption. Furthermore, in both narrow and everyday 
distribution, goods are scarce and some rivalry occurs for the possession of 
these goods. Even where narrow distribution includes goods that are not 
strictly material, socially-allocated resources such as education and healthcare, 
these goods still tend to be scarce, subject to rivalry and can be made to fit the 
model of narrow distribution reasonably easily.  
 
Social equality, on the other hand, although it can be concerned with the same 
types of goods as narrow distribution, is also concerned with goods that are 
non-material, not scarce and not directly distributable. Jonathan Wolff refers 
to goods of this kind when he claims that there might be more to a society of 
equals than a just scheme of distribution of material goods. There may also be 
goods that depend on the attitude people have toward each other.79 Quoting 
R. H. Tawney, Wolff maintains that there is a realm of goods where to 
divide is not to take away There are ways of giving certain goods to the 
people without taking from others.80  
 
When we focused on what social equality is, we identified various ways in 
which social inequalities are expressed. These include an unfair distribution of 
material goods and social resources, and when it comes to these goods, there 
is an overlap with narrow distribution. We also identified expressions of 
social inequalities, however, such as cultural imperialism, stereotyping, 
derogatory language and snobbery, which are difficult to express in terms of 
material goods. They have to do with peoples attitudes to each other. We can, 
                                                 
79 Wolff (1998: 104). 
80 Tawney c.f. Wolff (1998: 104).  
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however, say that these social inequalities are related to problems of 
distribution, even if it is not a problem of narrow distribution. The harms of 
social equality correlate to unfair distributions of the social basis of self-
respect, for example.  Like money or rights we can say that some people 
receive or have more of the social basis of self-respect than others, and like 
other social goods, how these are distributed is often socially imposed, as 
oppression and discrimination for example, will systematically privilege some 
groups, and devalue and disadvantage others by not affording them economic 
goods, rights and respect, among others. This implies that although social 
equality is related to the distribution of social goods, it cannot be sufficiently 
described according to the same framework used to describe narrow 
distribution because the types of goods which require a fairer distribution are 
not always material.  
 
Furthermore, using a framework of narrow distribution can lead to problems 
of social equality being overlooked even when they seem to be dealing with 
the same types of goods. While our concern for the poor may be primarily that 
what they receive is not enough, this is not always the case when it comes to 
differences in income. If women who are highly paid receive lower salaries 
than men for the same job, then, according to a distributive framework that 
does not consider equality per se to be a problem, we may not consider this to 
be an injustice: after all, they may receive much more than many others. 
However, in this case, it is the inequality itself which is the injustice: women 
are treated as if they have comparatively less value than men, and thus we can 
say that social equality has been violated. Whereas the injustice suffered by 
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the poor in being poor is clearly distributive (although one could argue that it 
is more than that), the injustice suffered by women who are paid less than 
men, although reflected in the distribution of income, is a violation of social 
equality: the problem is that women are devalued and that devalue is reflected 
in income. Although the solution may lie with the redistribution of income, 
and thus with narrow distribution, identifying this injustice could require a 
conception of social equality. Social equality is, thus, distinct from narrow 
distribution.  
 
2.3. The difference between formal equality and social equality 
 
Similarly to narrow distribution, social equality and formal equality influence 
each other. When we violate social equality we are often breaking the law or 
violating legal rights: this is particularly clear when it comes to violations 
such as harassment and any form of violence. While social equality leads to 
formal inequalities, violations of formal equality also lead to social 
inequalities: by not providing people with the full complement of basic human 
rights and liberties, we are treating them as inferior, as second-class citizens. 
Although interdependent, they are distinguishable but the distinction between 
formal equality and social equality is not based on a difference in types of 
goods.  
 
Both formal and social equality deal with non-material goods which are not 
scarce. Whether we are talking about rights and liberties or respect-for-
persons, generally, we will not be depleting a stock of goods when we provide 
those who do not have enough, or any of these goods, with more. The 
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distinction between formal equality and social equality lies rather in which 
sphere these forms of equality apply. The key to the difference lies in the fact 
that social equality aims at achieving a society of equals rather than 
establishing equality before the law (formal equality) or, for that matter, an 
equal (or prioritarian or sufficient) narrow distributive scheme. Social equality 
is much wider in scope. Whereas formal equality establishes equality through 
the state, and more particularly through the constitution and the law, social 
equality requires people to treat each other as equals in any sphere, whether 
this is within politics, the law, the market, civil society or in personal 
relationships and interactions. Thus although social equality would demand 
that equal worth is reflected in the law, it also demands equality in 
interactions beyond the scope of the law.81  
 
There is one clear area where we can say social equality is concerned but 
which cannot be addressed properly by formal equality. We can refer to the 
sphere of behaviour outside the ambit of formal equality as the informal. The 
informal covers any forms of behaviour about which the law or official rules 
are (mainly) neutral. This includes behaviour which an individual can choose 
to do or not do, i.e. it is a matter of personal choice. For example, according to 
the law, if I have a job and my income exceeds a certain minimum, I must pay 
income tax, however, the law is neutral concerning what job I choose to do, 
and thus this is subject to personal choice. The distinction is not always easy 
to draw. Smoking in liberal democracies is referred to as a personal choice, 
                                                 
81 This is also a further difference between social equality and narrow distribution, but it is a 
difference in practice rather than in definition. Per definition formal equality establishes 
equality through legislation, and thus differs in scope from social equality. Although narrow 
distribution is established by the state through legislation, we could imagine a society in 
which this need not necessarily be the case. 
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however, we cannot say that the law is entirely neutral about whether or not 
individuals should smoke. Although individuals can choose to smoke (in 
private), government policy strongly discourages smoking. Although I admit 
that this distinction between the formal and informal spheres is somewhat 
artificial or tricky, what is important for the purposes of this discussion is that 
there are many forms of behaviour which are either entirely or partially left 
open to choice, and despite doubts about the influence of formal policies on 
choices, it is clear that much of what we do or do not do is mainly irrelevant 
to the law.  
 
Informal behaviour is thus something you are allowed to do but you do not 
have to do. This is where social equality and formal equality depart company. 
Formal equality does not compel or prohibit behaviour which would be 
described as personal choice, per definition: what we mean by personal choice 
is precisely that the law does not either compel you to do or prohibit. 
However, social equality can evaluate this type of behaviour: whether or not 
you violate social equality is not directly concerned with whether or not you 
have violated the law or rights or rules. You violate social equality if you 
violate respect-for-persons, civility and toleration, whether or not your 
behaviour was a matter of personal choice. This means that social equality and 
formal equality can differ in how they evaluate individual behaviour.  
 
We may have the right to make certain decisions or behave in certain ways 
and thus formal equality is neutral about this type of behaviour. However, 
social equality need not be. Take ones choice of friends or partners or 
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neighbours. According to the law, if you are white, there is nothing wrong 
with choosing only to be friends or to choose a partner that is also white, or to 
choose not to live in a predominantly black neighbourhood. However, we can 
say that social equality is violated when someone rules out friends or such 
who are non-white because they attach special value to whites as a race and 
attach less value to non-whites.82  
 
The informal extends not only to individual behaviour but also to the 
decision-making within, and rules of, private associations. Within certain 
limits set by the law, formal equality is often mute when it comes to the 
private rules established by associations of civil society such as churches. 
Decisions by religious organisations not to ordain women or gays as priests 
are examples of such private rules. Although the law remains neutral here, 
social equality does not. If women or gays are not ordained because they are 
devalued then social equality has been violated.  
 
There is thus a realm of individual behaviour and of associations, the 
informal, where it would clearly not be sufficient to describe social equality in 
terms of formal equality. Even, however, when it comes to behaviour where 
                                                 
82 There is, of course, a difference between this and simply being more likely to have white 
friends, partners or neighbours because you are white. The violation of social equality occurs 
when conscious or unconscious choices are made on the basis of biases which rank blacks and 
whites hierarchically according to their value as human beings, or some such proxy value as 
intelligence. Furthermore, and this is a more difficult issue, I understand that group identity 
and culture play a fundamental role in peoples lives. This means that people rightfully seek 
out others with the same cultural or religious identity and this may have to come to exclusion 
of others. The attitude in a society of equals cannot be, however, that others are inferior or 
have less worth and that is why I must stick to my own kind. Hypothetically, however, it 
seems then that a society of equals could consist of different communities who separate 
themselves entirely from each other as long as they are civil, tolerating and they do not violate 
respect-for-persons. Somehow this level of separation and the exclusion and lack of co-
operation it implies seem difficult to tally with a society of equals. It is for this reason that a 
more comprehensive notion of social equality might need to include something like solidarity 
or affiliation.  
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formal equality does demand compliance, it remains insufficient to describe 
social equality according to formal equality. To do so would miss the point of 
social equality. Reducing social equality to formal equality implies that the 
essential feature of equality is legislation through rights and freedoms. 
However, it is the aim of social equality that people should treat each other as 
equals, not that they should abide by the law. A society of equals cannot be 
properly described with claims about formal equality because it is not the 
ideal that people should respect rights or obey the law but that in their 
relationships to each other they should treat each other as equals. From the 
viewpoint of social equality, firstly and as a priority, we expect individuals to 
act in a way which upholds respect-for-persons in their relationships (and thus 
also through the choices expressed in informal structure), and, secondly, we 
demand legislation to ensure that they treat each other equally in case they do 
not.  According to social equality, the law and rights are a safeguard; a set of 
coercive rules designed to ensure that people treat each other as equals, but it 
is a last resort, not the embodiment of equality.  
 
Considering the law to be the means with which to establish equality in 
human relationships is bizarre as this would require equality only as mediated 
by the state through legislation. Expecting the state, for example, to act as 
mediator and to rely on the law to regulate interactions between family 
members, loved ones and friends is evidently problematic, and yet this is 
precisely what would be required if we chose only to describe injustices solely 
through formal equality. In a liberal state, extreme injustices suffered by 
women, for example, are often perpetrated in the private sphere by intimates 
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such as husbands and fathers, and although evidently we require formal 
equality to prevent women from suffering such emotional and physical abuse, 
that this is a sufficient description of a society of equals is implausible. Can 
we really claim that a society is either just or equal when we rely on a 
husband not to beat his wife because it is against the law or against her rights? 
Surely these relationships and the beliefs, attitudes and norms of gender 
discrimination and oppression that underlie violations such as domestic 
violence, need to be reformed, rather than merely regulated?  
 
This point I am making is similar to the point Jeremy Waldron makes in 
response to criticisms of rights-based theories from socialists and 
communitarians.83 Waldron claims that when it comes to social relationships, 
such as marriage, rights should not be seen as constitutive of those 
relationships but [should] instead be understood as a position of fallback 
and security in case other constitutive elements of a social relationship ever 
come apart.84 Once partners in marriage, for example, insist on their rights, 
the relationship has started to fail: If we hear one partner complaining to the 
other about a denial or withdrawal of conjugal rights, we know something has 
already gone wrong with the interplay of desire and affection between 
partners.85 This does not mean, however, that I am arguing that the only way 
in which to describe social relationships is according to social equality: this is 
evidently untrue as it is emotions and attitudes such as desire and affection 
rather than respect or toleration, for example, which are most likely to be the 
defining features of close relationships. The values of social equality, 
                                                 
83 Waldron (1993a: 370-391).  
84 Waldron (1993a: 374). 
85 Waldron (1993a: 372).  
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however, provide a description of what it takes for social relationships to be 
considered to be equal.  
 
Formal equality is only concerned with behaviour which is related to the 
formal realm; it is when I violate rights, or laws, or official rules, that formal 
equality is violated. Social equality is concerned with behaviour in any of 
these spheres, whether formal or informal. Violations of respect-for-persons 
are expressed in numerous forms which include problems of formal equality 
such as a denial of rights but which are also expressed through the informal 
behaviour of individuals and rules of associations. This does not mean that all 
behaviour is related to social equality; it simply means it has the potential to 
be. No type of behaviour can be ruled out as necessarily inapplicable to social 
equality.86  
 
As social equality insists on equality even in personal choice, it points to an 
element of distributive justice which seems to be neglected by theories which 
consider only such things as formal equality and the distribution of material 
goods: justice in choice. When devaluations and dehumanisation are 
expressed in the informal, through, for example, private discrimination and 
through peoples attitudes to each other, then, among others their self-respect 
can be harmed. This harm is suffered by some systematically because of their 
race or their sexuality, for example. When this happens it seems clear that 
there is something wrong with the way in which the social basis of self-
respect is being distributed; there is thus an injustice in choice, which can be 
                                                 
86 Furthermore, this difference between formal and social equality is also similar to the 
difference between fair equality of opportunity and social equality. I will discuss Rawlss 
notion of fair equality of opportunity and how it relates to social equality in the next chapter. 
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expressed by social equality as a lack of respect-for-persons in peoples 
everyday behaviour. Informal social equality can capture this injustice; while 
narrow distribution and formal equality cannot.  
 
What has thus been established in this section is that social equality is 
distinguishable from narrow distribution and formal equality. A primary 
difference between social equality and narrow distribution is that narrow 
distribution deals only with divisible, directly distributable goods, whereas 
social equality can deal with these types of goods but also deals with non-
material goods which do not conform to a literal model of narrow distribution. 
As opposed to formal equality, social equality is concerned not only with laws 
and rights but also with informal behaviour. 
 
2.4. Narrow distribution and formal equality are not sufficient to achieve 
social equality 
 
One could agree, however, that social equality is distinguishable from formal 
equality and narrow distribution but still disagree that social equality is 
something that needs to be addressed independently of these aspects of 
distributive justice. Some will claim that formal equality or narrow 
distribution, or both, although constitutively different from social equality, 
result in social equality. This seems to be the typical attitude to social equality 
or to aspects of social equality in liberal theory: Liberals tend to believe that 
cultural oppression cannot survive under conditions of civil freedom and 
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material equality.87 This view of social equality is not exclusively liberal: 
Marxists are likely to claim that social equality would be taken care of 
through changes to the economy and ownership of the means of production.88 
As the objection goes, the analytic distinction between social and formal 
equality, or social equality and narrow distribution may stand but when it 
comes to actually resolving these inequalities, we do not need to include 
social equality in our descriptions of just and equal societies.  
 
Social equality is clearly not going to ensue without the basic rights and 
protections guaranteed by formal equality. Also, social equality requires at 
least some form of redistribution if not economic equality. Violations of social 
equality require intervention of a formal nature and the social inequalities 
suffered by the poor in the form of, for example, degradation and a lack of 
respect need to be resolved, at least mainly, by improving their material 
conditions. So there is something to the claim; we will go at least some way to 
achieving social equality if we live in a society with formal equality and fair 
distributive schemes. But are formal equality and the redistribution of material 
goods all we require to achieve a society of equals? In this section I will argue 
that social equality does require more than merely measures for fair narrow 
distribution and formal equality.  
 
                                                 
87 (Kymlicka 2002: 257).  
88 Classes will be abolished, and thus seemingly, greater equality will be achieved when the 
proletariat gain control of production; for an in-depth analysis of Marxs notion of class, see 
Elster (1985: 318-397). I say equality because Wood (1986) claims it is false that Marx was 
interested in equality as either an aim or an ideal. For a specific example, see Robert Miles, 
who claims that race is an ideological effect, a mask that hides real economic relationships 
(Back and Solomos 2000: 7; they refer to Miless claims in his book Racism and migrant 
labour and his article Marxism versus the sociology of race relations). 
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2.4.1 Narrow distribution is not sufficient for achieving social equality 
 
i. The case of economic inequality 
In the previous section we discussed the different types of goods with which 
social equality and narrow distribution are concerned. However, one could 
agree that the goods of social equality cannot be described adequately as 
directly distributable but still claim that the distribution of economic goods 
remains the solution to injustices of social equality: if we provide social 
groups who suffer injustices with a certain amount of such goods, such as 
income, the ideal of social equality will be achieved. One of the harms of 
violations of social equality, for example, is that it interferes with self-respect. 
We cannot distribute self-respect but if the goods of narrow distribution, such 
as wealth and income, are fairly distributed, the argument could go, we will 
achieve a fair distribution of the social basis of self-respect.  
 
Claiming that narrow distribution will lead to social equality implies that one 
believes that as long as enough of certain material goods are distributed to the 
right groups of people, then social equality will prevail. This can only be true, 
however, in cases where a lack of material goods is the only cause of a 
violation of social equality. Perhaps a close enough example here would be 
the poor: when it comes to a lack of self-respect suffered by the poor, it is 
feasible that the redistribution of material goods is sufficient for, and even the 
only solution for, an increase in self-respect, as long as the poor suffer from a 
lack of self-respect solely because they are poor. This is not the case when it 
comes to all injustices involving self-respect: redistribution, I would argue, is 
not going to alleviate (or not solely alleviate), for example, a lack of self-
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respect suffered due to racial discrimination. Racial discrimination usually 
includes unfair narrow distribution: black people, for example, are often paid 
less than white counterparts. The injustices they suffer, however, are not 
solely economic. Racial discrimination also includes other direct violations of 
respect-for-persons where blacks are systematically devalued and disparaged, 
such as, for example, through stereotyping in the media. How can these 
injustices be remedied purely through a redistribution of material goods?  
 
Respect is not solely expressed through the distribution of economic goods. 
How we value people cannot be expressed in economic terms alone. A 
wealthy black person is still harmed when she is treated as inferior. In such 
cases, it is respect-for-persons itself which is the concern, not the goods of 
narrow distribution. Most distributive justice theorists, Fraser claims: 
 
assume a reductive economic-cum-legalistic view of status, supposing 
that a just distribution of resources and rights is sufficient to preclude 
misrecognition. In fact, however, not all misrecognition is a by-
product of maldistribution, nor of maldistribution plus legal 
discrimination. Witness the case of the African-American Wall Street 
banker who cannot get a taxi to pick him up.89  
 
Thus although the type of injustice that leads to a lack of self-respect or 
respect may be remedied by the redistribution of material goods, this form of 
redistribution cannot be the solution or the entire solution to violations of 
                                                 
89 Fraser (1997: 93). When Fraser refers to this as a problem which is not a by-product of 
maldistribution she means narrow distribution, although she is likely to disagree with my 
claims that we should see it as a problem of even broad distributive justice. See section 5 for 
Iris Marion Youngs criticism of over-extending the distributive paradigm to include non-
material goods and my response. 
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social equality. What we would need are remedies specifically focused on 
addressing the aspects of social equality with which narrow distribution 
cannot deal.  
 
In this section, I have referred to a non-ideal world in which there are material 
inequalities which need to be addressed through material redistribution. The 
objection may be, however, that although social inequalities cannot be 
resolved through material redistribution, in a world of perfect economic 
equality, social inequalities could not exist. 
 
ii. The case of economic equality 
Consider David Humes description of a world in which there is an abundance 
of material goods:  
 
Let us suppose, that nature has bestowed on the human race such 
profuse abundance of all external conveniences, that, without any 
uncertainty in the event, without any care or industry on our part, 
every individual finds himself fully provided with whatever his most 
voracious appetites can want.90  
 
In such a world, Hume claims, there would be no need for justice, because 
there would be no rivalry over scarce goods, and thus no injustices. Although 
Hume was describing a world with an abundance of material goods, a similar 
claim can be made about the need to address social equality in a world of 
economic equality.  One could argue that although it is true that in an 
economically unequal society, social equality could still be violated, in an 
                                                 
90 Hume (1998: 83).  
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economically equal society, violations of social equality would not occur, and 
thus, economic equality must be the solution to problems of social equality. 
This is similar to Marxs claims that inequalities in social, legal and political 
status will be eliminated through economic change.91   
 
This is a tricky claim to address as it is empirical. We could speculate, 
however. Imagine a society in which there are no economic inequalities: so 
men and women, whites and blacks, and other groups likely to suffer social 
inequalities, are economically equal. Could violations of social equality occur 
in this society? I think it is safe to speculate there would be less social 
inequalities. I do not agree, however, that we would achieve perfect social 
equality.  
 
Take the case of gays and lesbians. Gays and lesbians tend to be as well off 
economically as heterosexuals. However, they suffer from pervasive 
violations of social equality expressed through stigmatisation, exclusion, 
humiliation, public and private discrimination, harassment and violence. This 
is how Will Kymlicka states the problem:  
 
many gay people feel wrongly excluded from their own national 
culture. The source of this exclusion is not any economic inequality 
Rather, they are stigmatised within their own national culture, whose 
official symbols are heterosexual.92  
 
                                                 
91 See, for example, Andrew Heywood (2003: 126-7) on Marxs claim that social 
consciousness and the legal and political superstructure arise from the economic base, the 
real foundation of society. 
92 Kymlicka (2002: 330). 
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Although your position on the status hierarchy often corresponds to your 
position in the economic hierarchy, this relationship is not necessary. It is 
possible, in fact, to be in inverse positions on the status and economic 
hierarchies. Gays and lesbians are probably as likely as heterosexuals to be in 
a privileged position on the economic hierarchy but are in a disadvantaged 
position when it comes to the status hierarchy. There are thus cases where 
social and economic status do not correspond. In these cases, where social 
status is low but economic status is not, it seems very unlikely that a society 
characterised by economic equality will eliminate social inequalities. Thus it 
seems that violations of social equality could occur even in a perfectly 
economically equal society.  
 
2.4.2. Formal equality is not sufficient for achieving social equality 
 
i. The non-ideal 
Formal equality differs from social equality because it is focused only on 
equality determined by the law and by formal rules. This leaves the informal, 
the personal choice of individuals and the private rules of associations, 
unaddressed by formal equality. Severe disadvantages are embedded not only 
in the law or in economic structures but also in social structure and 
interaction. We cannot and should not sanction the legislation of all aspects of 
life: we should not, for example, compel people to stop being snobs or to stop 
using derogatory language or to make unjust private decisions about family 
life and yet we still need to find some way to acknowledge and describe these 
violations of social equality; which we cannot do using the notion of formal 
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equality alone. In a non-ideal world then, formal equality cannot fully address 
social equality because it cannot address informal inequalities. 
 
Furthermore, I have claimed that even where social and formal equality 
overlap, within the ambit of legal and political equality, formal equality is still 
insufficient for describing social equality because this form of equality is 
concerned with relationships and with motivation whereas formal equality is 
concerned with the law. In this case, imperfections in the law may make it 
necessary to rely on more than the formal to describe a society of equals when 
both social and formal equality are violated. Here, we can make a distinction 
between what the law demands and where formal equality is socially 
operative. Take the example of sexual harassment suffered by women. We 
cannot say that sexual harassment is a matter of personal choice when the law 
forbids this form of behaviour. Thus sexual harassment falls under the ambit 
of formal equality. However, this is not always socially operative, i.e. the law 
is often unwilling or unable to act against harassment. Women may be 
protected from harassment in the workplace through legislation but it is 
impractical to expect the law to protect women in many other circumstances, 
for example, from strangers in the street or in informal contexts. What this 
means is that in certain cases, even where formal equality is at issue, we 
cannot use only a notion of formal equality to describe the inequality in this 
situation. The problem is not solely that someone has violated the law or that 
the law is not socially operative when a woman is sexually harassed; this 
cannot be the sum of inequality. Besides imperfections in the law and so on, in 
these situations, the problem is a failure of informal social equality; it is a 
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failure on the part of those who commit harassment to uphold respect-for-
persons.  
 
ii. The transition from injustice to justice and the ideal fair 
society 
A response to this is that when it comes to an ideally fair society, there will be 
no imperfections of the law and thus formal equality will adequately address 
violations of social equality where these violations are also forbidden by the 
law. One could go further and argue that in an ideally fair society or in a 
society that has become fair, violations of social equality, including violations 
through personal choice, will no longer occur. According to this claim, perfect 
formal equality results in social equality. The types of values underlying 
formal equality in a society that has become fair, so the argument could go, 
will filter down into consciousness and motivation. So, for example, in 
response to claims that the British police force is racist, according to this 
argument, direct intervention is unnecessary: conservative members of the 
force who espouse racist beliefs and attitudes cannot be forced to change but 
will eventually be replaced by newer, mainly younger, members who espouse 
the values common to liberal societies. 
 
Like the issue of perfect economic equality, this is an empirical question. 
There is evidence for there being something to this claim. Clearly the values 
reflected by the laws and institutions of a fair society do not develop 
instantaneously and part of the explanation for why fair norms and values 
become more widely espoused has to do with the influence of formal 
institutional justice. Take post-apartheid South Africa as an example: in a 
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country where racism is a deeply-entrenched norm, establishing a democratic 
constitution, legislation and measures to redress the inequalities between 
white and black will not lead to immediate changes in the ways in which 
people treat each other, but it is likely that after time, when for example, 
racists see that democracy is working well, they may come to accept 
democratic values. An even stronger case can be made for an ideally fair 
society where there is no history of injustice. It can be argued that no 
violations of social equality would occur because there has never been a 
history of oppression and discrimination.  
 
There are at least two problems, however, with the claim that social equality 
will simply develop from formal equality. The first is that it seems to assume 
an absurd social ontology in the relationship between values and formal 
equality. We can say that formal equality will reinforce fair values or that it 
can make those values more widespread but we cannot claim that those values 
develop solely from formal equality, for if these values are the values 
underlying formal equality they are clearly already at least partially present. 
We cannot believe that formal justice develops in a social vacuum, 
unconnected to the values and norms reflected in the broader society, and thus 
we cannot simply claim that the values of social equality develop from formal 
justice. It is likely that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between 
informal social equality and formal equality. The egalitarian values that 
inform formal equality need to be to some extent present for formal equality 
to occur; in turn the justness of the state provides a formal expression of the 
values of equality which will reinforce an egalitarian ethos, and so on. That 
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social equality is not merely a straight-forward product of formal equality 
means that in describing a society of equals, one would need to include both 
formal and informal equality.  
 
The second problem is that I do not believe that it is clear that violations of 
social equality would not occur in an ideal fair state. As Cohen has pointed 
out, unjust personal choices, such as a gendered division of household labour, 
could still occur as personal choice is not restricted by fair laws.93 If we do not 
rule out such injustices, by describing a fair and equal society as one with both 
formal and informal equality, then there can be no guarantee that a so-called 
fair state is necessarily fair. If social equality is not a requirement, then a 
hypothetical society with perfect formal equality (and a fair scheme of 
economic distribution) but with pervasive disrespect, snobbery, bias and 
discrimination, could be called a society of equals, when it seems clearly that 
it is not, and calling it fair seems as spurious if we consider that violations of 
social equality are also interferences with opportunities and self-respect. 
  
Although formal equality and narrow distributive justice are required for 
achieving social equality and although there is much more that can and should 
be done through the law and through distribution to secure social equality and 
justice in liberal democracies, it seems unfeasible that this is all that is 
required. This means that in our descriptions of a society of equals and a fair 
society we need more than merely descriptions of formal equality and narrow 
distribution; we also need to include social equality.  
                                                 
93 Cohen (2000: 136-142). 
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3. What social equality requires: an egalitarian ethos 
 
When we examined Rawlss conception of social justice in the previous 
chapter, I claimed that Rawlss primary concern is how a fair society should 
be organised. We can ask a similar question about social equality. If I say that 
formal equality and narrow distribution are not sufficient for describing how a 
society should be organised to achieve equality, then how should it be 
organised? A similar question we can ask, by linking social equality to 
distributive justice, is how do we organise society to encourage a fair 
distribution of the goods influenced by social equality, such as the social basis 
of self-respect? These seem to be particularly challenging questions to 
answer because it is informal social equality which is being neglected and this 
form of social equality includes individual behaviour, for example. How can 
we describe how individual behaviour needs to be organised without 
sacrificing the rights and freedoms of formal equality, or simply, how can we 
organise individual behaviour? The best way to describe this, I believe, is 
according to a social ethos.94 
 
Individual behaviour and the organisation of particular associations are not 
atomistic: they function within a larger social context which provides them 
with meaning. Violations of equality, where these contribute to or result from 
the disadvantage of social groups, although they are expressed by individuals, 
are pervasive patterns of value and behaviour. These patterns of violations 
                                                 
94 Cohen (2000), Mason (2000) and Wolff (1998; 2003) claim that an ethos could be a 
necessary requirement of a fair or equal society. 
 148 
should not exist within a society of equals, so in order to describe what a 
society of equals would look like, we would need something to capture 
pervasive patterns of not violating social equality or patterns of value and 
behaviour which uphold social equality. We can refer to the structure of 
norms that determines such a pattern as an egalitarian ethos. I will explore the 
answers to three questions in this section: (1) what is an ethos? (2) what is an 
egalitarian ethos? and (3) why would social equality require an egalitarian 
ethos as opposed to rules or laws governing individual behaviour? 
 
I am going to describe an ethos as a set of values which are translated into 
norms or principles and which, in turn, are applied to individual behaviour in 
the form of (i) an assessment of behaviour and (ii) motivation for behaviour.95 
In application to behaviour, an ethos does two things. Firstly, it provides an 
assessment of behaviour: conduct which conforms to the values and norms of 
the ethos are encouraged and behaviour which violates those values and 
norms are discouraged, even sanctioned. As an ethos is part of informal social 
structure rather than formal legislation, sanctions are informal and social, 
rather than legally coercive. Sanctions take the form of criticism, 
disapproval, anger, refusal of future cooperation, ostracism, beating and so 
on.96 Secondly, individuals internalise its values and norms, and thus are 
motivated to act from those values. This is why Cohen refers to an ethos as a 
                                                 
95 My discussion of an ethos has three important sources: G. A. Cohen (2000), Jonathan 
Wolff (1998; 2003), and Brian Fay (1996). My definition of an ethos is influenced 
particularly by Wolff (1998: 105) who explains the notion of an ethos according to values, 
principles and application: [e]ssentially  a set of underlying values, which may be explicit 
or implicit, interpreted as a set of maxims, slogans, or principles, which are then applied in 
practice.    
96 Cohen (2000: 145). 
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structure of response lodged in the motivations that inform everyday life.97 
An ethos should thus not be seen as something entirely external to the 
individual.  
 
Furthermore, we should not see an ethos as something which influences 
behaviour and which is not influenced in return. As part of social structure, an 
ethos depends on the behaviour it encourages: while it encourages conformity, 
it is reinforced, even shaped by behaviour. The stronger the influence of an 
ethos, the greater the likelihood that individuals will conform to its norms; in 
turn, the greater the number of individuals who conform to its norms, the 
stronger the influence of the ethos. Cohen uses environmental awareness as an 
example: 
 
At first, only a few people bother to save and recycle their paper, 
plastic and so forth, and they seem freaky because they do so. Then, 
more people start doing that, and, finally, it becomes not only difficult 
not to do it but easy to do it. It is pretty easy to discharge burdens that 
have become part of the normal round of everybodys life. 
Expectations determine behaviour, behaviour determines expectations, 
which determines behaviour and, so on.98  
  
An egalitarian ethos would then be a set of egalitarian values translated into 
norms which would assess and motivate behaviour. If our aim is to achieve 
social equality, the values of such an ethos would then be (i) respect-for-
persons, (ii) civility and (iii) toleration of difference. These would be 
                                                 
97 Cohen (2000: 128). 
98 Cohen (2000: 144). For a more general description of the influence of culture/ society on 
identity and the interplay between the individual and society, see Brian Fays (1996) chapter 
entitled Does our culture or society make us what we are?.   
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translated into norms such as do not discriminate against people on the basis 
of their race. Such an ethos would encourage behaviour which conformed to 
these norms and which discouraged behaviour that did not. In this way, non-
material goods such as the informal social basis of self-respect (through 
attitudes for example) could be distributed fairly. By encouraging behaviour 
which upholds social equality, an egalitarian ethos also provides a description 
of justice in personal choice.99  
 
Something more needs to be said about why particularly an ethos is required 
as part of a description of a society of equals, or a fair society. It does not 
necessarily follow logically from the claim that because of violations of social 
equality in the informal that we need to include a description of an egalitarian 
ethos in our descriptions of these societies. Legislation, for example, could be 
put in place to regulate personal choice. I will highlight three reasons why we 
should choose an ethos above further legislation.  
 
The first is that the solution I am trying to find is a solution for a liberal or 
social democracy which upholds civil liberties and freedoms. Even if we 
could legislate every aspect of individual behaviour, and practically this seems 
highly unlikely, if we did so this would hardly be compatible with the basic 
rights and freedoms which should be guaranteed each person.  
 
                                                 
99 There will undoubtedly always be many different ethi in one particular society. I am not 
claiming that an egalitarian ethos would be the only one. Besides ethi that are neutral about 
equality, it is likely that there will probably also be inegalitarian ethi; and there would 
potentially also be different kinds of egalitarian ethi. How strong and how predominant an 
egalitarian ethos would need to be, I cannot say, however, as this would require empirical 
research.  
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The second point, and this is related to my claims about the difference 
between formal and social equality, is that legislation cannot achieve what it is 
we want to achieve when we talk about a society of equals. Social equality 
demands equality in the form of respect, civility and toleration from 
individuals, reflected in their interactions and relationships. If we directly 
coerce people into social equality, we have not achieved social equality, 
which is concerned with what motivates behaviour, not merely with whether 
or not individuals comply with the law or a set of standards. From the 
perspective of social equality, we make laws to protect individuals against 
violations of equality in relationships but these laws should be last resorts, not 
the basis of equality. The answer to the problem of justice in the informal is 
thus not to make choice legally enforceable or to subject it to formal rules, but 
to describe equality in the form of an ethos of respect, civility and toleration, 
with legislation providing a safety net to ensure that rights are not violated. 
Indeed, we would not be able to achieve social equality in informal structure 
through legislation or formal rules: the point is to achieve social equality in 
the informal, not to make the informal, formally coercive.   
 
A third reason is that the law will always have imperfections which means we 
need something more than merely the law to address violations of social 
equality. No matter how stringently anti-discrimination laws are enforced, no 
matter how liberal a constitution may be, legal and procedural mechanisms for 
justice are unable to combat all violations of social equality even if these 
violations are against the law. Social pressure exerted through the norms of an 
egalitarian ethos serves to encourage egalitarian behaviour within personal 
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choice and within associations, covering behaviour which legislation cannot 
address. 
 
4. The significance of social equality 
 
When we start looking at how social equality would apply as distinguished 
from formal or distributive equality, its relevance can become easily 
misunderstood because we are dealing with the everyday world of choice, 
attitudes and relationships, a world where differences are so much a part of 
what we expect that what we mean by equality in these attitudes and 
interactions is not necessarily apparent. It is clear that formal equality is 
essential: we are not considered and treated as equals if we do not have the 
requisite political and legal rights and protections. Once we apply our social 
ideal of equality to the informal, however, thus to a realm of application 
beyond the formal, making it more clearly distinct, the significance of social 
equality could be questioned.  
 
In its concern for personal choice and ordinary relationships, is social equality 
claiming, in contrast to common-sense and everyday practice, that I should 
treat a stranger in the same way as I treat my best friend, or is social equality 
merely expressing a banality, why cant we all just get along? Understood in 
either of these ways, social equality is problematic: according to the former it 
is absurd, the latter, trivial. It is not absurd, however: social equality should 
not be misunderstood as an ideal of literal equality which aims at regulating 
all relationships or all aspects of relationships according to equality. This is 
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clearly not the way human relationships can or should be understood: we treat 
loved ones differently to acquaintances, and acquaintances differently to 
strangers; we accept and indeed require some inequality between parents and 
children, employers and employees, teachers and students, and so on.  
 
If social equality, however, is not advocating a breakdown of all hierarchies 
and inequalities, can it really be so significant? Surely if it is not advocating a 
radical rethink of relationships it can only be the trivial platitude that we 
should be nicer to each other?  
 
The significance of social equality becomes easier to understand when we 
remind ourselves of the harm that is caused by its violations. It is not trivial: 
what social equality is opposed to is discrimination, unfair social hierarchies, 
injustices, oppression, and as such, social equality matters greatly. Social 
equality outside of the bounds of traditionally-conceived social justice, 
detractors may claim, is a pointless focus on symbolism and language, 
something akin to political correctness gone mad. Commenting on 
controversy caused by a wheelchair called spazz, a disabled comedian 
claimed that it is patronising of the able-bodied to become outraged on the 
behalf of the disabled over derogatory words.100 An emphasis on the harm of 
names, he maintains, deviates from the real issues which the disabled face: a 
lack of rights and unequal material conditions. There are three responses to 
this type of objection.  
 
                                                 
100 My source is the BBC Radio 4 programme, You and yours (21/07/2005).  
 154 
Firstly, an emphasis on symbolic injustices, such as derogatory language, does 
not need to detract from formal equality and narrow distribution. Social 
equality requires the full complement of human rights and liberties and a fair 
scheme for the distribution of income and wealth; it does not merely focus on 
the symbolic. Brian Barry, however, has argued that although it may be 
conceptually possible to attend to both problems of recognition and 
redistribution, practically we cannot address both: trying to resolve symbolic 
and cultural injustices will jeopardise redistribution, and thus, he argues, our 
focus should be redistribution.101 There is some doubt, however, about the 
empirical accuracy of Barrys claims. Discussing multiculturalism, Kymlicka 
claims that there is no evidence to support Barrys claims, and, in fact, there is 
fragmentary evidence for a contrary claim: he points out that evidence from 
Canada and Australia seems to suggest that multicultural politics might 
promote social unity.102  
 
Secondly, social equality beyond formal equality and narrow distribution is 
not concerned with symbolic injustices alone: for example, choices made in 
the family about education and the division of household labour which violate 
social equality are also often violations of fair equality of opportunity. If we 
care about fair equality of opportunity it is important to care about violations 
of informal social equality.  
 
Thirdly, I think that claims that symbolic injustices are insignificant 
underestimate or do not consider the harm that these injustices can cause by 
                                                 
101 Kymlikca (2000: 376 n.43).  
102 Kymlicka (2000: 367). 
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diminishing self-respect and by interfering with the formation of conceptions 
of the good. Developing a notion of ones own self-worth requires some 
positive feedback from others; when people are systematically devalued they 
risk suffering substantial harms to self-respect, among others. Insults or 
degradation, as Axel Honneth claims, impairs these persons in their positive 
understanding of self- an understanding acquired by intersubjective means.103  
 
5. The relationship between social equality and justice 
 
An objection common to the claim that we need to consider justice beyond 
material distribution and equal rights is that when we move beyond these 
institutional measures we are no longer engaged with justice. Charles Taylor 
and Seyla Benhabib, for example, claim that focusing on narrow distribution 
is problematic but this is not a problem of justice which per definition is 
concerned with the distribution of material goods, and with this distribution 
alone.104 An analysis of institutional frameworks and social structure, so they 
claim, moves beyond distribution and thus beyond justice.  
 
Furthermore, as social equality emphasises equality in personal choice, 
discussions of social equality are open to the criticism that they confuse 
morality with justice. Violations of social equality, so the objection goes, may 
be wrong but they are wrong in the same way as telling a lie may be wrong or 
greed may be wrong. These are issues of ethics; they are not concerns of 
political philosophy and social justice. Often, underlying this criticism is the 
                                                 
103 C.f. Fraser (1997: 14). 
104 Young (1990: 34-5). 
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assumption that justice is a matter of state, meaning governance, not of 
society or of individual behaviour. When we talk about justice, according to 
this assumption, we need necessarily to be talking about something 
enforceable by law.105 I disagree, however, that reference to social equality 
requires moving beyond the framework of justice.  
 
My disagreement lies not in a specific definition of justice but in the way the 
term and its scope are commonly understood both by theorists and in 
everyday life. Firstly, think of Rawlss project of social justice: he is 
concerned with how to arrange society in such a way as to achieve the best 
fair distribution of primary social goods. According to how I have described 
social equality, the goods of social equality, which include primary Rawlsian 
social goods such as opportunities and the social basis of self-respect, will be 
distributed whether or not we recognise the importance of social equality. If 
then we are concerned with how to arrange society so as to achieve the best 
distribution of these goods we need also to be concerned with achieving social 
equality. Part then of describing distributive justice in a society would be to 
describe it as requiring an egalitarian ethos. Moreover, the harms that result 
from violations of social equality, such as a violation of fair equality of 
opportunity and diminished self-respect, are accepted by theorists as 
interferences with justice; the disagreement lies not with whether these are 
relevant to justice but with whether fair equality of opportunity and self-
                                                 
105 Take Jan Narveson (1998: 79) as an example: we are considering here the claim that 
equality of the type in question is a demand of justice, to be imposed by force of law. 
Admittedly though there is some ambiguity here; although I am taking it that what he means 
is that a demand of justice is necessarily imposed by force of law, he could mean that it is a 
demand of justice and it is to be imposed by force of law. Despite this ambiguity, it seems 
uncontroversial, however, to claim that justice is frequently associated with what is imposed 
by the law. 
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respect can feasibly be dealt, without addressing the justice of personal choice 
and of associations.  
 
Additionally, much of what we consider to be part of social equality is related 
to the oppression of and discrimination against members of disadvantaged 
social groups. As such the onus is on those who believe that we have moved 
beyond the scope of justice to demonstrate why this is the case, as oppression 
and pervasive discrimination are clearly injustices. Why would it be then that 
when we consider these forms of injustice from the perspective of formal 
equality and of narrow distribution that we are dealing with the issue of justice 
but when we view these from the perspective of social equality we have 
moved beyond justice?  
 
Lastly, political theory explicitly or implicitly relies on assumptions about the 
duties or virtues of individuals which problematises the claim that justice is a 
concern of the state and is far-removed from individual behaviour. William 
Galston, for example, has argued that although liberalism claims to demand 
little from the individual, in reality, a fair state requires liberal virtues: liberal 
theory, institutions, and society embody and depend upon individual 
virtue.106 Thus defining justice according to a distinction between state and 
society or state and citizens seems untenable.    
 
To say that social equality deals with morality and not justice merely 
reiterates the point that my discussion of social equality is trying to refute: 
                                                 
106 Galston (1991: 215). 
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formal equality and narrow distribution are insufficient for justice and 
equality. If we neglect social equality, I have argued, we neglect important 
injustices. That those injustices may be perpetrated in the realm of the 
private, of personal choice and of associations, should not make them any 
less problems of justice. Besides, this view that it is society not merely 
government that perpetrates injustices is not a novel or entirely unusual idea 
in liberal theory. After all, it is John Stuart Mill who argued that it is not only 
political tyranny that should be guarded against, but also social tyranny:  
 
Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong 
mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which 
it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable 
than any kinds of political oppression Protection, therefore against 
the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough.107 
 
This is not to say, however, that I believe that social equality and justice are 
interchangeable. I am simply claiming that there is an important overlap 
between them without saying that everything that has to do with social 
equality necessarily has to do with justice nor that social equality provides a 
sufficient understanding of justice.  
 
Iris Marion Young would be likely to provide a different type of objection to 
my association of social equality with distributive justice. For Young, the 
problem is describing oppression and discrimination in distributive terms.108 
                                                 
107 Mill (1991: 26). Of course, using Mill to defend my claims can be problematic. Mills 
claims about social tyranny could be used as an argument against an egalitarian ethos. I will 
address this objection in chapter V. 
108 Young (1990).  
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Young claims that it is mistaken to use a model of distribution to capture the 
injustices associated with decision-making, culture, the division of labour, 
domination, rights and power.109 She identifies two problems with using a 
distributive model: the first is that theorists of justice tend to focus on the 
distribution of material goods and ignore the social structure and institutional 
context that often help determine distributive patterns.110 As my concern is 
with non-material goods, I will not address this objection as it does not apply 
to my claims or to Rawlss conception of justice, which provides the 
framework for this thesis.  
 
Her second objection is relevant however: she claims that where theorists like 
Rawls include non-material goods, such as rights and the social basis of self-
respect, in their conceptions of justice, the distributive paradigm represents 
them as though they were static things, instead of a function of social relations 
and processes.111 My first response to this criticism is pragmatic: I am using 
a distributive model as I aim to provide an internal critique of Rawlss justice 
and thus I am framing my inquiry in his terms. My second response is more 
substantive however. It is that I see no necessary relationship between using a 
distributive paradigm and ignoring the social relations, such as domination 
and oppression, which determine the distribution of non-material goods. I 
agree with Young that a successful description of social justice requires an 
acknowledgement of the significance of social relations, but I disagree that 
distribution is necessarily unsuccessful here: you can describe justice in terms 
                                                 
109 Young (1990: 8).  
110 Young (1990: 15). 
111 Young (1990: 16). 
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of distribution while ignoring social relations or you can describe distribution 
according to social relations.  
 
As an example of what she means, Young claims that rights are not usefully 
understood as things which people possess: 
 
We can conceive of a society in which some persons are granted these 
rights  [such as free speech] while others are not, but this does not 
mean that some people have a certain amount or portion of a good 
while others have less. Altering the situation so that everyone has 
these rights, moreover, would not entail that the formerly privileged 
group gives over some of its right of free speech112  
 
Part of her point is to claim that rights cannot be described in the same way as 
material goods: there is no need to deprive some people of rights if we wanted 
to grant others more rights as if these are scarce material goods. Point taken, 
however, this says nothing about the problem of using a distributive paradigm 
to describe rights; it merely tells us that we should not use a paradigm of 
narrow distribution to describe the distribution of non-material goods, a point 
I emphasised when I claimed that the goods of narrow distribution and social 
equality are often distinct, and thus we need to address deficiencies in both. 
Distribution is simply a useful way of describing who gets what and how 
much but in describing who gets what you need not nor should not ignore the 
causal story of how and why they are getting what they are getting.  
 
                                                 
112 Young (1990: 25). 
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Conclusion 
 
In the introduction, I claimed that the aim of this chapter would be to 
determine what social equality is and to demonstrate that it has value 
independent from narrow distribution and formal equality. I have argued that 
social equality is: 
 
1. Respect-for-persons, which has two negative requirements: (i) not treating 
people according to unacceptable hierarchies of value and (ii) not 
dehumanising; 
2. Civility; and 
3. Toleration of difference. 
  
Social equality, I have argued, is distinguishable from narrow distribution and 
formal equality both constitutively and causally: 
 
1. Narrow distribution cannot adequately capture social equality because it 
relies on a model of distribution based on goods that are material and scarce. 
Furthermore, narrow distribution cannot fully result in social equality because 
it can only address interferences with respect and self-respect where these are 
functions of economic injustices. 
 
2. Formal equality cannot adequately capture social equality because its scope 
is necessarily limited to legislation and policy, whereas social equality is 
committed to a society of equals which demands equality beyond the law.  
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This means that formal equality cannot fully result in social equality because 
it cannot address injustices that arise in the informal: the realm of personal 
choice, and so on. Furthermore, trying to reduce social equality to formal 
equality cannot be successful as the point of social equality is to achieve equal 
respect in relationships, not to achieve equality mediated by the law.  
 
What we are missing from current descriptions of a fair society is the notion 
of an egalitarian ethos. A fair society would include an egalitarian ethos which 
motivates fair personal choice, thus achieving informal social equality and not 
merely formal equality or a fair distribution of material goods. Without such 
an ethos, which would encourage the values of respect-for-persons, civility 
and toleration, social goods such as opportunities and the social basis of self-
respect would be distributed unequally, with those devalued receiving too few 
of these goods.  
 
I have argued in this chapter that informal social equality, thus social equality 
in personal choice and associations, is a requirement of distributive justice 
unique from formal equality and narrow distribution. In the previous chapter I 
analysed Rawlss conception of social justice. In the next chapter I will use 
the notion of social equality that I have developed to evaluate Rawlss justice 
to determine whether it addresses social equality, particularly informal social 
equality and justice in choice. I will argue that it does not.  
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III. Justice-as-fairness and violations of social equality 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
In chapter I, I claimed that in Rawlss theory of justice priority is placed on 
the application of the institutional principles of justice to the basic structure. I 
also argued, however, that despite this emphasis, one does not need to read 
Rawls in such a way that justice-as-fairness consists only of such institutional 
measures to achieve justice. I claimed that according to one reading of the 
principles of justice, what I referred to as the extensive view, justice-as-
fairness could be compatible with additional principles of justice applied to 
subjects of justice besides the basic structure. In chapter II, I argued that 
distributive justice needs to take account not only of formal equality and 
narrow distribution but also of social equality, which demands respect-for-
persons, civility and toleration from both institutions and individuals. Thus 
far, we can say that what has been established is that informal social equality 
is an important component not only of a society of equals but also of broad 
distributive justice, and thus this implies that Rawls should accommodate the 
demands of informal social equality (chapter II) and that he can accommodate 
principles of justice other than the institutional or other subjects of justice 
besides the basic structure, i.e. justice-as-fairness can be read as being 
compatible with measures for justice besides the institutional (chapter I). In 
this chapter, however, I will argue that justice-as-fairness does not provide 
fully for the demands of social equality.  
 
The question I aim to answer in this chapter is: 
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Could violations of social equality still occur in a society regulated by the 
institutional principles of justice? 
 
I will examine (1) the implications for social equality of the institutional 
measures of justice (i.e. the 3-step application of the institutional principles of 
justice)1 with particular reference to the problem of injustice in the family and 
(2) Rawlss treatment of the notions of respect and self-respect. Respect and 
self-respect are also important components of social equality. In the broader 
context of this thesis this chapter aims to demonstrate that Rawlss justice is 
indeed lacking when it comes to addressing informal social equality, at least 
when we consider his notion of institutional justice. 
 
In the first section I will argue that, at best, justice-as-fairness is only able to 
provide measures for achieving social equality through formal equality, fair 
equality of opportunity and a fair scheme of narrow distribution. It thus 
neglects violations of social equality which occur informally, such as 
injustices in the family. I will also argue that although the values of social 
equality, such as respect, appear to play an essential role in Rawlss justice, 
Rawls neither has the correct notion of respect and self-respect in order to 
address social equality, nor does he consider the significance of respect 
through informal behaviour. In the second section I will revisit the two 
interpretations of the principles of justice in justice-as-fairness, the exclusive 
and the extensive views, and compare how informal social equality could be 
                                                 
1 Perhaps there are non-institutional measures for justice which could apply to social equality. 
In chapter I, we determined that Rawls does recognise principles for individuals. I will 
consider whether the application of these could still allow for violations of social equality in 
chapter V.  
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reconciled with justice-as-fairness according to these conflicting 
interpretations.   
 
1. The three-step application of the institutional principles and 
the problem of informal social equality 
 
In chapter I, I summarised Rawlss institutional solution for justice as a 3-step 
application of the institutional principles of justice. The institutional 
principles, of equal liberty, fair equality of opportunity and the difference 
principle, apply (1) to the basic structure of society directly, (2) to individual 
behaviour and particular cases indirectly through the direct application to the 
basic structure and (3) to the outcome of processes (1) to (2). The basic 
structure seems to consist of the institutions of political form, the economic 
system, the constitution and legislation, and through their influence, to the 
public rules of other institutions. The question now is, could violations of 
social equality still occur in a society in which the 3-step process has been 
applied? Could a Rawlsian society designed and regulated by the institutional 
principles allow violations of respect-for-persons, civility and tolerance? The 
answer, I will argue, is yes: it could allow violations of social equality. 
 
The problem with the 3-step application is that it does not address violations 
of informal social equality.  According to the first step of the process, the 
institutional principles are applied to the basic structure. This step may 
provide for social equality where it coincides with formal equality and fair 
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schemes for narrow distribution but it does not provide for informal social 
equality.2  
 
Formal equality establishes legal and political equality through, for example, 
legally codified rights. The first principle, which states that each person has 
an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all, is likely to demand a 
constitution which enshrines the liberties of equal citizenship as a 
requirement of fair basic structure, and thus it can be seen to provide for 
formal equality. 3 The difference principle, which demands that [s]ocial and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are  to the greatest 
advantage of the least advantaged, could demand an inheritance tax, for 
example, to ensure that inheritance benefits the worst-off, and thus it makes 
some provision for the fair distribution of material goods.4 The first step of the 
process applies directly only to political and economic institutional design and 
to determining the constitution and legislation (at least where the principles of 
justice are relevant to the distribution of the primary goods) and thus the direct 
application of the institutional principles to the basic structure will prohibit 
violations of social equality where these can be addressed through narrow 
distribution, legislation and rights.  
                                                 
2 I say it may provide for what social equality would demand of formal equality and the 
narrow distribution of material goods but it is not necessarily clear that Rawlss justice would 
provide for these demands of social equality.  Determining whether justice-as-fairness would 
uphold social equality through formal equality and narrow distribution would require greater 
investigation of both Rawlss theory and social equality. What is clear, however, is that at 
least something like the formal and narrow distributive demands of social equality would be 
achieved in a Rawlsian ideal society. My concern is with an aspect of social equality, the 
informal, which seems not to be addressed at all by such a Rawlsian society.  
3 The statement of the first principle is taken from Rawlss final statement of the principles of 
justice in Theory (1999: 266). The second quote is also from Theory (1999: 243). 
4 This is the final statement of the difference principle in Theory (1999: 266). Rawls discusses 
particular applications of the difference principle such as inheritance tax on pages 245-6. 
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What this step does not address, however, is the informal. Violations of social 
equality which are perpetrated through personal choice or through the rules of 
associations are not tackled. A woman in the workplace, for example, would 
benefit from the rights of formal equality and from pay equity which may 
result as part of a Rawlsian scheme of justice but she will not be protected 
from damage to self-respect and to her life-chances through, for example, 
private discrimination, verbal abuse and harassment, marginalization and 
incivility. Formal rights and money may go some way to make her feel valued 
but it does not go all the way: to be treated as a valued and respected equal 
member of society she needs to be treated as worthy beyond the formal realm 
and beyond the distribution of material goods.  
 
Although the subject of the second step of the application includes individual 
behaviour it still does not apply to the informal: the institutional principles are 
only applied to individual behaviour through the initial direct application of 
the institutional principles to the basic structure. So the principles only apply 
to individual behaviour, for example, by guaranteeing rights through the 
constitution and by enforcing particular systems of taxation. Individual 
behaviour is not actually evaluated according to the principles of justice but 
rather it is evaluated according to whether it conforms to the demands of a 
legislative and distributive structure which is determined by the principles. As 
long as individuals do not violate the rules determined by the principles, the 
institutional solution has nothing to say about individual behaviour: 
individuals and associations may do as they wish insofar as the rules of 
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institutions permit.5 Personal choice and the rules of associations are thus left 
unevaluated by principles of justice. 
 
The third step of the process, the application of the principles to steps (1)  
(2), again does not apply to the informal. This third step is necessary to ensure 
that justice is maintained. If we regulate the basic structure according to the 
institutional principles, over time, injustices could still occur, thus we would 
need to adjust the basic structure where necessary to ensure that justice is 
sustained:  
 
The two principles also specify an ideal form for the basic structure in 
the light of which ongoing institutional and procedural processes are 
constrained and adjusted. Among these constraints are the limits on the 
accumulation of property We need such an ideal to guide the 
adjustments necessary to preserve background justice.6    
 
Rawlss just state will not be determined once-off by the institutional 
principles. Even if we have institutions and policies designed by the principles 
of justice, unfair inequalities such as an accumulation of wealth and property 
may still occur and thus ongoing monitoring and possibly adjustment is 
necessary. We can use the principles to evaluate the fairness of inequalities 
that could arise and make adjustments to institutional rules and policy in the 
light of any newly developed injustices. As this application remains focused 
on the basic structure, which does not include the informal, it will not, 
                                                 
5 Rawls (2001a: 50).   
6 Rawls (1993: 259). 
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however, correct violations of social equality that occur through personal 
choice or through the rules of associations.  
 
Formal equality and a fair distribution of material goods are not Rawlss only 
concerns. The principle of equal liberty corresponds to formal equality and the 
difference principle corresponds to narrow distribution, however, there is of 
course a third element to Rawlss justice: fair equality of opportunity. This 
form of equality of opportunity does not merely require that positions which 
confer advantage are open to all, which is the traditional understanding of 
equality of opportunity, but that those who are at the same level of talent and 
ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same 
prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system.7 So 
being born into a poor family in comparison to being born into a rich family, 
for example, should not provide you with fewer or weaker opportunities for 
attaining social advantages and successes.  
 
Although social equality cannot be reduced to fair equality of opportunity 
because violations of social equality cause harms beyond interferences with 
opportunities, such as a lack of self-respect, social equality and fair equality of 
opportunity do overlap. Firstly, equality of opportunity is often stated in terms 
of an opposition to hierarchies of social status.8 Secondly, violations of social 
                                                 
7 Rawls (1999: 63). See, for example, Arneson (1999; 2002) for a detailed description of 
various forms of equality of opportunity and for a criticism of Rawlss fair equality of 
opportunity.  
8 See, for example, Arneson (2002): Equality of opportunity is a political ideal that is 
opposed to caste hierarchy but not to hierarchy per se when equality of opportunity 
prevails, the assignment of individuals to places in the social hierarchy is determined by some 
form of competitive process, and all members of society are eligible to compete on equal 
terms. 
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equality can be violations of fair equality of opportunity. When individuals 
are denied education or jobs because they belong to a devalued social group, 
both social equality and fair equality of opportunity are violated. However, the 
application of the principle of fair equality of opportunity to institutional 
structure still does not solve the problems posed by violations of social 
equality. Firstly, this is precisely because social equality is necessary beyond 
merely establishing fair equality of opportunity but also because the 
application of this principle remains at an institutional level, which like the 
principle of equal liberty and the difference principle, does not address 
informal injustices: a girl who is denied the same educational opportunities as 
her brothers by her parents would be a case in point here, or any rigid gender 
socialisation which encouraged girls to be less ambitious than boys.  
 
For the institutional principles to account for social equality, they would have 
to ensure that, in the informal, individuals uphold respect-for-persons, civility 
and toleration (although this could be a result of the application of these 
principles; they need not do so directly). Yet, if the institutional principles are 
only applied to public rules and only to the informal indirectly, I am unsure 
how they would ensure that these values are upheld in personal interactions 
and in civil society, and so on. They do not rule out unacceptable devaluing, 
nor certain forms of dehumanisation, such as the social coercion of what 
should be autonomous choices, nor do they require civility or toleration.    
 
That the 3-step application does not apply to the informal should come as no 
surprise. Applying the institutional principles to the informal would be 
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inconsistent with Rawlss stipulations that these principles do not apply 
directly to individual behaviour and associations.9 The application of the 
institutional principles aims to establish formal equality and fair equality of 
opportunity within the basic structure and to manage institutional design and 
policy to establish a fair scheme of narrow distribution. This is likely to 
prohibit violations of social equality which coincide with violations of formal 
equality, fair equality of opportunity and narrow distribution, but they will not 
address informal violations. Although one can argue Rawls intends not to 
address the informal through the application of the institutional principles and 
thus it is not necessarily a criticism to say that these principles cannot fully 
address social equality, something, however, needs to be done about 
addressing injustices of social equality even if it is not through the principles 
applied to the basic structure.  
 
1.1. The problem of the family again 
 
[I]t would be difficult to deny that the family has been a, if not the, 
major site of the oppression of women. Love and care do exist in 
families. So too do domestic violence, marital rape, child sex abuse, 
undernutrition of girls, unequal health care, unequal educational 
opportunities, and countless more intangible violations of dignity and 
equal personhood.10 
 
What one can accuse Rawls of is over-estimating the institutional principles. 
When it comes to the family, for example, Rawls insists that justice-as-
                                                 
9 See, for example, Rawls (1999: 47; 2001b: 10).  
10 Nussbaum (2000: 243). 
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fairness can cope adequately with gender inequalities. However, his claim 
seems to be that the institutional principles applied to the basic structure alone 
will secure gender equality:  
 
Since wives are equally citizens with their husbands, they have all the 
same basic rights, liberties, and opportunities as their husbands; and 
this together with the correct application of the other principles of 
justice, suffices to secure their equality and independence.11 
 
When Rawls refers to the other principles of justice, he does not mean 
principles other than the institutional principles: in the first half of the 
sentence he is referring to the first principle (of equal liberty) and thus the 
other principles of justice are fair equality of opportunity and the difference 
principle. So, for Rawls, the application of the institutional principles 
suffices to secure gender equality. This, however, cannot be the case 
according to social equality which demands that respect-for-persons, among 
others, is secured not only on a legislative level but also in private behaviour. 
If the institutional principles do not apply to everyday individual behaviour, 
and Rawls insists that they do not, then some other measures for justice need 
to provide for respect-for-persons expressed through everyday behaviour.  
 
The gendered distribution of household labour is an example of the problem.12 
When women perform the majority of household tasks, all other things being 
equal, this could interfere with their opportunities for leisure, education and 
                                                 
11 Rawls (2001g: 597). 
12 This is one of the examples that Cohen (2000: 139) uses in order to demonstrate that unjust 
personal choice is still possible in a Rawlsian society. In the next chapter, I will consider his 
argument in more detail.  
 173 
career development, and it would thus seem to be unfair if women are 
pressurised or (socially) coerced into this imbalanced division of labour 
simply because they are women. Yet, the application of the institutional 
principles to the basic structure cannot condemn such a distribution of 
household tasks as unjust because the principles of justice are precluded from 
applying to personal choice at any stage of the 3-step application.  
 
Rawls argues that a gendered division of labour cannot be prohibited because 
this would interfere with the basic liberties;13 as Martha Nussbaum claims, It 
just seems an intolerable infringement of liberty for the state to get involved in 
dictating how people do their dishes.14 The concern, however, is with how to 
describe a fair society, and if we do not include requirements for justice in 
personal choice, we cannot claim that at times a gendered division of labour is 
unjust: we do not need to, should not in a free society, legally prohibit all 
unjust choices but this does not mean we should not even consider whether 
they are indeed fair. Although Rawls claims that this division of labour cannot 
be prohibited, he does claim that where it is involuntary it should be reduced 
to zero.15 Now there are two related points to emphasise here. One is being 
able to even judge whether or not something that is the function of choice can 
be conceived of as fair or unfair. The other is how we would describe a fair 
society if we recognised that choice could be fair or unfair and that justice in 
choice should be a requirement of such a society.  
 
                                                 
13 Rawls (2001g: 599-600). 
14 Nussbaum (2000: 280). 
15 Rawls (2001g: 600). 
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In relation to the first issue, why is it that Rawls should be concerned about 
reducing involuntary gendered household labour, where household labour is at 
least partially a function of choice (as opposed to legislation or public rules)? 
With what is he judging this choice, if we cant either judge choice according 
to the institutional principles, and Rawls claims we cannot, or we do not have 
any other standards with which to judge choice (and about this we can say that 
either Rawls is against judging justice in choice by any other standards, which 
would conform to the exclusive view of the status of principles of justice, or 
he does not explicitly affirm such standards)? So why is he concerned? He 
claims that If the gendered division of labor in the family is indeed fully 
voluntary, then there is reason to think that the single system [the basic 
structure] realizes fair equality of opportunity for both genders.16 This seems 
to be an admission that we do indeed require informal justice because it seems 
that Rawls is conceding that an involuntary division of labour would interfere 
with fair opportunities.17 However Rawls may be judging such choices as 
unfair, by the institutional principles or some other standards, this would then 
bring us to the next point which is how do we account for justice in household 
labour and thus justice in personal choice in our descriptions of a fair society?  
 
Unsurprisingly Rawlss answer seems to be that justice in household labour 
would occur through the regulation of the basic structure by the institutional 
principles: he claims, in the above quote, that it would be the basic structure 
                                                 
16 Rawls (2001g: 600).  
17 Unless he denies that this division of labour is related to choice. Although clearly 
government policy, such as funding day-care facilities, can influence decisions about 
household labour, unless gendered divisions are prohibited, and Rawls claims they cannot be 
because of the principle of equal liberty, then he must concede that they are subject to the 
informal, thus to choice, norms, and so on. 
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that would realise fair equality of opportunity. How is it though that the 
application of the institutional principles to the basic structure would achieve 
justice in choice, if it does not apply to choice? Either then the institutional 
principles should apply to choice or some other principles should. The only 
alternative I can see is if Rawls believes that by making the public rules of 
institutions fair, then somehow the informal will become fair. There may be 
something to this interpretation, as Rawls emphasises that formal justice is 
likely to result in its acceptance:  
 
The liberties of the intolerant may persuade them to a belief in 
freedom. This persuasion works on the psychological principles that 
those whose liberties are protected by and who benefit from a just 
constitution will, other things equal, acquire an allegiance to it over a 
period of time.18  
 
In the previous chapter I claimed, however, that it is spurious to assume a 
simplistic relationship between formal and informal equality because each is 
likely to reinforce the other and thus, we cannot explain informal equality 
merely as a product of the formal. Furthermore, there are no guarantees that 
formal equality will result in informal equality, so if we recognise that justice 
in the informal is a requirement of justice, we must explicitly include this 
recognition in our descriptions of a fair society.  
 
This unwarranted faith in the ability of the institutional principles alone to 
secure equality is particularly peculiar when Rawls goes on to claim, in 
response to John Stuart Mills notion that the family is a school for male 
                                                 
18 Rawls (1999: 192). 
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despotism, that the principles of justice can plainly be invoked to reform the 
family.19 How can the principles of justice be used to reform gender 
inequalities conditioned by the family when these principles are not meant to 
apply to personal choice and informal social structure, considering that these 
inequalities, if inculcated by the family, are clearly neither necessarily or only 
caused by legislation or a lack of rights or distribution, nor necessarily directly 
influenced by it? From his discussion of the gendered division of labour and 
of the family more generally, Rawls seems to implicitly recognise something 
of the need for informal justice but he seems under the misapprehension that 
the institutional principles applied to public rules will secure informal justice. 
  
It is interesting that Rawls chooses to focus his discussion of the family on 
adult women. He claims that if choices, such as who should bear the brunt of 
household labour, are voluntary and do not result from or lead to injustice, 
then they are not a problem according to political liberalism.20 Although of 
course there is some question, which Rawls recognises, as to whether and 
which choices can be said to be voluntary or involuntary, I agree that if such 
choices are genuinely voluntary then they are not a concern of either social 
equality or justice.21 According to social equality, as long as such choices do 
not occur because of devaluation or are not dehumanising, and such choices, 
if genuinely voluntary would not be, then they are not violations of respect-
for-persons; indeed such a voluntary choice should be treated with toleration. 
Furthermore, if you voluntarily choose a particular distribution of goods, in 
                                                 
19 Rawls (2001g: 598). 
20 Rawls (2001g: 599). 
21 See Andrew Mason (2000) on how gender socialisation problematises the notion that 
people should be held responsible for the consequences of even their autonomous choices. 
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this case opportunities, then the result of that choice, that you receive an 
unequal share of that good, cannot be unjust. In the family, however, and 
when it comes to gender inequalities, there is a less complicated case, where 
voluntariness of the targets of violations of equality and justice does not play a 
role, and that is with female children.22 Whatever ones conclusions may be 
about the role that rigid gender socialisation plays on the autonomy or 
voluntariness of adults choices later in life, it seems that this socialisation, 
which could interfere with a female childs ambitions, opportunities for 
education and careers (and so on), conceptions of the good, and sense of 
worth, is in of itself a violation of informal social equality and of justice in 
choice (the choice here then is not hers but her parents or caregivers, or 
such). It cannot be fair if it denies the child a fair distribution of social goods 
or a fair future distribution, and it cannot be acceptable in a society of equals 
if it devalues girls or forces them into set social roles without providing them 
with the opportunity to make their own autonomous choices, or without 
providing them with the means of making those choices.23  
 
If we require justice in the family it seems that a description of institutional 
justice will not suffice; we also need something like a description of the 
values and norms of an egalitarian ethos in which social equality will be 
upheld: 
 
                                                 
22 Children are [the familys] captives in all matters of basic survival and well-being for 
many years Nor is a childs choice to be a member of such a unit at all voluntary, as 
membership in a university is, or as membership in a church is apart from the issue of family 
pressure. (Nussbaum 2000: 274).  
23 This interference with autonomy, I take it, would be dehumanisation. 
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[W]e might say that full equality of access requires a social ethos that 
precludes the widespread, even if informal, operation of a norm which 
holds women primarily responsible for caring for their children In 
the absence of such an ethos, a fully just distribution of the benefits 
and burdens which attend these decisions seems impossible in 
practice.24  
 
Rawlss over-confidence in the institutional principles to secure justice is not 
limited to the family and to gender equality. When Rawls addresses respect 
and self-respect directly, he continues to rely on formal measures to achieve 
justice and equality whereas both formal and informal requirements are 
necessary.  
 
1.2. The problem of respect and self-respect 
 
Claiming that Rawls neglects social equality may seem strange when we 
consider that the values of social equality, i.e. respect, civility and toleration, 
play an important, if not (in the case of respect) foundational, role in Rawlss 
conception of justice. Equal respect and concern, Dworkin claims, underlie 
and justify the principles of justice, while Charles Larmore argues that the 
public recognition of the principles of justice, not so much the principles 
themselves, expresses respect-for-persons.25 Rawls claims that the social basis 
of self-respect is a primary good, recognises that respect is necessary to 
achieve self-respect and stipulates a duty of mutual respect with which 
                                                 
24 Mason (2000: 245). 
25 Dworkin (1975:50) and Larmore (2003: 373). 
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citizens of a just society must comply.26 Toleration motivates political 
liberalism, and civility seems to be accounted for through the duty of civility 
and the duty of mutual respect.27  
  
Although Rawls acknowledges something similar to the values of social 
equality, this does not mean, however, that he employs the correct notions of 
these values nor more importantly does this mean that they operate in the 
correct spheres, where correct in both these cases means correct for 
addressing social equality. When it comes, for example, to respect and self-
respect, Rawls does not use the same understanding of respect and self-respect 
that is applicable to social equality and he does not consider the importance of 
informal harms to respect and self-respect through violations of social 
equality in personal choice and in associations.  
 
In this section I am going to discuss the notions of respect and self-respect to 
highlight that although Rawlss justice does recognise the importance of these 
values, he does not do so in the requisite way for social equality. I will (1) 
reiterate the criticism that Rawls confuses notions of self-respect and self-
esteem and thus does not acknowledge that recognition self-respect is an 
essential component of a fair society, and (2) argue that he neglects the 
                                                 
26 See Rawls (1999: 386-391) for a discussion of self-respect and Rawls (1999: 297) for a 
discussion of the duty of mutual respect. 
27 See, for example, Horton and Mendus (1999: 1-5) on political liberalism as a solution for 
toleration and Nagel (2003: 72-3) on toleration as a condition of mutual respect. See Rawls 
(1999: 312; 2001g: 576-7) on the duty of civility. 
 180 
informal social basis of self-respect, focusing almost exclusively on the 
legislative and distributive social conditions which influence self-respect.28  
 
Rawls describes self-respect as having two features.29 Firstly, self-respect 
means believing that your conception of the good is worthwhile. Secondly, 
self-respect is the confidence that you are able to fulfil your conception of the 
good. Self-respect (or the social basis of self-respect) is a primary good30, thus 
any rational person will want this good regardless of her conception of the 
good life because [w]ithout it nothing may seem worth doing, or if some 
things have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them.31 This 
understanding of self-respect, however, has been frequently criticised for 
confusing self-respect and self-esteem.32 Evidence for the claim that Rawls 
confuses these notions is that (1) he uses the terms interchangeably,33 and (2) 
his description and treatment of self-respect makes it seem as if he is 
discussing self-esteem rather than recognition self-respect.  
 
Recognition respect includes respect-for-persons, the recognition that every 
person has intrinsic worth. Recognition self-respect is a recognition of your 
                                                 
28 I am not going to address the duties of respect and civility in this chapter. I will discuss 
them in chapter V which focuses on what Rawls has to say about individuals and informal 
behaviour. My focus in this chapter is on the provisions that Rawls makes for institutional 
justice and whether those provisions would accomplish social equality.  
29 Rawls (1999: 386). 
30 Rawls (1999: 54, 386, 388; 2001d: 158) refers directly to self-respect as a primary good. 
At times, however he refers to the social basis of self-respect as the good (2001b: 260; 2001j: 
314). Joshua Cohen (2003) regards both self-respect and the social basis of self-respect 
(respect from others) as primary goods. See Nussbaums (2000: 89) comments on why we 
should refer to such goods according to their social basis and not to the distribution of the 
goods themselves. 
31 Rawls (1999: 386). 
32 See Darwall (1977: 48; fn. 18), Larry L. Thomas (1999: 37-48) and Jeanne S. Zaino (1998: 
738; fn. 5). For a prominent analysis of the difference between esteem and respect, see David 
Sachs (1999: 22-36).  
33 For example, Rawls (1999: 386), We may define self-respect (or self-esteem) as having 
two aspects.  
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own intrinsic worth as a person merely because you are a person.34 Having 
good self-esteem requires a positive assessment of such aspects of the self as 
character traits or accomplishments, but it is not an assessment of ones 
character (whereas appraisal self-respect is an assessment of character).35 By 
defining self-respect according to a conception of the good and by associating 
the worth of that conception of the good with ones activities and capacities, 
Rawls seems much closer to describing self-esteem than recognition self-
respect. Rawls claims that we know our conceptions of the good are 
worthwhile when our activities are appreciated and considered worthy by 
others.36 He also claims that our life-plans can only be worthwhile if they 
satisfy the Aristotelian Principle, which states that human beings enjoy the 
exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this 
enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its 
complexity.37 Recognition self-respect is not dependent on our activities or 
our abilities or how others view these; self-esteem, however, is dependent on 
an affirmation and appreciation of what we do or how we do things. Rawls 
thus seems to be describing self-esteem and not self-respect.  
 
This is a significant confusion when it comes to social equality, which is 
concerned as a priority with recognition respect rather than with appraisal 
respect or esteem. Damage done to self-respect through injustice is often more 
                                                 
34 Darwall (1977: 47-48). For further explanations of notions of self-respect which correlate 
to recognition self-respect, see for example, Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (1995) and Laurence Thomas 
(1995). 
35 Darwall (1977: 36) discusses the difference between self-esteem and appraisal self-respect.  
36 Rawls (1999: 387). 
37 The description of the Aristotelian Principle can be found in Rawls (1999: 374) and the 
claim that our conceptions of the good are worthwhile if they are rational plans of life which 
satisfy the Aristotelian Principle, in Rawls (1999: 386).  
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fundamental than damage done to the worthiness of a conception of the good 
or to the ability to fulfil a conception of the good: the disadvantaged and the 
devalued are considered to have less worth, to be less worthy of respect as 
people, thus they are not accorded recognition respect, and thus they suffer 
from a lack of recognition self-respect (although I am not denying that they 
probably also suffer from a lack of self-esteem).  
 
Larry L. Thomas uses the example of the Black Consciousness Movement 
[BCM] in his critique of Rawlss confusion of self-esteem and self-respect. 
The BCM, he argues, led to an important change in blacks self-description 
which enhanced their self-respect. This notion of self-respect, however, does 
not conform to Rawlss description of self-respect as it is primarily unrelated 
to worthwhile conceptions of the good and the ability to fulfil these 
conceptions:  
 
The change in blacks self-description, then, was not indicative of the 
fact that they came to pursue more worthwhile plans of life, though 
many in fact did. Rather, it indicated a more fundamental change, 
namely, a change in the way blacks came to view themselves as 
persons qua persons. For the BCM was a rejection of a conception of 
persons according to which to have a certain pigmentation of the skin 
was ipso facto to be less worthy of rights and liberties to which other 
members of the American society had been so long accustomed.38  
 
Thomas is emphasising that racial oppression damages what I have referred to 
as recognition self-respect: black people are not treated as having the same 
                                                 
38 Thomas (1999: 41).    
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worth as white people, and in turn are denied the rights which should apply to 
all human beings, and this, among others, damaged their notions of their own 
worth.  
 
I think there are numerous ways in which peoples notions of self are affected 
by oppression and discrimination and would not like to claim that only 
recognition respect is affected. Furthermore, these notions of respect and 
esteem are probably interdependent and failures of one might cause failures of 
another. Social equality, however, is most concerned with the notion of 
recognition respect, because social equality relies on the recognition that 
people, as people, have equal intrinsic worth and should be treated as such. A 
lack of recognition respect from others would lead to a lack of recognition 
self-respect. Thus to address social equality and the harms caused to self-
respect through violations of social equality, one would need to consider and 
incorporate a notion of recognition self-respect and not merely self-esteem 
into a conception of a fair society. Rawls cannot be said to be addressing 
social equality suitably if he does not have a notion of self-respect which 
coincides with that of social equality.  
 
Even if Rawls did have the correct notion of self-respect, he could still not be 
said to provide for social equality. A further problem with Rawlss notion of 
self-respect relates to how we achieve self-respect.  As (the social basis of) 
self-respect is a primary good, indeed, he refers to it as perhaps the most 
important primary good,39 he claims that the parties in the original position 
                                                 
39 Rawls (1999: 386) 
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would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine 
self-respect.40 From the perspective of social equality, however, Rawls has 
neglected some of the social conditions that undermine self-respect.  
 
As Rawls acknowledges, an important condition, or the condition, for 
achieving self-respect is respect from others: our self-respect depends in 
part upon the respect shown to us by others; no one can long possess an 
assurance of his own value in the face of the enduring contempt or even 
indifference of others.41 This is why Joshua Cohen claims that the social 
basis of self-respect is essentially, respect from others.42 How is respect 
from others expressed in a society? How, in other words, do we achieve the 
social basis of self-respect?  
 
Rawls appears to believe that purely formal and narrow distributive measures 
for justice (the application of the institutional principles to the basic structure) 
are sufficient for establishing the right conditions for self-respect: a desirable 
feature of a conception of justice is that it should publicly express mens 
respect for one another. In this way they ensure their own value. Now the two 
principles achieve this end.43 Although he seems to acknowledge the role of 
the difference principle, and thus of economic factors, in determining respect 
and thus self-respect through this quote which emphasises that the two 
principles accomplish a public expression of respect, on other occasions, he 
                                                 
40 Rawls (1999: 386). 
41 Rawls (2001d: 171). 
42 J. Cohen (2003: 109).  
43 Rawls (1999: 156). Freeman (2003: 23): Equal basic liberties and political and economic 
independence are primary among the bases of self-respect in a democratic society. 
.
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claims that the first principle alone is essential for establishing respect. Thus 
the social basis of self-respect seems to be fairly distributed when the first 
principle is applied to the basic structure: The basis for self-respect in a just 
society is not then ones income share but the publicly affirmed distribution of 
fundamental rights and liberties.44 For Rawls then, the distribution of the 
social basis of self-respect is a function of the institutional principles, whether 
this is all of them or only the principle of equal liberty. 
 
I claim, however, that these expressions of respect are not sufficient to 
achieve the social conditions of self-respect because respect from others is not 
determined alone by the distribution of rights and liberties, or goods such as 
income and wealth. If the institutional principles apply only to the legislative 
and distributive framework of institutions it seems that they cannot address 
forms of individual behaviour and the rules of associations which, for 
example, discriminate against the members of certain social groups, and thus 
violate respect-for-persons, and which could thus undermine self-respect.  
 
Imagine a society in which perfect equal liberties have been established by the 
law but one group in society, let us say people with brown eyes, treat any 
member of another group in society, let us say blue-eyed people, with extreme 
disdain in their everyday behaviour. Brown-eyed people are frequently rude to 
blue-eyed people; they discriminate against them privately; they insult them; 
they refuse to live in the same neighbourhoods or date them or become friends 
with them. Although blue-eyed people have the same rights and liberties as 
                                                 
44 Rawls (1999: 477). 
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brown-eyed people, their self-respect is undermined through the patterned and 
persistent lack of respect they suffer. The Rawlsian application of the 
institutional principles to basic social institutions can provide us with no 
answers to this problem, and yet, not all of the social conditions which 
establish self-respect have been achieved because blue-eyed people are 
systemically and socially devalued simply because they are blue-eyed. 
Political and legal equality does not suffice to express respect and neither 
would the redistribution of material goods or economic equality; even if the 
brown-eyeds and the blue-eyeds have similar or the same income and wealth, 
this does not preclude violations of informal social equality. It is because self-
respect can be undermined by informal behaviour and not exclusively by the 
formal and narrow distributive framework of institutions that social equality 
demands respect-for-persons both from institutions and from individuals. If 
we aim at establishing respect and self-respect, on what basis should we only 
concern ourselves with establishing respect through the fair distribution of 
liberties and material goods?  
 
Furthermore, that respect is expressed through equal liberties is often only 
socially operative, when informal social equality has been achieved. Joshua 
Cohen emphasises the importance of respect expressed through political 
equality in justice-as-fairness: 
 
others show respect for me by expressing their willingness to share 
responsibility on equal terms for making judgments of justice that 
provide supreme guidance for collective political life  not simply by 
recognizing me as an equal in some way, or attributing to me some 
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equal rights regardless of the content of those rights, but as an equal 
with respect to the final authoritative judgments about collective 
affairs.45  
 
I agree that political equality is an essential component of respect-for-persons, 
however, we cannot claim that people share responsibility for collective 
decisions on equal terms when equal opportunities and the power to make 
decisions are hampered through violations of informal social equality. It is 
fairly uncontroversial to claim that a fair distribution of material goods is 
necessary for political equality to be a reality: if, for example, it is made very 
difficult for me to access a polling booth because I am poor, then it is difficult 
to see how I can be an equal with respect to the final authoritative judgments 
about collective affairs. Something similar can be said about social 
inequalities: if as a woman I am treated and expect to be treated as an inferior 
in decision-making within my own household or by society more generally, 
for example, it seems likely that I would also consider myself to be unequal 
when it comes to collective decision-making in the political sphere, no matter 
whether my legal and political status insists that I am an equal.  
 
Using G. A. Cohens terms to describe the Rawlsian divide between the 
coercive and noncoercive, and thus by implication between public and private 
behaviour, it seems as if there is an arbitrary divide between the formal and 
distributive conditions for self-respect on the one hand and informal 
conditions on the other.46 If Rawls is genuinely concerned about establishing 
                                                 
45 J. Cohen (2003: 109). 
46 Cohen (2000: 136-140). 
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the social conditions for self-respect, a fair society should demand that the 
informal conditions that help to establish self-respect must also be fulfilled.47  
 
2. How can social equality be reconciled with justice-as-
fairness? The exclusive and extensive views 
 
Justice-as-fairness, understood only as the application of the institutional 
principles, cannot fully establish social equality. How then can we reconcile 
social equality with justice-as-fairness? Is social equality even compatible 
with justice-as-fairness? In chapter I, I discussed two interpretations of what 
Rawls means when he calls the basic structure the primary subject of justice: 
the exclusive and the extensive views. In this section I will discuss how 
justice-as-fairness can be read to be compatible with the demands of social 
equality and justice in choice according to these two interpretations.  
 
The exclusive view claims that principles for individuals cannot be 
distributive or perhaps cannot even be principles of justice at all. The only 
principles of distributive justice are the institutional principles (and formal 
subsidiary principles which aim at achieving the ideals embodied in the 
institutional principles). If we want to reconcile Rawlss justice, as understood 
through the exclusive view, with the demands of social equality, we would not 
be able to introduce additional principles of justice aimed at individual 
                                                 
47 In the section of Theory entitled Self-respect, excellences, and shame Rawls (1999: 386-
391) notes the significance of associative ties in developing self-respect (or more 
accurately, self-esteem) but he appears to believe that the variety of communities and 
associations which will affirm and appreciate individuals plans of life will be a result of a 
society well-ordered by the institutional principles applied to the basic structure (1999: 387). 
Thus, even in this case, the work to achieve self-respect is done by formal institutions rather 
than through an acknowledgement of the independent role of informal behaviour. 
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behaviour and associations to address informal violations of social equality. 
So if we cannot address social equality through principles of justice for 
personal choice and associations, it seems that the only way to reconcile the 
exclusive view with social equality would be to try to make the only 
distributive principles of justice that the exclusive view acknowledges, apply 
to informal justice. Thus the institutional principles would have to establish 
informal social equality. Cohen aims at something similar to the first strategy. 
He argues that in order to realise justice in personal choice the institutional 
principles should be applied to individual behaviour directly. The basic 
structure, according to Cohens claims, needs to be extended to include 
personal choice. I will discuss Cohens claims in the next chapter.  
 
The exclusive view, as we have seen however, is not the only interpretation of 
the status of principles of justice in justice-as-fairness. According to the 
extensive view, subjects of justice other than the basic structure, and other 
principles of justice besides merely the institutional principles can be the 
subjects of and principles for distributive justice. The extensive view is thus 
compatible with developing or adapting measures which aim to address 
informal justice directly, as it can allow for additional principles of 
distributive justice and these principles can be applied to subjects such as 
individual behaviour. At least when it comes to Rawlss conception of 
principles and subjects of justice, it would not be inconsistent, prima facie, 
with justice-as-fairness to apply principles of justice, or at least some sort of 
measures for justice to the informal which would aim to establish distributive 
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justice in personal choice and through associations.48 Thus the extensive view, 
unlike the exclusive view, does not require that the basic structure be 
redefined or that the institutional principles be applied beyond the 3-step 
application. Including social equality in justice-as-fairness would be an 
extension of justice-as-fairness, rather than an alteration of it. In chapter V I 
will discuss Rawlss principles for individuals and how these can be 
developed and adapted to accommodate the demands of social equality.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the introduction I stated that the aim of this chapter is to determine whether 
violations of social equality could still occur in a society regulated by the 3-
step application of the institutional principles of justice-as-fairness. I have 
argued that, yes, such violations of social equality could still occur because 
this application of the principles would not address informal violations of 
social equality, through, for example, personal choice. This is particularly 
clear when we examine injustices in the family, which seem as if they cannot 
be rectified by institutional justice alone, and Rawlss understanding of 
respect-for-persons, which firstly tends towards the wrong type of respect, and 
secondly which seemingly relies entirely on respect through formal and 
distributive rules. We can say that although justice-as-fairness should 
accommodate the demands of social equality, the institutional measures for 
justice cannot accommodate these demands because they do not apply to 
                                                 
48 I say prima facie because particular principles may well conflict with the institutional 
principles, however, as I mentioned in chapter I, I will discuss this potential conflict in 
chapter V. 
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individual behaviour. So what are we to do with justice-as-fairness in light of 
social equality?  
 
Accommodating social equality would require either changing the 
institutional measures so that they could be applied to individual behaviour 
(this is what the exclusive view would require) or it would require 
establishing requirements for achieving justice beyond the application of the 
institutional principles (this is compatible with the extensive view). In the next 
chapter, I will analyse and evaluate attempts to change the institutional 
measures so that they are able to accommodate fair personal choice as a 
requirement of justice. I will focus primarily on Cohens argument which 
aims to demonstrate that the basic structure should include personal choice 
and thus that the institutional principles of justice should apply to both 
individuals and institutions. 
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IV. The personal choice argument 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
And then I shall ask whether structural design is enough  whether we 
can settle for changing the world and not also the soul.1  
 
In chapter I, I claimed that Rawlss conception of justice has come under 
criticism for focusing on institutional measures to implement justice; some 
critics, proponents of what I refer to as the personal choice argument, claim 
that justice should include personal choice and not merely institutional design. 
Cohen is one such critic who argues that a fair society requires both fair 
institutional rules and fair individual choice. More particularly, he claims that 
Rawlss account of justice is internally inconsistent because it should, but 
does not, include personal choice as a subject of justice. In this chapter I will 
explain and evaluate the personal choice argument, focusing particularly on 
Cohen version of this argument. By elaborating on the personal choice 
argument (PCA), I provide an account of where this argument succeeds and 
where I believe it fails to prepare the ground for what it is that we need from, 
or what we need to do to, Rawlss justice to ensure that it includes the justice 
of personal choice. It fails, I will argue, by advocating that in order to address 
justice in personal choice we should measure choice according to the 
institutional principles. Instead of accepting the personal choice argument as 
is, I describe a revised version of this argument, which advocates applying 
                                                 
1 Cohen (2000: 44). 
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principles of social equality to choice and thus avoids many of the drawbacks 
associated with the original argument.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to answer two primary questions: 
1. What is the personal choice argument? 
2. How successful is it in providing a solution to the problem of justice in 
personal choice? 
 
Within the broader context of this thesis, my aim is to provide justification for 
why, in response to the problem of informal social equality and justice in 
choice, I choose to part ways with the original personal choice argument and 
its claim that the institutional principles of justice should apply to choice. 
Instead I will provide an alternative in which I formulate duties of social 
equality to be applied to individual behaviour.   
 
There are 6 sections to this chapter. In the first section I briefly explain the 
personal choice argument and summarise two versions of this argument, Liam 
B. Murphys and Cohens. In section 2, I elaborate on Cohens personal 
choice argument. In section 3, I provide support for the PCAs claims that 
personal choice should be subject to standards of justice because personal 
choice affects justice. In section 4, however, I argue that the PCAs 
conclusion, that principles of justice applied to institutions should also be 
applied to individuals, is not convincing because (i) if there are other 
measures used to judge the justice of personal choice, then there is no need to 
apply the institutional principles and (ii) there are good reasons not to apply 
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the institutional principles to individual behaviour. In the light of this 
criticism, in section 5, I provide a revised version of the PCA which 
substitutes the claim that the institutional principles should be applied to 
choice with the claim that the justice of choice should be judged by principles 
of social equality. In the last section I defend the revised PCA from objections 
that are commonly aimed at its original version, arguing that these objections 
are usually only aimed at the claim that the institutional principles, 
particularly the difference principle, should be applied to individuals.  
 
1. What is the personal choice argument? 
 
Personal choice means behaviour which is not subject to the law or official 
rules: if behaviour is open to personal choice then it is open to an individual or 
groups of individuals how they choose to act. There are three components of 
the personal choice argument: 
 
1. Personal choice affects the justice of the distribution of social goods. 
2. Principles of justice (or some such measures)2 should thus be applied to 
personal choice. 
3. The principles of distributive justice that apply to institutions should be 
applied to personal choice. 
 
It is significant that I break the PCA into three parts. Neither proponents of 
this argument such as Murphy or Cohen present the argument in this form, nor 
                                                 
2 My use of the word principle is not necessary. What I mean is that some standard for 
judging the justice of personal choice is required.  
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do their critics. As they do not make this distinction between different parts of 
the argument, it seems that both proponents and critics of the PCA assume 
that the second part of the argument also implies the third.3 By doing so they 
seem to implicitly assume the exclusive view of Rawlss principles of justice: 
if the claim is that personal choice relates to distribution, they seem to assume 
that this implies the claim that the institutional principles should be applied to 
choice seemingly because these principles are the only principles of 
distributive justice in Rawlss theory. I will argue that the first two parts of the 
PCA are convincing but the last statement is not. 
 
Before explaining the strengths and the weaknesses of this argument, 
however, it is important to explore it in more detail. I will briefly summarise 
two versions and then in the next section I will elaborate on the second 
version, Cohens version, to provide a more in-depth understanding of the 
PCA. 
 
Murphy distinguishes between two approaches to normative principles: 
monism and dualism. According to monism, the view Murphy defends, all 
fundamental normative principles that apply to the design of institutions apply 
also to the conduct of people.4 Dualism, a view that Murphy associates with 
Rawls and Rawlsians such as Pogge, requires different fundamental principles 
for institutional design and personal choice and conduct.5 Murphy criticises 
                                                 
3 For example, Cohen (1997: 3) makes the general claim (statement 2), which I endorse, 
principles of distributive justice apply to peoples legally unconstrained choices but 
implies that this is equivalent to the claim that we should apply Rawlss institutional 
principles to choice. 
4 Murphy (1999: 251). 
5 Murphy (1999: 25). 
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dualism for encouraging people to aim at the good of institutions rather than 
at the good institutions can best do.6 Instead of dividing fundamental 
principles of justice into types for individuals, such as the duty to support fair 
institutions, and types for institutions, such as the difference principle, 
Murphy provides an example of a monist principle, the principle of weighted 
beneficence, which would apply to both personal choice and institutions.7 
 
Cohen aims to extend the scope of justice beyond the limits usually set within 
liberal philosophy by claiming that distributive justice requires both fair 
personal choice, informed by an egalitarian ethos, and fair rules, as opposed to 
the typical liberal view associated with Rawls that distributive justice requires 
only, or primarily only, justice in institutional rules.8 Cohens argument can 
be broken into two primary parts: (1) he claims that demands for material 
incentives, usually justified by the difference principle, are inconsistent with 
Rawlss stipulation that in a fair society citizens would act upon the principles 
of justice, and thus these demands are unjust. (2) In response to the basic-
structure objection, which claims that it does not matter if personal choice is 
inconsistent with the principles of justice because these principles should not 
be applied to individuals, Cohen argues that choice, such as the demand for 
incentives, should be subject to the principles of justice, otherwise, the 
application of these principles to coercive structure only is arbitrary. In the 
next section I will provide a detailed explanation of Cohens argument, 
                                                 
6 Murphy (1999: 272). 
7 Murphy (1999: 262-4). 
8 I rely mainly on Cohens critique of Rawls in the chapters Justice, incentives, and 
selfishness and Where the action is: on the site of distributive justice in If youre an 
egalitarian, how come youre so rich (2000), which develops from (and is often precisely the 
same as) Where the action is: on the site of distributive justice (1997).  
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divided into two sections according to the two parts of his argument, (1) the 
argument against incentives and (2) the reply to the basic-structure objection.  
 
2. Cohens critique of Rawls: the incentives argument and the 
basic-structure objection 
 
2.1. Applying the difference principle to economic choice: the argument 
against incentives argument 
 
The difference principle, which states that social and economic inequalities 
should be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,9 has been used to 
defend inequalities which result from material incentives given to the 
talented.10 According to the incentives argument, material incentives are fair if 
they benefit the worst-off, by for example, increasing the productivity of the 
talented. Cohen claims that for the incentives argument to justify inequalities 
it must demonstrate that incentives are necessary to benefit the worst-off as 
this is a requirement of the difference principle. He claims, however, that 
incentives can only be necessary to benefit the worst-off if dubious 
assumptions are made about human nature (particularly about the nature of the 
talented). Incentives, he claims, are not necessary in the requisite way: they 
are not necessary tout court  that is, independently of human will, so that 
with all the will in the world, removal of inequality would make everyone 
                                                 
9 Rawls (1999: 266). 
10 I use the term talented in the same way as Cohen (2000: 125): All that need be true of 
them is that they are so positioned that, happily for them, they do command a high salary and 
they can vary their productivity according to how high it is. 
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worse off.11 They are not necessary in this way because the talented could 
choose to work without incentives. The only way in which it seems that 
incentives would be necessary is if the talented are unavoidably acquisitive: 
they are incapable of working more productively for average pay due to their 
ingrained selfishness. Not only does Cohen doubt that this acquisitiveness 
could be so embedded, more importantly, he claims that assuming that people 
are unavoidably selfish is inconsistent with Rawlss demands for a fair 
society.  
 
Cohen argues that a stipulation for Rawlss justice is that a fair society 
requires fair citizens, or more specifically, that citizens in a fair society would 
affirm the institutional principles of justice,12 and this Cohen claims means 
that they would apply the principles of justice in their daily life.13 In the 
case of incentives this would mean that individuals would apply the difference 
principle to their own decisions, thus agreeing that an unequal economic 
distribution can only be justified if it is necessary to benefit the worst-off.14 If 
their choices were motivated by the difference principle, the talented, Cohen 
claims, would agree that incentives are not necessary to benefit the worst-off 
as they could choose to work without receiving special incentives: 
 
                                                 
11 Cohen (2000: 127). 
12 Cohen does not refer to the institutional principles as specifically institutional. This is my 
term not his. He does not differentiate between different types of principles of justice and 
refers to what I have called the institutional principles of justice as the principles of justice, 
as they are referred to by Rawls himself and in the secondary literature. However, to avoid 
confusion, and as part of the purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that we need to 
differentiate between institutional principles and other principles of justice, I will continue to 
refer to them as the institutional principles of justice or merely institutional principles for 
short.   
13 Cohen (2000: 126). 
14 Cohen (2000: 126). 
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it is they themselves who make those rewards necessary, through their 
own unwillingness to work for ordinary rewards as productively as 
they do for exceptionally high ones, an unwillingness which ensures 
that the untalented get less than they otherwise would. High rewards 
are, therefore, necessary only because the choices of talented people 
are not appropriately informed by the difference principle.15 
 
Inequalities in pay in these circumstances are only made necessary if the 
talented choose not to work as productively without incentives, and as they 
would choose to work without them if their choices were informed by the 
difference principle, Cohen concludes that incentives are unjust.  
 
Cohen believes that because the difference principle should influence 
individuals economic choices and more generally because personal choice 
should be informed by Rawlss principles of justice, that distributive justice 
requires not only fair rules applied to institutions but also an egalitarian ethos 
that would motivate individuals to make fair personal choices. We can say 
that an ethos is necessary for justice because as personal choice influences 
distributive justice, an ethos that motivates justice in personal choice will 
inspire a fairer distribution of goods than no such ethos or a different kind of 
ethos (such as a non-egalitarian ethos or an anti-egalitarian ethos).  
 
Cohens argument rests on the claim that it is a stipulation of Rawlss 
conception of justice that citizens must affirm the institutional principles, 
meaning they must apply the principles to their choices, and specifically in the 
case of incentives, to their economic choices. It is here that some critics are 
                                                 
15 Cohen (2000: 127). 
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likely to object to Cohens claims. Rawls, they might argue, means something 
different when he claims that citizens should affirm the institutional principles 
(for example, he could merely mean that they should agree that institutions be 
regulated by the institutional principles and that they agree to comply with the 
rules of these institutions). Evidence for this view is that Rawls explicitly 
disassociates individual behaviour from the institutional principles, claiming 
that these principles apply to the basic structure and not to individuals. Cohen 
anticipates this claim and calls it the basic-structure objection. He addresses 
this objection by arguing that limiting the primary subject of justice to the 
basic structure would either be arbitrary if it applied to coercive structure 
alone or, if noncoercive structure was included as part of this subject, personal 
choice should also be incorporated because noncoercive structure is (at least) 
partially constituted by choice.  
 
2.2. Personal choice as part of the primary subject of justice: rebuttal of 
the basic-structure objection 
 
Cohen claims that advocates of the basic-structure objection would accuse 
him of confusing where the difference principle should be applied.16 Rawls 
stipulates that the principles of justice only apply to the basic structure of 
society: the way in which major social institutions distribute fundamental 
rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social 
cooperation.17 They are not, he claims, intended to apply to individuals, and 
                                                 
16 See Cohen (2000: 129-130) for his explanation of the basic-structure objection. 
17 Rawls (1999: 6). 
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thus the difference principle should not be applied to the personal choice of 
the talented.18 
 
Cohen has two replies to this objection:  
(1) A preliminary reply in which he points out that three aspects of Rawlss 
justice, (i) the notion of fraternity, (ii) the dignity of the worst-off and (iii) the 
stipulation that citizens should act from the principles of justice, are 
inconsistent with applying the principles of justice only to the basic structure 
and not to personal choice.19  
(2) A fundamental reply in which he argues that the basic structure, if it is not 
arbitrary, must include the noncoercive structure of an institution. Once 
noncoercive structure is allowed into the framework of justice, then personal 
choice must also be included.20  
 
Cohen admits that the preliminary reply is not decisive against Rawls: Rawls 
could abandon the claims inconsistent with the basic-structure objection. 
However, he believes that the fundamental reply demonstrates that the 
institutional principles of justice can be applied to personal choice.    
 
The basic-structure objection states that principles of justice should be applied 
only to the basic structure. Cohens fundamental reply, the rebuttal of the 
basic-structure objection, questions what is meant by the basic structure. 
Cohen claims that when we talk about the structure of society, we can 
distinguish two types of structure: (1) coercive structure, and (2) noncoercive 
                                                 
18 Rawls (1999: 47). 
19 Cohen (2000: 134-5). 
20 The fundamental reply can be found in Cohen (2000: 136-142). 
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structure. Coercive structure is constituted by the broad formal rules, laws and 
policies of society.21 Noncoercive structure is a framework of informal rules, 
convention, usage, and expectation.22  
 
Cohen maintains that there is some ambiguity in Rawlss conception of the 
basic structure as to whether it includes only coercive structure or both 
coercive and noncoercive structure. At times, Rawls considers only the 
broad coercive outline of society as part of the basic structure but in other 
descriptions of the basic structure he includes all major social institutions, 
such as the family.23 Cohen claims that if institutions such as the family are 
included as part of the basic structure then the basic structure cannot be 
defined merely as coercive as the structure of the family is mainly 
noncoercive: it is guided primarily by convention rather than by formal laws 
and policies. Not only does Rawls at times seem to include noncoercive 
structure as part of the basic structure, Cohen argues, his reason why the basic 
structure is the primary subject of justice determines that noncoercive 
structure should be part of the basic structure.  
 
In chapter I, we identified that one of the reasons that Rawls has for why the 
basic structure is the primary subject of justice is because its effects are so 
profound and present from the start.24 Cohen argues, however, that the 
effects of noncoercive structure are also profound and present from the start. 
If we are concerned about the effects of the justice of coercive structure on 
                                                 
21 Cohen (2000: 137). 
22 Cohen (2000: 137). 
23 Cohen (2000: 137). 
24 Rawls c.f. Cohen (2000: 138). 
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individuals lives, we should also be concerned about noncoercive structure. 
This means that if the basic structure only includes coercive structure, it is 
arbitrary: if the basic structure is the primary subject of justice because of its 
effects on individuals lives there seems no good reason why only part of such 
structure should be included as part of the scope of the principles of justice. 
So, to avoid arbitrariness, the basic structure should include noncoercive 
structure. Once noncoercive structure is included as part of the scope of 
justice, Cohen argues, then choice needs to be included as well. 
 
Noncoercive structure, Cohen claims, although conceptually distinguishable 
from choice, is partially constituted by chosen behaviour; this structure is 
what it is because of the behaviour of individuals.25 By choosing to act 
according to the conventions of noncoercive structure, an individual sustains 
that convention and puts social pressure on other individuals to act in a similar 
way. One can say that it is the convention itself that pressurises individuals to 
conform, but that convention only exists because of conforming behaviour:  
 
When A chooses to conform to the prevailing usages, the pressure on 
B to do so is reinforced; and [when] no such pressure exists, the very 
usages themselves do not exist, in the absence of conformity to them.26  
 
So, for example, in a society where it is common for the talented to receive 
material incentives (we can call this a society with an acquisitive ethos), and 
thus where there is an expectation or convention of incentives, this convention 
can only be sustained by the demand for material incentives. The convention, 
                                                 
25 Cohen (2000: 137-140). 
26 Cohen (2000: 138). 
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which we can say is part of the noncoercive structure of that society, and the 
choices of the talented to demand incentives are not easily distinguishable 
because if there was no demand, there would be no such convention. Thus if 
we want to tackle the justice of the convention, then we would need to tackle 
the justice of personal choice. If the basic structure includes noncoercive 
structure, and it must do so Cohen argues if it is not arbitrary, then the basic 
structure includes choice, and thus principles of justice that apply to the basic 
structure must apply to both the formal rules of institutions and to the choices 
made within them. If we only apply the institutional principles of justice to 
coercive structure, choices, such as the demand for material incentives, which 
could lead to severe inequalities in the distribution of social goods, would be 
consistent with justice, and yet how can we accept maximizing economic 
choices, or other choices which violate the principles of justice, if our aim is 
to achieve distributive justice?    
 
According to Cohen, one doesnt even need to agree that choice is (at least 
partially) constitutive of noncoercive structure to agree that choice could be 
evaluated according to the principles of justice. Cohen claims that merely 
acknowledging that choice has profound and pervasive effects on the lives 
of individuals would mean that we should apply the principles of justice to 
choice, because if choice affects the distribution of social goods then we 
should be concerned with making it fair.27  
 
                                                 
27 Cohen (2000: 138). 
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Thus according to Cohen the basic-structure objection cannot stand: it makes 
no sense to apply the principles of justice only to coercive structure and not to 
personal choice as (1) choice determines noncoercive structure, and 
noncoercive structure partially determines the distribution of social goods, and 
(2) choice has profound and pervasive effects on individuals lives, which 
influences the justice of their lives. Justice, thus, is a function not only of fair 
rules but also of fair personal choice.   
 
3. Defending the personal choice argument: Cohen, personal 
choice and informal social equality  
 
In this section, focusing particularly on the example of the family, I defend 
Cohens general claim that personal choice should be included in the scope of 
justice. Including personal choice and an egalitarian ethos as requirements for 
justice receives significant support from the notion of social equality which 
demonstrates an important overlap between informal social equality, which 
includes personal choice, and distributive justice. 
 
3.1. The significance of personal choice for justice 
 
In chapter I, I explained that we could describe the application of the 
institutional principles of justice in three ways: (1) they apply directly to the 
basic structure, (2) through the direct application to the basic structure, they 
apply indirectly to institutions themselves and to individual behaviour and (3) 
they apply as an evaluation of the outcome of the direct and indirect 
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application. If we were to agree with Cohen that personal choice should be 
included what we would be saying is (i) that these applications of the 
institutional principles do not address (or do not properly address) 
noncoercive structure and personal choice and (ii) that this failure to address 
these is relevant to broad distributive justice (justice cannot be properly 
achieved without addressing the justice of noncoercive structure and personal 
choice). Thus we would be saying that the application of the institutional 
principles described above is not sufficient for achieving justice. I believe that 
in this case Cohen is right. In the previous chapter I explained that applying 
the institutional principles to the basic structure does not address informal 
justice. Using the extended example of the problem of justice and equality in 
the family, we can elaborate on why this is an issue of justice, and thus lend 
support to the first part of the personal choice argument, the claim that 
personal choice affects the distribution of social goods. 
 
In chapter I, I argued that although Rawls includes the family as part of the 
basic structure, this inclusion is not only confusing but indeed misleading: 
when we analyse what is meant by the basic structure we find that only the 
public rules that regulate the family are included in the basic structure and that 
the principles of justice apply directly only to these rules, through, for 
example, the constitution and through legislation, and thus the family, as a 
whole and as a separate institution, is not actually part of the basic structure. 
This then means that the institutional principles do not apply (directly) to the 
family and thus they do not apply to personal choice within the family. This is 
consistent with general claims that Rawls has made, in which he states that the 
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principles of justice do not apply to individuals, and to more specific claims 
he has made about the family, in which he argues that the principles of justice 
constrain the family by, for example, providing legal equality to all adult 
members of the family, but which do not apply to its internal life.28 So, 
according to Rawls the institutional principles of justice should not apply to 
choice in the family.  
 
Returning to Cohens argument, we can say that what Cohen would be saying 
is something like this: the principles of justice should not only apply to the 
public rules regulating the family as the choices that occur within the family 
impact on the fairness of distribution because of (1) the profound and 
pervasive effects of certain choices, and because (2) the choices made within 
the family are constitutive of family structure.  
 
In chapter III, I discussed the problem of the gendered division of household 
labour for Rawlss justice: although Rawls seems to concede that an 
involuntary gendered division is a problem, the application of the institutional 
principles to the basic structure neither demonstrates why it is a problem nor 
provides us with an account of justice in household labour. Lets examine the 
implications of Cohens critique of Rawls on this example of injustice in 
choice.29  
 
                                                 
28 Rawls (2001d: 163). 
29 Cohen (2000: 139) also uses the example of the injustice of a gendered division of 
household labour. Unlike his argument from incentives, however, he does not explicitly 
explain the injustice involved in sexist family structure. Like Andrew Williams (1998: 230, 
fn. 18), I have to infer some of Cohens argument. 
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The female members of a household often have a much greater burden of 
household labour than male members: this is true usually of both the adult 
females and female children (for example, mothers are expected to spend 
more time looking after the children than fathers, and girls are expected to do 
more household chores than their brothers). In a state where the division of 
household labour is not regulated through legislation, who does what in the 
household is a matter primarily of (1) choice and (2) convention (although this 
is not to deny that such choice and conventions are also influenced by policy, 
such as a wage for housewives or day-care funding).  
 
Although it would be difficult to find a contemporary liberal theorist who 
would condone norms that direct women to bear a greater burden of domestic 
duties, if we define justice as the application of institutional principles to the 
basic structure, understood as coercive, we could not claim that this division 
of labour implicit in family structure is unjust because this application is not 
meant to apply to choice or convention. According to only the application of 
the institutional principles of justice to the basic structure, if women are 
pressurised through expectation or social coercion to do a greater share of 
household labour, this is not unjust.  
 
We should, however, agree that choice (and convention) be part of the scope 
of justice when we consider how an unfair gendered division of household 
labour can affect the distribution of opportunities. Let us say that both a man 
and a woman in a family have full-time employment which takes up the same 
amount of time and requires the same levels of productivity and the man 
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chooses not to share in the domestic tasks. His choice, we can say according 
to Cohen, (1) contributes to maintaining (and creating in the first place) an 
unfair division of labour within specifically that household, and (2) 
contributes to maintaining the social norm that would pressure other 
individuals to conform to that division of labour.  
 
According to the first claim we can say that his choice is unjust because of its 
pervasive and profound effects as, let us say in this case, the division of 
labour interferes with the womans opportunities: she is unable, for example, 
to dedicate the extra time she would have if her husband shared the domestic 
tasks to studying or to furthering her career. According to the second claim, 
the mans choice is unjust because his choice is constitutive of noncoercive 
structure: it helps to sustain a convention of an unfair division of household 
labour. Here we could say that this convention could pressurise both (i) 
individuals within his household (for example, his children could be 
pressurised into sustaining this division of labour in their own households) 
and (ii) individuals in entirely separate households who could be influenced 
because his choice helps to sustain a social convention. This could be judged 
to be unjust on the same grounds as claim (1) as the continuation of this social 
pressure interferes (or contributes to interfering) with the fair equality of 
opportunity of the women affected.   
 
This does not mean, however, that justice and choice is only a problem when 
it comes to the household division of labour in the family nor that this is a 
problem of the family as an institution alone. Within the family, much 
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individual behaviour can disadvantage members. For example, female 
children in a family may be denied education or resources, and both female 
children and adults may be treated as inferior or marginalized (in decision-
making procedures, for example) in ways which are not subject to formal 
rules or the law. Furthermore, the family is not a unique institution when it 
comes to its relationship between justice and choice. Many institutions and 
associations such as churches, firms, and universities have a legislative or 
formal side and also an informal noncoercive side, where norms and choice 
influence behaviour. For example, in a firm, although government policies 
may prohibit discrimination in hiring and promotion procedures, much scope 
is left open for personal choice that could marginalize and disadvantage black 
employees. The influence of choice on justice has wide application.  
 
3.2. Informal social equality 
 
Clearly there is an overlap with Cohens argument and my claims about the 
problem of informal social equality. In chapters II and III, I argued that the 
aspect of social equality that is (at least) not addressed by formal equality, 
legislative fair equality of opportunity and the principles of narrow 
distribution is the informal, the realm of personal choice and associations, 
where choices and rules are left open to individuals and groups of individuals 
to decide. In these cases, the law and schemes of narrow distribution have 
nothing to say about the behaviour of individuals and associations, even 
though that behaviour influences the distribution of opportunities and the 
social basis of self-respect. Injustice, however, is suffered when individuals 
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are denied social goods even where this occurs through personal choice. So 
social equality, and thus justice, cannot be fully addressed without considering 
its informal, rather than merely its economic, political or legal bases. What is 
missing from descriptions of ideally fair societies is the notion of an 
egalitarian ethos which would inform and evaluate personal choice and 
motivate individuals to make fair choices. In order to then describe such an 
ethos, we need to identify measures that can be used as standards to evaluate 
the justice of personal choice. Here the argument from informal social 
equality coincides with Cohens claims and echoes the first two parts of the 
more general PCA: (1) personal choice affects distributive justice and (2) 
principles of justice should be applied to personal choice.  
 
This does not mean, of course, that it is necessary to buy into the notion of 
social equality in order to recognise that principles of justice should be 
applied to personal choice. Furthermore, as Cohen does not use the notion of 
social equality, clearly his argument does not rest on it. One can agree that 
distributive justice requires justice in personal choice purely on the basis that, 
if personal choice affects distribution then, if we aim at describing a fair 
distribution, we should include a description of justice in choice. What the 
notion of social equality does, however, is provide further ammunition for the 
personal choice argument by demonstrating an important and yet neglected 
area, informal social equality, where personal choice and justice overlap 
particularly.  
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More importantly, however, the description of social equality becomes 
especially necessary because it provides us with an explanation of what it is 
that we are looking for in order to describe personal choice as fair. I identified 
social equality with three primary values, respect-for-persons, civility and 
toleration. These need to be upheld institutionally and individually in order to 
achieve (1) a society of equals, and, where violations of social equality 
coincide with unfair distribution, (2) justice. Thus choice would be fair if it 
upheld respect-for-persons, civility and toleration. The significance of 
identifying these values will become clearer in the next section where I 
criticise the personal choice argument. Social equalitys description of justice 
in personal choice will help to provide what I believe is a preferable 
alternative to Cohen and the PCAs claims that institutional principles of 
justice should apply to personal choice. 
 
4. Which measures for justice in personal choice? The problem 
of the institutional principles  
 
In the first section of this chapter I summarised the personal choice argument 
as having three components: 
 
1. Personal choice affects the distribution of social goods. 
2. Therefore, we need principles of justice to evaluate personal choice. 
3. The same principles that are used to evaluate the justice of institutions 
should be applied to personal choice.  
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Both the proponents and critics of the PCA seem to assume that statements 2 
and 3 are equivalent. I believe, however, that the personal choice argument is 
successful only when it comes to statements 1 and 2. The weakness of the 
argument lies in claim 3. In this section, I will explain why I believe that 
Cohen and Murphy fail to demonstrate that we should use the same principles 
of justice to judge institutions and personal choice. They fail to consider other 
principles of justice which could be applied to personal choice. As long as 
personal choice is addressed sufficiently by some measures of justice, it does 
not seem appropriate to use the institutional principles to judge personal 
choice. 
 
4.1. Cohen and the basic-structure objection  
 
In chapter III, I claimed that the application of the institutional principles to 
the basic structure, as is, is not sufficient for distributive justice. This is 
because it neglects the influence of informal social equality on the distribution 
of goods. This is where Cohens claims and the argument from social equality 
coincide. What I do not agree with, however, is that this means that we should 
apply the institutional principles of justice to personal choice. The problem 
with Cohens interpretation of Rawls is that he does not differentiate between 
whether Rawlss argument should include personal choice as part of the scope 
of justice (I agree with Cohen that it should) and whether Rawlss institutional 
principles can and should be applied to individuals (here Cohen fails to 
convince).  
 
 214 
Cohens argument that the institutional principles of justice should apply to 
choice rests on the claim that it is a stipulation of Rawlss conception of 
justice that individuals need to act upon the principles of justice and Cohen 
takes this to mean that they must apply these principles in their everyday life. 
He quotes Rawls: Citizens in everyday life affirm and act from the first 
principles of justice and They act from these principles as their sense of 
justice dictates and thereby their nature as moral persons is most fully 
realized.30 Of course, Rawls explicitly denies that the institutional principles 
apply to individuals: [t]he principles of justice should not be confused with 
the principles which apply to individuals and their actions in particular 
circumstances.31 This is where the basic-structure objection comes in: 
according to this objection, the principles of justice apply solely to institutions 
and not to personal choice.  
 
Now, if the basic-structure objection is formulated to say that one shouldnt 
apply any principles of justice to personal choice, then I agree with Cohen that 
it is wrong. However, we could formulate a more particular basic-structure 
objection which claims that the institutional principles of justice should only 
be applied to institutions and not to personal choice. Cohens response does 
not address the basic-structure objection in this form. He claims that it would 
be arbitrary to apply the principles of justice only to institutions and not to 
personal choice as both justice in choice and justice in institutions are 
necessary for achieving distributive justice. However, it is only arbitrary if no 
principles of justice or insufficient principles are applied to personal choice.  
                                                 
30 Cohen (2000: 207, fn 28). 
31 Rawls (1999: 47). 
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According to Cohens account, Rawls is wrong when he says that the 
institutional principles do not apply to individuals because he seems to believe 
that fair personal choice and the application of institutional principles to 
choice are inseparable. One could agree, however, that you need justice in 
choice (because, for example, you are convinced of the need to achieve social 
equality) and still agree with Rawls that the institutional principles should not 
apply to choice. There are two main reasons why I am making this distinction: 
(1) it does not follow from the claim that choice should be included in the 
scope of justice that the institutional principles of justice should necessarily be 
applied to choice and (2) Rawlss conception of justice can be read to be 
consistent with the claim that we need to address justice in choice but that we 
should not apply the institutional principles to personal choice.  
 
(1) By arguing that personal choice should be included as part of the primary 
subject of justice Cohen has demonstrated that something like the institutional 
principles of justice should be applied to individual behaviour; however he 
has not demonstrated why specifically these principles should be applied 
directly to choice.  As long as we recognise that justice in noncoercive 
structure is needed, then we can agree with Rawls that we should not apply 
the institutional principles of justice to individuals, and we could apply 
principles other than the institutional to individuals instead.  
 
(2) A further problem with the application of the institutional principles to 
choice is that this is inconsistent with aspects of Rawlss justice, whereas 
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acknowledging that personal choice should be addressed as part of distributive 
justice but not applying the institutional principles to individuals could be 
consistent, if we accept what I have called the extensive understanding of the 
principles of justice. According to this interpretation of Rawlss justice, the 
institutional principles are not necessarily the only principles responsible for 
distributive justice thus principles besides the institutional could be used to 
evaluate or determine distribution, including principles specifically designed 
to evaluate the justice of personal choice. 
 
Let us say that we accept, as I believe we should, Cohens claim that personal 
choice needs to be included in the scope of Rawlss justice. After this 
recognition, our next step would be investigating how to do so. Cohens 
solution is to appropriate the institutional principles of justice and use them to 
judge the justice of personal choice. Thus personal choice should be judged 
according to whether it conforms to the institutional principles: for example, 
when the talented demand incentives we should judge whether their demands 
are fair by evaluating them according to the difference principle, and thus 
according to whether those demands are necessary to benefit the worst-off. 
However, this is a direct contradiction of Rawlss claims that such measures 
for justice should not be applied to individuals. Cohen does not consider an 
alternative which does not seem to contradict this claim: measures other than 
the institutional principles could be used to judge the justice of choice and 
could be incorporated into our descriptions of what a fair society would be 
like.  
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4.2. Murphy and the problem with monism 
 
Whereas Cohen claims that, at least within a Rawlsian framework, Rawlss 
institutional principles should apply to personal choice, Murphy makes a 
slightly different claim. He argues that the same fundamental normative 
principles that apply to institutions should also apply to personal choice.32 I 
agree with Murphy that the same sort of fundamental ideal, such as equal 
respect and concern, will underlie principles of justice for institutions and 
principles for individuals. Within a cohesive theory of justice, we could say 
that the spirit of these measures would be the same but this does not mean 
that the same principles should guide both.  
 
Like Cohen, Murphy seems to conflate the problem of having no or 
insufficient principles for individuals, with the notion of having different 
principles for institutions and individuals. He refers to any form of dualism, 
the view that we should have different fundamental principles of justice for 
institutions and for individuals, as implausible precisely because they have us 
aim at the good of institutions rather than at the good institutions can best 
do.33 Yet, I do not understand why claiming that there should be different 
principles of justice should commit one to the view that there should be 
insufficient principles of justice for individuals for addressing justice in 
choice. Why is it infeasible in Murphys view to have two different sets of 
principles, principles for individuals and principles for institutions, where the 
principles for individuals do address the justice of personal choice?  
                                                 
32 Murphy (1999: 251). 
33 Murphy (1999: 272). 
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The problem seems to be that Murphy is setting up dualism in such a way that 
makes it difficult not to agree with monism, as long as you accept that justice 
in personal choice is necessary. It fails thus to provide a fair comparison 
between monism and dualism. If monism claims that fundamental normative 
principles which apply to institutions, should also apply to individuals, then 
dualism should be the claim that different principles apply to institutions and 
individuals, not the claim that only principles which do not address justice in 
choice apply to individuals (although such a claim might be a particular form 
of dualism). Yet Murphy, as we have seen, seems to define dualism as 
necessarily deficient.34 Murphys argument, however, would not apply so 
strongly against a different form of dualism which would apply different 
principles to both institutions and individuals, and which would apply 
principles to choice which would address Cohen and Murphys problems with 
the neglect of justice in personal choice.  
 
Murphy may claim that I am missing the point, and that actually our views 
about personal choice and principles of justice coincide: his emphasis is that 
the same fundamental principles need to apply to institutions and individuals, 
although practically there would be different subsidiary principles. Thus 
perhaps we could say that the different principles applied to institutions and 
individuals which I seem to be advocating are merely practically different and 
that they rely on the same underlying fundamental principle.35 Murphy, 
however, implies that Rawlss principles of justice are fundamental which 
                                                 
34 See also Murphy (1999: 265-6). 
35 Murphy (1999: 254) admits that there are different practical principles which apply to 
personal choice and institutions.  
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means that if you agree that the institutional principles should be applied to 
institutions, then according to Murphy, you should agree that they also apply 
to personal choice. Yet it is with this that I take issue. I believe that either 
Murphy has to let go of the notion that Rawlsian principles are fundamental or 
he has to let go of the notion that we cannot have different fundamental 
principles of justice for individuals and institutions. My response to Murphy 
resembles my response to Cohen: as long as we have other principles to apply 
to individuals which will take care of the justice of personal choice then we do 
not need to apply institutional principles to personal choice. 
 
4.3. Why we should not apply the institutional principles to personal 
choice  
 
I have argued that Cohen and Murphy have not shown that we need to use 
Rawlss institutional principles to apply to personal choice. I agree that 
something needs to apply to personal choice but I fail to see why it has to be 
the institutional principles. We can go further than this, however, and question 
why it would be desirable to apply these principles to individuals. In this 
section I will discuss four reasons why it is not desirable to apply the 
institutional principles to personal choice. I do not believe that these reasons 
demonstrate that there could never be a good argument in favour of this form 
of application, thus I do not consider them to be conclusive. My aim in this 
section, however, is to demonstrate that (i) Cohen and Murphy are not 
convincing on insisting that the same principles applied to institutions should 
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be applied to personal choice and (ii) there are good reasons for not applying 
the institutional principles:36 
 
(1) The institutional principles have been designed specifically to apply to 
institutions. Surely we should design a solution to the problem of justice in 
personal choice that is specifically geared towards individuals and not 
institutions? Simply appropriating the institutional principles of justice, as is, 
to guide individual behaviour is problematic because they were designed to 
apply to institutions, and as such we will struggle to make them fit properly as 
guides for individual behaviour. At a minimum, we cannot assume that they 
do apply readily to individuals and this is precisely what Rawls claims:  
 
if one supposes that the concept of justice applies whenever there is an 
allotment of something rationally regarded as advantageous or 
disadvantageous, then we are interested in only one instance of its 
application. There is no reason to suppose ahead of time that the 
principles satisfactory for the basic structure hold for all cases.37 
 
Murphy might argue that if we were to start from the drawing-board, and 
perhaps he would argue that we should start from the drawing-board precisely 
because Rawlss principles were designed for institutions, we should design 
principles from scratch that would apply to both institutions and individuals.38 
The point, however, is not merely that Rawlss principles for institutions are 
probably inappropriate to apply to individuals but that any principles made to 
                                                 
36 These are enough for my purposes in this chapter which is to lay the groundwork for 
providing an alternative to the PCA. I will discuss this alternative in the next chapter.   
37 Rawls (1999: 7). 
38 Murphy (1999: 262-4), as I mentioned, claims that a principle of weighted beneficence 
could be applied to both institutions and individuals. 
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design and regulate institutions would probably be unsuitable for individuals. 
Murphy could concede, as I mentioned in the previous section, by claiming 
that these different principles are then not fundamental and that some more 
fundamental principles underlie both sets of principles. As such I would be 
likely to agree with him but then his claims would provide no objection to 
mine.    
 
(2) One of the reasons why Rawls claims that justice cannot be achieved 
solely though the application of rules to particular transactions is because the 
principles of justice are too complex to be applied to particular transactions. 
Although Rawls uses this claim as an argument against using rules of justice 
based on particular transactions as sufficient for justice, we could use the 
same claim for why the institutional principles of justice should not be applied 
to individuals. Let us say that an individual is directed by Cohens egalitarian 
ethos to conform to the difference principle. Surely in many cases it would be 
very difficult, if not impossible, for this individual to work out which choices 
would benefit the worst-off. Rawls uses bequests as an example: 
 
Individuals and associations cannot comprehend the ramifications of 
their particular actions viewed collectively, nor can they be expected 
to foresee future circumstances that shape and form present 
tendencies It is obviously not sensible to impose on parents (as 
heads of families) the duty to adjust their own bequests to what they 
estimate the effects of totality of actual bequests will be on the next 
generation.39  
 
                                                 
39 Rawls (1993: 268). 
 222 
If the difference principle, however, is only directly applied to the basic 
structure, and thus it is not expected to be applied to individuals or particular 
cases, then there is no need for individuals or associations to attempt to 
calculate what will benefit the worst-off as the basic structure of society has 
been rigged to help the worst-off: Once this division of labor is set up, 
individuals and associations are then left free to advance their (permissible) 
ends within the framework of the basic structure, secure in the knowledge that 
elsewhere in the social system the regulations necessary to preserve 
background justice are in force.40 
 
(3) It is not merely, however, that the effects of the institutional principles 
applied to particular transactions are difficult for individuals to calculate; they 
could be self-defeating. Van Parijs asks us to imagine that if a manager had to 
take the difference principle into account when she had to hire a new 
employee, it would seem that she would have to employ the person who most 
needed the job but who was also likely to be the least employable, the least 
productive among the applicants.41 This would become self-defeating as a 
decrease in productivity will hamper, not benefit, the worst-off in society:  
 
Surely this inference from the maximin at the macro-level to maximin 
at the micro-level is spurious, as the latter, when consistently 
practiced, is bound to undermine the former, by gravely impairing the 
economys performance, and hence making the best material condition 
that can sustainably be granted to the worst off considerably worse 
than is necessary.42 
                                                 
40 Rawls (2001i: 54). 
41 Van Parijs (1999: 119). 
42 Van Parijs (1999: 119-120). 
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If individuals and associations were expected to apply such principles to their 
decisions and behaviour, the worst-off could be further disadvantaged.   
 
(4) A last problem with applying the institutional principles to personal choice 
is that they would not be sufficient to address certain injustices in personal 
choice. The previous two problems identified with the institutional principles, 
that they are too complicated for individuals and that they could be self-
defeating, apply particularly to the difference principle. Cohen could argue, 
however, that fair equality of opportunity is more clearly applicable to 
individuals. Indeed when I described the problem of the gendered division of 
household labour, I described its injustice in terms of a violation of fair 
equality of opportunity and thus it seems that there is a clear case here for 
applying such an institutional principle to choice.  
 
Although I agree that applying the institutional principle of fair equality of 
opportunity to individual behaviour would, at times, cover certain injustices in 
personal choice, and for that matter, certain violations of social equality, this 
does not provide sufficient reason for claiming that the solution to the neglect 
of justice in personal choice is that we should apply the institutional principles 
to individuals.43 Besides problems with other principles, such as the ones just 
highlighted with the difference principle, even if we had to modify the claim 
and say that the solution is to apply only fair equality of opportunity to choice, 
                                                 
43 Furthermore, recognising that choice affects the distribution of opportunities is not 
necessarily to judge choice directly by the principle of fair equality of opportunity. It could be 
justified instead according to Rawlss (1999: 79) list of primary social goods which need to be 
distributed fairly and which includes opportunities.   
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this would still not cover all of the injustices caused by personal choice. A 
significant omission would be injustices caused by interferences with self-
respect.  
 
If you accept that the social basis of self-respect is a good that needs to be 
distributed fairly in order to achieve justice and you accept that self-respect 
has an informal basis which should also be a concern of justice, which I have 
argued is the case, then it is difficult to see how the application of any or all of 
the institutional principles to personal choice will resolve problems with the 
distribution of the informal basis of self-respect. None of the institutional 
principles are geared to resolving injustices caused through peoples attitudes 
to each other such as for example through biases, stereotyping, derogatory or 
abusive language, and avoidance and exclusion, and yet it is these, among 
others, which affect self-respect. The solution we need to the problem of 
injustice in personal choice should address not only informal fair equality of 
opportunity but also self-respect; as such applying the institutional principles 
to personal choice does not seem to be a sufficient solution.  
 
A similar rejoinder could be formulated to a potential counter-claim from 
Murphy. He could concede that at times it is problematic to apply the 
institutional principles to choice but where it is not too complicated and where 
it is not self-defeating, we should judge choice according to the difference 
principle. Consider his claim that sometimes it is clear that acting according to 
the difference principle, rather than supporting fair institutions, is more likely 
to benefit the worst-off:  
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it could not be right that an individual rich First Worlder is required to 
devote her resources to the Quixotic task of promoting just 
international institutions. Such a person could clearly do so much more 
to alleviate suffering or inequality by doing what she can on her own  
by giving money to humanitarian aid agencies.44  
 
It is preferable, however, that the solution to justice in choice should be 
consistent. For example, we should judge choice according to social equality, 
or according to the institutional principles, or some such consistent standard 
and not piecemeal by a standard which is sometimes applicable and 
sometimes not, particularly as such inconsistency would, on a practical level, 
only increase the complexity and confusion of an individuals decisions. Thus 
although fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle sometimes 
seem to be applicable to individuals choices, we would do better to address 
justice in choice if we used a standard of justice which could be applied 
reliably, not erratically, to choice.  
 
 
5. Revising the personal choice argument  
 
I have claimed that I agree with the first two statements of the PCA: 
 
1. Personal choice affects the distribution of social goods. 
                                                 
44 Murphy (1999: 281). 
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2. Therefore, we need principles of justice to evaluate the justice personal 
choice. 
 
As the reasons presented by Cohen and Murphy for applying institutional 
principles to personal choice are unconvincing and as there are reasons why 
we should not apply these principles to choice, I am going to present a revised 
version of the PCA which will not include the third claim of the original 
argument. Instead I will substitute it for this: 
 
3. Injustices in choice will not occur or are less likely to occur if social 
equality is upheld 
4. Therefore, we should apply principles which aim to uphold social equality 
to choice in order to evaluate the justice of choice. 
 
These four statements are what I will refer to as the revised personal choice 
argument. A qualification is necessary: I am not claiming that principles 
which uphold social equality are the only option; perhaps some other 
principles would be able to achieve justice in personal choice. My concern is 
to provide an alternative to the problem of justice in choice, not to present 
such an alternative as definitive. 
 
In the next section I aim to show that this revised argument avoids some of the 
objections aimed at the original argument. Of course, I have not explained in 
detail yet what these principles of social equality are, and as such they may 
still need to be defended from objections. Much will depend on the content of 
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these principles, and in the next chapter I will explain this content and defend 
it from objections. For the time being it is sufficient for me to demonstrate 
that many objections to the PCA are usually only applicable to its original 
form, and particularly to the claim that the difference principle should be 
applied to individual behaviour.   
 
6. Defending the revised personal choice argument from 
objections 
 
In this section I aim to address objections to the personal choice argument. I 
will focus on the prerogatives argument, the publicity condition argument and 
Thomas Pogges criticism of Cohen and Murphy. I aim at demonstrating that 
these objections do not show that personal choice should not be a subject of 
justice. At times, I will be defending both the original personal choice 
argument and my revised personal choice argument. However, mostly, I will 
demonstrate that criticisms levelled against the PCA only apply to its original 
version: in these cases, the revised personal choice argument does not seem to 
be subject to the same objections. This is because many or all of the 
objections raised by critics such as Andrew Williams (the publicity condition 
argument) and Pogge are directed at statement 3 of the original PCA, i.e. that 
the same principles of justice that apply to institutions should be applied to 
personal choice. Thus as the revised PCA rejects this claim, it is not subject to 
these objections. 
 
6.1. The prerogatives argument 
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The real question is not whether a person has a right to a private space 
but what its shape should be.45  
 
The prerogatives argument could apply to both the original and the revised 
PCA. Here I will respond to this argument as an objection aimed at Cohens 
incentives argument, however, this defence could also apply in general to 
other forms of the personal choice argument.  
 
The prerogatives argument is centred on the claim that personal choice that 
violates the demands of justice can be justified by inegalitarian but acceptable 
prerogatives.46  Cohen accuses the talented of selfishness in their demands for 
incentives. Surely, the prerogatives argument goes, we can justify incentives 
according to individuals own commitments and projects which form an 
integral part of their lives, and which would be difficult to reduce to pure 
material selfishness, or according to an individuals commitments to loved 
ones and dependants, commitments which are clearly not motivated by 
acquisitiveness? Perhaps I demand material incentives because I want to pay 
for a life-saving operation for my mother or I demand incentives in order to 
fund my childs education. If Cohen denies the acceptability of these 
prerogatives, the rightness of an individuals economic choices becomes a 
function solely of whether or not they benefit the worst-off. This, the 
prerogatives argument claims, is too demanding. Furthermore, this violates 
our understanding of common-sense morality: Cohen would then place too 
                                                 
45 Cohen (2000: 168). 
46 My formulation of the prerogatives argument is based on David Estlund (1998), Norman 
Daniels (2003) and Pogges (2000) critiques of Cohens stance.  
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great an emphasis on justice and the needs of the worst-off to the detriment of 
common-sense prerogatives to pursue self-interest and the interest of friends, 
family and loved ones: Unless it recognizes a range of prerogatives, Cohens 
radicalised Rawlsianism would, to a notable degree, subordinate the concern 
for ones brother, sister or spouse to the concern for ones very badly off 
fellow citizen.47 
 
A first response to this claim is that not only is denying prerogatives not a 
logical consequence of judging personal choice according to justice, Cohen 
actually explicitly endorses at least one prerogative: he claims that he is not 
an extreme moral rigorist, meaning that he agrees that every person has 
a right to pursue self-interest to some reasonable extent (even when that 
makes things worse than they need be for badly off people).48 Thus 
recognising that personal choice should be included in the scope of justice is 
not necessarily too demanding nor does it defy the precepts of common-sense 
morality by subordinating concern for oneself and ones loved ones to concern 
for the worst-off. In response to Cohens argument, Norman Daniels claims 
A commitment to fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle as 
principles of justice should not require us to shape our plans of life so the 
pursuit of the goals of those principles become our primary motivations.49 
Sounds like a terrible idea: having to shape your life plans according to fair 
equality of opportunity and the difference principle. I am unsure though what 
it has to do (necessarily) with Cohens position or any version of the personal 
choice argument, which does not have to deny prerogatives.   
                                                 
47 Estlund (1998: 106). 
48 Cohen c.f. Williams (1998: 227, fn. 7).  
49 Daniels (2003: 271). 
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In response, the prerogatives argument could claim that although Cohen 
explicitly acknowledges prerogatives, incorporating recognition of 
prerogatives into Cohens argument is inconsistent because once prerogatives 
are accepted, Cohen cannot demonstrate that incentives are unacceptable 
because they can be justified by prerogatives. This response misses the point, 
however. Cohens claim is that incentives are unjust not that they are 
unjustifiable: justifying incentives on the basis of prerogatives may even make 
incentives acceptable but they do not make them fair. It is important to make a 
distinction between the claim that the talented should not demand incentives 
under any circumstances and that incentives are unjust: Cohen, I believe, has 
only aimed at demonstrating the latter and not the former. Thus his claim is 
that we should be able to judge the justice of personal choice but this should 
not necessarily mean that unjust personal choice is always prohibited: Cohen 
has not argued that the justice of personal choice should always be the 
deciding factor in choice.  
 
A further rejoinder from the prerogatives argument could be that there is 
something necessarily incompatible with accepting both judgements of 
personal choice from the standpoint of justice and from the standpoint of 
prerogatives because these values underlying personal choice compete and the 
competition that justice affords prerogatives undermines prerogatives. This, 
however, cannot be an argument against judging choice according to justice 
as, whether or not we recognise justice as a value which should motivate 
choice, the values that do motivate choice are multiple and often do conflict. 
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Think, for example, of Thomas Nagels list of motives behind choice. He 
argues that there are five fundamental types of value that give rise to conflict: 
obligations to people and institutions, constraints on action from rights, utility, 
perfectionist ends, and an individuals own projects.50 It cannot be an 
argument against a value that there are other values with which it competes 
(and even if it were, it is not then self-evident why justice should be 
sacrificed. At least some explanation would have to be given about why 
prerogatives trump justice).  
 
A further response then from the prerogatives argument could be that Cohen 
fails to provide us with guidelines for what to do when justice does compete 
with prerogatives; he fails to provide us with guidelines as to under which 
circumstances, justice should prevail in personal choice. This may be true. 
However, this is evidently not a refutation of Cohens claims but rather a call 
for extension or for further research. It does not demonstrate that Cohens 
argument fails as it does not demonstrate that incentives are fair nor that 
personal choice should not be included in the scope of justice.   
 
6.2. The publicity condition argument  
 
A further argument claims that the problem of prerogatives is really a problem 
of publicity: as prerogatives could justify certain inegalitarian choices, the 
injustice of market choices is not open to the publicity condition. Publicity, 
however, is a requirement of justice and thus applying the difference principle 
                                                 
50 Nagel (1979: 129-130). 
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to choice should not be included in the scope of justice. This is the publicity 
condition argument. A proponent of this argument is Andrew Williams. 
 
Williams argues that Cohens reply to the basic-structure objection rests on 
identifying the basic structure with legal coerciveness. Cohen defines the 
basic structure according to its legal coerciveness, and Williams claims that it 
is because Cohen identifies the basic structure with this intrinsic property that 
limiting the principles of justice to the basic structure seems arbitrary.51  If, 
however, you identify the basic structure with a different intrinsic property 
then, Williams argues, Cohens response to the objection no longer holds.  
 
Williams claims that the defining intrinsic feature of the basic structure is that 
it consists of public rules: the structure comprises those actions which realize 
public rules in a way that exerts profound and unavoidable influence on 
individuals access to social goods.52 The problem with an egalitarian ethos 
which motivates market choice is that it cannot be public in the requisite way, 
mainly because it is too informationally demanding.53 Williams argues that 
acceptable prerogatives which could justify market choices are often too 
complex and vague to be publicly scrutinised and thus it is highly 
improbable that Cohens favoured ethos could be represented as an institution 
embodying public rules Instead the ethos appears to lie outside the basic 
structure.54 A market ethos then fails to fulfil the publicity condition and 
thus, according to Williams, it cannot be a requirement of justice. 
                                                 
51 Williams (1998: 231). 
52 Williams (1998: 234). 
53 Williams (1998: 241). 
54 Williams (1998: 241). 
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To explain this problem, lets take the example of Pauline. Pauline is about to 
be promoted from a human resource officer to the human resource manager in 
a large company. Although this position does not require extra work or extra 
time, she demands a substantial increase in salary to accompany the 
promotion. We can imagine that Cohen might argue that Paulines demands 
would be unjust. Receiving a salary substantially higher than average is not 
necessary for benefiting the worst-off. If Pauline was motivated by an 
egalitarian ethos, she would choose to work for an average salary, and this 
would be the fair choice. The publicity condition argument could claim 
something like this in response: Paulines choice could be motivated by an 
acceptable prerogative but as we cannot know why she is demanding this 
incentive, the ethos that motivates her choice fails to live up to the publicity 
condition, and thus does not fall under the scope of justice. As Williams 
claims: 
 
some choices, although they may be profoundly influential, cannot be 
regarded as according with, or violating public rules. Consequently the 
nonpublic strategies and maxims that individuals employ in making 
those choices need not be assessed as just or unjust by means of 
Rawlsian principles.55 
  
Stated so far, the publicity conditions argument seems circular. If the question 
is why should we apply principles of justice only to the basic structure and 
not to personal choice?, then it seems circular that the answer should be a 
definition of the basic structure, i.e. because the basic structure comprises 
                                                 
55 Williams (1998:  234). 
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public rules and personal choice does not. It is as if we are answering the 
question why should we only apply principles of justice to public rules? with 
the answer because the basic structure is comprised of public rules. This 
answer assumes something about the relationship between justice and public 
rules which is not yet explicit: it needs to be explained why publicity is a 
necessary condition of justice and thus why, if an ethos cannot fulfil the 
publicity condition, it should be considered to be outside the ambit of justice. 
Williams answer is that a conception of justice which fulfils the publicity 
condition is necessary to achieve Rawlss ideal of social unity. Social unity 
means that a society is well-ordered, and Williams claims that according to 
Rawls, a society can be well-ordered only if it is regulated by a conception of 
justice that is both public and stable.56 To complete the argument without 
circularity then, we can say that social unity requires a conception of justice 
that fulfils the publicity condition, and thus, as a market ethos does not fulfil 
this condition, it cannot be a requirement of justice. 
 
Three primary responses are potentially open in defence of the original 
personal choice argument:  
(1) claiming that a market ethos that motivates personal choice does fulfil the 
publicity condition,  
(2) denying that that the publicity condition is a requirement of justice,  
(3) denying that social unity requires a conception of justice that is public.  
 
                                                 
56 Williams (1998: 244). 
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I believe that option 2 might be able to defend the original PCA from this 
objection. I will briefly explain why I believe it has this potential but then I 
will turn to what I believe is a more pertinent point: that the publicity 
condition argument does not pose an objection to the revised personal choice 
argument and, indeed, it seems that Williams might actually endorse this 
revised argument. 
 
In defence of the original PCA, one could argue that a publicity condition is 
an unfeasibly strict condition of justice and as such should not be a condition 
of justice. To illustrate, take an example from fair employment procedures: as 
a manager in a company looking to employ a new member of staff, I am not 
supposed to discriminate among the candidates on the basis of their race. 
Conceivably, however, I could choose not to hire a black candidate because 
she is black and yet feign to justify my choice on the basis of seemingly fair 
standards. An outsider judging this situation may not know what my 
motivations are and indeed, due to deep-seated unconscious prejudices and the 
conventions in my social environment, I may not even know that I have 
discriminated against this candidate, however the lack of publicity in this 
situation does not mean that such discrimination is not unjust nor could it 
mean that we should not aim towards non-discrimination as a matter of justice 
merely because some examples of discrimination are hidden or inscrutable or 
some such thing.57  
 
                                                 
57 Michael Otsuka (2006, forthcoming) emphasises a similar point in his article Prerogatives 
to Depart from Equality'. 
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Whether we are able to scrutinise motives does not seem to change the justice 
of the decision: how could we claim that discriminating against someone on 
the basis of their race is unjust only if such discrimination is transparent? It 
seems that it is the discrimination that is unjust not its fulfilment of the 
publicity condition. Publicity seems to be an issue not with determining 
whether discrimination is fair or unfair, but rather with whether we can accuse 
a particular person of making an unjust decision or censure them for that 
decision. I can understand that in our example, I should not be fired, or 
accused of discrimination, on the basis of this decision, because others and 
perhaps even I would not be able to identify whether the decision I made was 
unjust. Publicity then seems useful in determining the fairness of 
denouncement or censure. Publicity does not determine justice, however, for 
if I did discriminate against this candidate because of her race, what I did is 
unjust even if I or others do not know that this is what I did; the point is that if 
I did it, it is unjust.  
 
Whatever one can say about the problems associated with the original PCA 
and the publicity condition argument, it is significant that if one does not 
accept the last claim of the PCA, the claim that the principles of justice that 
apply to institutions should apply to personal choice, Williams objection no 
longer applies. The publicity condition argument focuses on the application of 
the difference principle to personal choice and claims that such an application 
fails to fulfil the publicity condition, and thus a market ethos, motivated by the 
difference principle, cannot be a requirement of justice. If, however, we 
concede that the difference principle does not have to apply to personal 
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choice, but that some other principles of justice do, then Williams argument 
no longer provides an objection. 
 
Williams claims that it would be highly erratic of Rawls to be unconcerned 
by the threats posed to fair equality of opportunity when it comes to Cohens 
examples of injustices which occur in the informal, such as the gendered 
division of household labour,58 and claims that such practices and attitudes 
are unjust regardless of whether they violate legal rules.59 Williams thus 
agrees that we could evaluate personal choice according to justice, and indeed, 
according to one of Rawlss principles, fair equality of opportunity. His 
problem with Cohens argument is the application of the difference principle 
to individuals because a market ethos which inspires personal choice to be 
motivated by the worst-off does not live up to the publicity condition, but he 
claims that an egalitarian ethos which motivates informal justice in the family 
could fulfil this condition: it may be possible to devise a domestic ethos 
which provides a public basis to condemn the relevant forms of gender 
injustice.60 Why domestic choice differs from market choice, Williams does 
not make explicit, however, perhaps we can surmise that this is probably 
related to the problems identified thus far with applying the difference 
principle to choice. Williams objection though is clearly directed, not even at 
the original PCA because he seems to think it is acceptable to apply fair 
equality of opportunity to choice, but at the application of the difference 
principle to individual behaviour.  
 
                                                 
58 Williams (1998: 230, fn. 18). 
59 Williams (1998: 242). 
60 Williams (1998: 242).  
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6.3. A response to Pogge 
 
Thomas Pogge develops two primary types of objections which would apply 
to the original PCA.61 The first is aimed specifically at Cohens incentives 
argument and thus at the application of the difference principle to personal 
choice. Among other objections, he claims that the calculations involved in 
working out how best to benefit the worst-off are too complicated for 
individuals to make when it comes to particular cases.62 This, however, is only 
a response to the application of the difference principle to personal choice and 
thus does not apply to the revised version of the PCA.  
 
The second type of objection addresses the more general claim that justice 
must have a wider range than Rawlss to include personal choice and 
convention, for example, which would, at least stated this generally, apply to 
either version of the PCA. 63  
 
Pogge believes that the claim that justice in choice is a requirement of justice 
can fall into one of two categories: (1) mastergoal monism, according to 
which both individuals and institutions must promote the goal underlying 
justice, or (2) supergoal monism, according to which both individuals and 
institutions should aim at this goal.64 I am uncomfortable with Pogges 
description of the PCA in these terms as I do not believe that any of its claims, 
even statement 3 which I have criticised, would necessarily commit it to either 
                                                 
61 Pogge (2000: 137  169). 
62 Pogge (2000: 147).  
63 Pogge (2000: 138). 
64 Pogge (2000: 155-6). Pogge claims that Cohen is clearly a supergoal monist but that it is 
ambiguous whether Murphy favours super- or mastergoal monism.    
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mastergoal or supergoal monism.65 As such, I will not try to defend these two 
forms of monism but will restate the argument in Rawlss terms and examine 
how Pogge would respond to the PCA based on his criticism of mastergoal 
and supergoal monism.  
 
Rawls is concerned with how we can organise society so as to achieve the best 
distribution of primary social goods. The original and the revised versions of 
the PCA both claim that you will get a better distribution of primary social 
goods if personal choice and institutions are fair rather than if institutions, 
merely, are fair. What would Pogges response be to this? Much of his 
response has already been addressed in my criticism of the original PCA as, 
although he aims to criticise the more general claim that Rawlss justice 
should have a more expansive range to include personal choice, his criticisms 
continue to be directed against the application of the difference principle to 
personal choice and thus do not necessarily apply to the revised PCA.66  
 
                                                 
65 I am uncomfortable with such a restatement of Cohen and Murphys claims for two 
reasons. (1) This restatement seems to avoid addressing one of the primary points around 
which debate should be centred, i.e. the claim that personal choice affects distribution. (2) It 
seems to infer a dubious association between utilitarianism and the PCA. For example, Pogge 
(2000:156) describes the tension between super- and mastergoal monism as similar to the 
tension between whether utility should be promoted (even through non-utilitarian action), or 
whether it should always be aimed at through utilitarian action. He also associates the PCA 
with the claim that justice is of ultimate moral importance (2000:156-6). This seems to 
imply that the PCA is a consequentialist argument, thus something like the claim that actions 
are only acceptable if they promote or aim at justice. It also seems to imply that the PCA is 
open to typical objections against consequentialism, such as that it is too demanding or that it 
denies agent-centred prerogatives (for a statement of consequentialism, see Kagan [1989] and 
for an example of criticism, see B. Williams [1973]). I am not aware, however, that Cohen 
and Murphy ever claim that their arguments are consequentialist, and Pogge provides no 
evidence that they are. At the least, it is not necessary for the PCA to be understood in such a 
way. It attempts to revise our descriptions of a fair society; it does not aim to tell us that 
justice is the most important or only moral value against which all our actions should be 
judged as acceptable or unacceptable.  
66 To say that Pogges objections are geared towards the application of the difference 
principle to personal choice is not to find fault with Pogges argument. Cohen and Murphy 
focus mainly on the difference principle and thus it seems consistent for Pogge to direct his 
criticism to this application.  
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For example, he claims that if justice needs to be achieved through personal 
choice, then it may not be best achieved by individuals trying to promote 
justice as a goal may not best be promoted by people pursuing it.67 This, 
however, is an argument specifically directed against applying the difference 
principle to choice and does not need to apply to other principles of justice 
which are used to measure the justice of the behaviour of individuals and of 
associations. As I highlighted in the previous section, expecting individuals to 
apply the difference principle could be self-defeating and this is one of the 
reasons why the institutional principles should not be applied to choice. 
 
Pogge also claims that accepting personal choice as a requirement of justice 
seems to make justice of ultimate moral importance.68 This is a problem 
because (i) Rawls does not make the principles of justice of ultimate moral 
importance and (ii) it would be totalitarian to force such ultimate moral values 
on individuals to pursue. This seems similar to the prerogatives argument, and 
indeed Pogge also criticises Cohens views because he claims that applying 
principles of justice to personal choice may lead to violations of agent-centred 
prerogatives.69 Although one could argue in response that the PCA does not 
necessarily makes justice an all-demanding value (see footnote 65), or, as I 
argued earlier, the PCA does not have to contradict common-sense 
prerogatives, I want to spend a little more time on this issue because there is a 
genuine concern that needs to be addressed.  
 
                                                 
67 Pogge (2000: 159). 
68 Pogge (2000: 157). 
69 Pogge (2000: 161). 
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Pogge seems to be concerned that if we start including personal choice as part 
of justice there is a chance that we could come up with some frightening 
totalitarian answers to the question how should we arrange society so as to 
achieve the best distribution of social goods?. Pogge, for example, claims 
that: 
 
It is quite possible that crime and poverty in the U.S. could be reduced 
most effectively through a national ethos involving a common 
religious allegiance to lifelong marriage, fidelity and other family 
values.70  
 
If we thus demand that individuals should aim to accomplish the same goals 
as  institutions, this would commit us to use our professional positions for 
supporting conservative efforts at rebuilding such an ethos and for projecting 
shining personal examples of pious and devoted family folk.71 Consider 
another example: if broad distributive justice is our goal, both through 
institutions and through personal choice, then perhaps the best way of 
distributing goods such as opportunities would be to abolish the family and 
have everyone raised equally in government-controlled communes.72 If we 
start considering the justice of personal choice, are we not opening ourselves 
up to the possibility of governmental control over aspects of our lives which 
should be open to choice? 
 
                                                 
70 Pogge (2000: 158). 
71 Pogge (2000: 158). 
72 See, for example, James S. Fishkin (1983) who claims that equality of opportunity and the 
autonomy of the family are incompatible.  
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My reply to this objection reinforces my claim that the answer to the problem 
of justice in personal choice lies not with the institutional principles but in 
social equality. Murphy and Cohen may be tempted to respond to this by 
saying that in a Rawlsian society in which the principle of liberty is prioritised 
such governmental control would be unacceptable. Pogge might point out 
here, however, that to be consistent the principle of liberty would also have to 
apply to personal choice. Not only might this be as self-defeating as applying 
the difference principle to choice, it could also cause excessive interference 
with peoples own priorities similar to those caused by an over-controlling 
state: [individuals] might then be permitted or even required to engage in 
freelance efforts against criminals, intolerant sects, and the like whenever such 
efforts improve overall fulfilment of the basic liberties.73  
 
Using the notion of social equality to respond to Pogge is more helpful. Social 
equality includes the notion of respect-for-persons, which I argued can be 
broken down into two primary components (1) an opposition to unfair 
hierarchies of worth and (2) an opposition to dehumanisation. In order to 
achieve social equality both of these (at least) need to be achieved. The 
opposition to dehumanisation provides us with an answer to why social 
equality does not seem to be subject to the levelling-down objection (see 
chapter II) or to Pogges claims about totalitarianism. This is because 
dehumanisation provides constraints on how people can be treated. So, for 
example, dehumanisation prevents people from being forced into set social 
roles, such as particular jobs. Furthermore, respect toleration which demands 
                                                 
73 Pogge (2000: 162). 
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toleration of differences, as long as these do not violate respect-for-persons, is 
another requirement of social equality which guarantees freedom in many of 
our choices including our conceptions of the good. Although we may aim to 
achieve a fair distribution of social goods, we are limited by dehumanisation 
and toleration in what we can expect or coerce people into doing in order to 
achieve such a distribution. Pogge is probably right that if our only aim is 
distributive justice we might come up with some illiberal solutions to the 
problem of justice in personal choice, but if an underlying concern is to 
uphold social equality, which includes a concern to uphold rights and 
autonomous choices, Pogges apprehension no longer seems applicable.  
 
As I have emphasised, Pogges problems with the PCA apply predominantly 
to the original version of this argument. A rare occasion in which he seems to 
consider an idea closer to my conception of the PCA is when he claims that 
one may also find disturbing that the members of a thoroughly D-inspired 
society [difference-principle-inspired society] would be morally required to 
devote to those in the lowest socioeconomic position not merely money, but 
also respect and friendship, which are, after all, social bases of self-respect.74 
He seems to find this idea so self-evidently disturbing that he devotes no more 
time to its consideration except to refer to Bernard Williams dismissal of 
such an idea as righteous absurdity in a footnote.75  
 
Without any need for Pogge to explain himself further, perhaps it is fairly 
self-evident why associating the notion of friendship with justice is disturbing. 
                                                 
74 Pogge (2000: 161). 
75 Pogge (2000: 161 fn. 43). 
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Friendship has to do with such things as bonds of loyalty, familiarity, 
affection, positive appraisal, likes and dislikes. It seems strange to associate 
such a notion with justice which is concerned with what people deserve as 
people or as citizens, removed from our particular preferences and biases. 
Even if the distribution of the social basis of self-respect is affected by 
friendship, a lack of friendship cannot be remedied by a general standard of 
justice: including as a requirement of justice something like a duty to be 
friends with people would be bizarre because, among others, (1) it contradicts 
what friendship is and (2) it cannot possibly solve issues of self-respect 
associated with friendship because it seems impossible to direct us to be 
friends with everybody or with people who most need friendship.  
 
I do not think, however, that it is self-evident why demanding respect from 
individuals is either disturbing or absurd (as long as we are talking about 
respect-for-persons). A choice not to be friends with a particular person 
because of personal preferences seems to have nothing to do with justice, but 
denying a particular group of people or particular individuals respect, civility 
or toleration seems clearly related to justice when we consider a history of 
real-life injustices in which both institutionally and individually, people have 
been systematically denied social goods and the justification for this denial, 
among others, has been that they are less worthy of such goods because of 
their class, race, gender and so on.76 Pogge would need to address these 
claims directly and not merely dismiss them as absurd.  
                                                 
76 Not being friends with someone because they are black, or so on, can be deemed a 
violation of social equality but this does not mean that we have obligations to be friends with 
particular people or anyone for that matter, merely that certain justifications for our actions 
are out of place in a society of equals.  
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Conclusion 
 
In the introduction I claimed that the broad aim of this chapter was to provide 
justification for why I would not be using the original personal choice 
argument as a solution to the problem of justice in personal choice in Rawlss 
theory. Although I agree with Cohen that personal choice affects the justice of 
distribution and as such we need to apply some standard of justice to choice, I 
do not agree that the solution is to apply the institutional principles to justice. 
Neither Cohen nor Murphy demonstrate why these principles should be so 
applied if other principles of justice, which would address the justice of 
personal choice, can be applied to individuals. Furthermore, applying the 
institutional principles does not seem convincing if we consider: (1) they are 
not designed to apply to individuals, (2) their outcomes are difficult to 
calculate, (3) they could be self-defeating and (4) they do not address 
interferences with the informal social basis of self-respect. It is for these 
reasons that I believe we should find an alternative to the original personal 
choice argument.  
 
An alternative to the original argument, which circumvents at least some of its 
drawbacks, replaces the claim that we should apply institutional principles to 
choice with the claim that we should apply principles which uphold social 
equality to individuals in order to address the justice of choice. This is 
because if informal social equality is upheld we will go at least some way to 
upholding justice in personal choice.   
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Although I may have demonstrated why the general format of this revised 
argument provides an alternative to the original, I have not yet made its 
content explicit. In the next chapter, I will explain what these principles would 
look like. I will argue that by revising Rawlss principles of justice for 
individuals according to the values of social equality we will find a solution to 
the deficiencies in Rawlss justice by using resources within his theory of 
justice.  
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V. Principles for individuals and the duties of social 
equality 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
Some writers have distinguished between equality as it is invoked in 
connection with the distribution of certain goods, some of which will 
almost certainly give higher status or prestige to those who are more 
favored, and equality as it applies to the respect which is owed to 
persons irrespective of their social position. Equality of the first kind is 
defined by the second principle of justice  But equality of the first 
kind is fundamental. It is defined by the first principle of justice and 
by such natural duties as that of mutual respect1  
 
Rawlss institutional justice seems insufficient for achieving a fair distribution 
of the primary social goods. For a fair distribution of these goods, we need 
fairness in institutional rules, the focus of Rawlss justice, and fairness in 
choice, a neglect of Rawlss justice. Cohen and Murphys attempts to 
reconcile Rawlss justice with justice in choice are flawed. How then are we 
to accommodate this requirement of justice in choice within Rawlss theory? 
Rawlss theory does include principles for individuals, and principles for 
individuals, rather than principles for institutions, seem to be the kind of 
measure we are looking for when it comes to judging the justice of choice. 
 
An examination of Rawlss principles for individuals, however, demonstrates 
that, as is, they do not address justice in choice and thus they would need to be 
revised if they are to provide a solution to the problem of informal social 
                                                 
1 Rawls (1999: 447; my emphasis). 
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equality. I have claimed that applying principles of social equality to 
individual behaviour and the rules of associations will help to achieve justice 
in personal choice as an alternative preferable to applying the institutional 
principles to choice. The precise content of these principles has not yet been 
determined, nor how they would be made to fit into Rawlss justice. In this 
chapter I aim to describe the content of the principles necessary for justice in 
choice and demonstrate how to situate them in Rawlss justice by 
incorporating the requirements of social equality into Rawlss principles for 
individuals. For this purpose, I will propose a revised version of two of 
Rawlss principles for individuals, the duty of mutual respect and the duty of 
justice, as a solution to accommodating justice in choice.  
 
I aim to answer two primary questions in this chapter: 
1. Do Rawlss principles for individuals address informal social equality? 
2. As I will demonstrate that the answer to the above question is no, then 
how can we adapt these principles to fulfil the demands of social equality? 
 
In the broader context of this thesis, I aim to provide an alternative to the 
original PCAs claim that the institutional principles should be applied to 
choice. This alternative, the duties of social equality, addresses justice in 
choice and addresses, at least, the minimum requirements of informal social 
equality, yet it does so without violating Rawlss stipulation that institutional 
and individual principles should be separate, or at least, not presumed to be 
the same. 
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There are 5 sections to this chapter. In the first section, I will briefly examine 
what it is that social equality can be said to demand and thus what it is that we 
would need as a solution for accommodating social equality within a 
conception of broad distributive justice. In the second section I examine 
Rawlss principles for individuals to determine whether they would be able to 
address the requirements of social equality. I claim that although there is some 
correspondence between the principles for individuals and the demands of 
social equality, I find that they cannot. In the third section, I examine how the 
principles for individuals could be adapted in order to fulfil the demands of 
social equality. I argue that we could revise two of Rawlss principles. (1) The 
duty of mutual respect should be revised to include specific requirements of 
respect-for-persons, civility and toleration, and (2) the duty of justice needs to 
be revised to include a demand that individuals would help to establish and 
comply with not only formal but also informal justice. In the last section I 
address some objections to, or questions that are raised by, the duties of social 
equality, which lead from their perceived demandingness and their 
consistency within a liberal and Rawlsian framework of justice.  
 
1. The demands of social equality 
 
The notion of social equality demonstrates that equality cannot be achieved by 
fair legislation and fair formal institutions alone. Equality also requires an 
egalitarian ethos: norms, values, attitudes and relationships, even in what is 
considered the private sphere, need to reflect the equal worth of persons.  This 
ethos, I have argued, would consist of egalitarian values and norms which 
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would (1) provide a standard against which individual behaviour could be 
measured and (2) would motivate individual behaviour. In this way, social 
equality makes demands of individuals: in order to achieve a society of 
equals, and also in this case, the fair distribution of certain social goods, 
individuals need to uphold the values of social equality.  
 
How best can we describe such an ethos? What values would it espouse and 
what would it ask of individuals? Social equality, and thus an egalitarian ethos 
that upholds social equality, consists of three primary values which could be 
used to judge individual behaviour and from which individuals would act: 
 
(1) respect-for-persons, which disallows arbitrarily treating some as lesser or 
better than others and which disallows dehumanisation;2  
(2) civility, which requires individuals to extend basic courtesies to all others, 
and  
(3) toleration, which demands that individuals are tolerant of, thus do not 
prevent or inhibit, differences of which they disapprove or which they dislike.  
 
Rawlss conception of justice, if it is to take account of informal interferences 
with the fair distribution of the primary social goods, should also demand that 
individuals, not merely institutions, uphold these requirements of social 
equality, or something similar to these requirements.   
 
                                                 
2 Disallows does not denote a legal duty or any necessary legal implications. These are 
moral requirements. 
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2. The demands of justice-as-fairness 
 
Much recent discussion of how personal choice features (or does not, rather) 
in Rawlss justice has focused on the basic structure.3 Emphasis on the basic 
structure tends to overshadow Rawlss account of what is required of an 
individual in a fair society, for Rawls does have such an account: an 
explanation of which principles of the right would apply to individuals.4 
Rawlss justice makes demands on individuals and provides measures against 
which individual behaviour should be judged. As something like principles for 
individuals, rather than principles for institutions, seem to provide a solution 
for describing justice in personal choice, it is important to examine what 
Rawls demands of individuals to demonstrate whether these measures do or 
can accommodate justice in choice. In this section I will describe Rawlss 
principles for individuals: 
 
(1) to demonstrate that they do not require individuals to uphold informal 
justice or the values of social equality, and 
(2) to begin to demonstrate that we can use them as a basis to revise Rawlss 
justice in order to accommodate informal social equality and thus justice in 
choice. 
 
The reason why Rawls claims that principles for individuals need to be 
adopted sounds as if it corresponds to social equality. Rawls claims that 
                                                 
3 Examples are Cohen (2000) and Pogge (2000). 
4 See Rawls (1999: 93-101; 293-343). 
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although his principles for individuals are not based on a single principle there 
are similar reasons for why many of these principles would be adopted: 
 
Once we try to picture the life of a society in which no one had the 
slightest desire to act on these duties we see that it would express 
indifference if not disdain for human beings that would make a sense 
of our own worth impossible.5 
 
This description of the principles for individuals seems similar to a general 
description of the need for duties of social equality because of its emphasis on 
respect and the importance of a sense of worth. However, when we examine 
these principles, we will find that despite some very broad correspondence 
with social equality, they are unable, as is, to provide for respect-for-persons, 
civility and toleration and they are unable to address informal justice.  
 
2.1. Principles of justice for individuals 
 
Rawls explains that principles for individuals consist of permissions and 
requirements, where permissions are acts which individuals may perform but 
are nonetheless not required to perform, and requirements comprise 
obligations and natural duties, thus, acts (and omissions) deemed compulsory. 
Obligations concern particular relationships we have to institutions whereas 
duties apply to us as moral beings, without reference to any particular role.  
 
                                                 
5 Rawls (1999: 298). 
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Obligations and some of the natural duties seem quite clearly irrelevant to 
social equality. Rawls claims that all obligations develop from one principle, 
the principle of fairness, which states that a person is under an obligation to 
do his part as specified by the rules of an institution whenever he has 
voluntarily accepted the benefits of the scheme or has taken advantage of the 
opportunities it offers to advance his interests.6 When it comes to finding 
measures for accommodating social equality we need to look to duties rather 
than obligations. This is because we are looking for requirements that are not 
tied to a particular institutional role and which are also not dependent on 
consent or reciprocity based on benefits received, because social equality is 
not conditional on consent or on accepting certain benefits.  
 
Rawls identifies a number of natural duties, some of which seem mainly 
unrelated to social equality, such as the duty of mutual aid and the duty to 
comply with unjust laws.7 There are three duties, however, which seem as if 
they could be relevant to informal social equality. These are: the duty of 
justice, the duty of civility and the duty of mutual respect. 
 
                                                 
6 Rawls (1999: 301). 
7 According to the duty to comply with unjust laws, as long as a state is nearly just and 
provided unjust laws do not exceed certain bounds of injustice, even unjust laws must be 
obeyed (Rawls 1999: 312). See Rawls (1999: 308-312) for his discussion of the duty to 
comply with unjust laws. The reason why we have a duty to comply with even unjust laws, 
Rawls argues, is explained by our duty of justice. The duty of justice demands that individuals 
support a just constitution. In turn this implies a duty to support a constitutions principle of 
majority rule, as long as institutions in a society are mainly fair, we need to comply with 
unjust laws (1999: 311). Rawls also acknowledges Kants duty of mutual aid, which demands 
that we help others (Rawls 1999: 297-8; 2001j: 318). The primary reason why he believes 
such a duty should be adopted is because the knowledge that others will come to our aid 
would have a pervasive effect on the quality of everyday life (1999: 298). The duty of 
mutual aid could be particularly relevant to social equality if this form of equality also 
included a notion of solidarity, although one could also probably argue that both mutual aid 
and the duty to obey unjust laws would also be requirements of a society of equals, even 
based on the minimum requirements of social equality I have identified. 
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2.1.1. The duty of justice 
 
The duty of justice consists of two requirements: (1) individuals must comply 
with fair institutions and (2) they must help to establish fair arrangements as 
long as this is not too costly.8 From the standpoint of the theory of justice, 
Rawls claims, this duty is the most important natural duty.9  
 
The first requirement seems straightforward. However, the second 
requirement is less clear. Firstly, what establishing just arrangements would 
require of the individual is not apparent and, secondly, Rawls provides no 
guidelines for what would be too costly and how to measure such costs. One 
could perhaps try to use the second requirement as a requirement for 
establishing informal social equality. Helping to establish just arrangements 
would then include a requirement for individuals in a private capacity, i.e. 
informally, to comply with the demands of social equality, thus with respect-
for-persons, civility and toleration. It seems particularly interesting from this 
viewpoint that Rawls has chosen to use the words just arrangements rather 
than just institutions as if the implication here is that individuals need to help 
to establish informal justice and that they are not merely required to comply 
with formal justice as specified by the first requirement.  
 
However, (1) it seems unlikely that Rawls intended this duty to be used to 
justify informal justice, and (2) it would need to be made clearer and more 
                                                 
8 See Rawls (1999: 99-100; 293-296) for his explanation of the duty of justice.  
9 Rawls (1999: 293). 
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explicit if it is to be used for achieving informal social equality. Although it is 
not entirely clear what this duty demands of individuals, it seems that Rawls 
would consider the duty of justice to be limited in scope. Firstly understood 
within the greater context of Rawlss theory, that Rawls does not explicitly 
require informal justice, makes it unlikely that this is what he would mean by 
the second requirement of the duty of justice. It is probably easier to 
understand it entirely in terms of formal justice: individuals are thus required 
to help to establish a fair basic structure, by for example, voting for the 
political party that would bring about justice in institutions. This is Pogges 
interpretation of the duty of justice; moreover, he implies that a duty which 
urged more direct intervention from individuals would be infeasible: 
 
Our causal contribution to the suffering of the poor is extremely 
indirect and intermixed with the causal contributions of others. It is 
quite infeasible for us to adjust our conduct so as to avoid such effects. 
And here again, Rawlss institutional approach is crucial for showing 
the alternative to such an (infeasible) adjustment of our conduct our 
responsibility vis-à-vis existing injustices hinges upon our ability to 
initiate and support institutional reforms.10 
 
Besides the fact that this duty does not explicitly direct individuals to achieve 
informal justice, more importantly, whatever Rawlss motives may be, this 
duty does not provide a requirement for individuals to fulfil the demands of 
social equality or to strive for justice in choice. If we wanted it to function in 
this way it would need to be changed to specify explicit demands of 
compliance with respect-for-persons, civility and toleration.  
                                                 
10 Pogge (1989: 12). 
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2.1.2. The duty of civility 
 
One of the few duties for individuals which is emphasised in Political 
liberalism is the duty of civility. This seems to be less of one specific duty and 
more an assortment of requirements which have been classified under one 
mutual term, civility.11 One aspect of civility is the duty to give public 
reasons, although at times Rawls treats this less as one aspect of civility than 
as equivalent to civility.12 Public reason means the reasons given in a public 
forum for political actions.13 Using public reason would include using only a 
political conception of justice and not comprehensive doctrines to justify 
political actions. The duty to use public reasons is limited to a public political 
forum: public reason is not required for background culture (the realm of 
personal choice and associations) where it is acceptable to use comprehensive 
doctrines for justification.14  
 
The civility that social equality requires and this Rawlsian duty of civility 
share mainly only a name: the demands of Rawlss civility do not cover what 
is required of civility from the perspective of social equality, which is civility 
understood on a more common-sense level, i.e. basic courtesies. The only 
clear association is that both civility for social equality and Rawlss civility 
                                                 
11 See Rawls (1999 312; 1993: 217; 2001g f: 576). Catriona McKinnon (2000: 146-151) 
claims that this duty includes the following components: good faith, compliance with the law, 
civil disobedience, voting in favour of the common good and public reason. 
12 Rawls (2001c: 617). 
13 Rawls (2001g: 573-615). 
14 Rawls (1993: 215). 
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demand what Rawls refers to as a willingness to listen to others and what 
we can call a general willingness to debate reasonably. 15  
 
This does not mean, however, that Rawlss duty of civility is dissimilar from 
social equality more generally understood. The requirements of public reason 
could be justified with reference to social equality. Firstly, the motivation 
underlying public reason could be described as an appeal to respect-for-
persons and toleration: individuals within a public forum must provide 
reasons which are divorced from comprehensive doctrines in order to treat 
others as equals by treating others conceptions of the good as counting for as 
much as their own and to demonstrate toleration for reasonable pluralism. 
However this does not mean that public reason accommodates respect-for-
persons or toleration adequately: no demand is made to fulfil the requirements 
of respect-for-persons or toleration; there is merely an overlap in broad 
values.  
 
2.1.3. The duty of mutual respect 
 
As a principle for individuals, mutual respect demands showing a person the 
respect which is due to him as a moral being, that is as a being with a sense of 
justice and a conception of the good.16 The reason why this duty would be 
chosen in the original position is because it is essential for achieving self-
respect: 
 
                                                 
15 Rawls (1993: 217): This duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and a 
fairmindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made. 
16 Rawls (1999: 297). 
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Their self-respect and their confidence in the value of their own 
system of ends cannot withstand the indifference much less the 
contempt of others. Everyone benefits then from living in a society 
where the duty of mutual respect is honored. The cost to self-interest is 
minor in comparison with the support for the sense of ones own 
worth.17  
 
Of all the principles for individuals, this duty shows the most promise as a 
requirement of social equality. Rawlss description of this duty as respect due 
to all people because they are moral beings matches the ideal of equal worth 
underlying respect-for-persons. Rawls claims that this duty is demonstrated, 
among others, in our willingness to see the situation of others from their 
point of view and in our being prepared to give reasons for our actions 
whenever the interests of others are materially affected.18 Although not quite 
so specific, this willingness to give reasons for our actions resembles the need 
to demonstrate that our preferences are not based on hierarchies of worth or to 
provide reasons for our preferences to show that they do not violate respect-
for-persons. Also this duty implies a duty of civility similar to the type of 
civility required (somewhat) by social equality: Also respect is shown in a 
willingness to do small favors and courtesies, not because they are of any 
material value but because they are an appropriate expression of our 
awareness of another persons feelings and aspirations.19  
 
Although there is some correspondence between Rawlss duty of mutual 
respect and the demands of social equality, we cannot say that this duty is, as 
                                                 
17 Rawls (1999: 297). 
18 Rawls (1999: 297). 
19 Rawls (1999: 297). 
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is, an adequate means to reflect the requirements of social equality. The duty 
of mutual respect is too sparse and it does not directly cover respect-for-
persons or any of the other requirements of social equality fully. Furthermore, 
it does not demand compliance for informal interactions, and thus informal 
justice is not addressed. 
 
If we were hoping to find a solution to the problem of social equality within 
Rawlss principles for individuals, we would be disappointed: none of the 
demands for individuals accommodate social equality.20 Overall, there are two 
main reasons why the duties of justice that Rawls identifies cannot fulfil the 
requirements of social equality: (1) they do not address the specific 
requirements of respect-for-persons, civility and toleration, and (2) they do 
not demand informal social equality.  
 
The duties seem mainly to be supplements for achieving formal institutional 
justice, rather than substantial principles which, on their own, aim at 
achieving justice besides the institutional. Thus they mainly direct individuals 
to comply with the law and with the rules of fair institutions, and provide 
justification for when refusing to comply with unjust laws is acceptable: the 
focus is thus on compliance or non-compliance with the law or with formal 
rules. For example, when Rawls discusses an individuals non-compliance 
with unjust arrangements he focuses on the relationship between the 
individual and the law, establishing criteria for civil disobedience and 
conscientious refusal, thus focusing on when and how it is acceptable for an 
                                                 
20 I am not evaluating these duties generally but only according to their ability to 
accommodate social equality. Thus I am not finding fault with them: I am merely claiming 
that they do not fulfil the requirements of social equality.  
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individual to challenge formal institutional injustices.21 Even where their 
scope seems to coincide somewhat with social equality they do not address its 
requirements explicitly or adequately. None of the principles would directly 
bring about what is required from individuals through the specific demands of 
social equality and furthermore most of the principles do not demand informal 
fair behaviour, which is precisely the reason why we need to look beyond the 
institutional principles in the first place. Thus, as is, Rawlss principles for 
individuals will not do for social equality or justice in choice. 
 
3. The duties of social equality 
 
It is hardly remarkable that the principles for individuals do not provide for 
the demands of social equality: Rawls has not designed these, even partially, 
in order to achieve social equality or informal justice. What is significant, 
however, is that the principles for individuals: 
 
(1) seem to deal with similar kinds of values, such as respect and courtesy, 
and  
(2) they seem to have the type of structure (they are measures applied to 
individual behaviour) we would need to address social equality.  
 
Principles for individuals seem to be the right type of thing we need in order 
to accommodate social equality because what we need is some measure to 
enable us to evaluate the justice of individual behaviour and associations. 
                                                 
21 Rawls (1999: 308-343). 
 261 
What we seem to have with the principles for individuals is a structure and 
broad content sympathetic to the demands of social equality although, as we 
have seen in the previous section, we do not yet have the specific content. It 
seems then that the best option for accommodating social equality as part of 
Rawlss justice is to incorporate its requirements within the principles for 
individuals.  
 
As the principles for individuals cannot yet accommodate social equality 
clearly they either need to be supplemented or adapted. We could, for 
example, design new, specific and exclusive principles for each requirement 
of social equality as supplements for the existing principles: so we would then 
have a duty of respect-for-persons, a duty of civility and a duty of toleration. 
Alternatively, we could adapt the existing principles. There are numerous 
feasible options. My aim, however, is to conceive of the best way in which to 
accommodate social equality within Rawlss justice. As such, although I do 
not believe that this is the only alternative, instead of designing brand new 
principles, I think it would be best to adapt principles which already share 
something of the spirit of social equality.22 In this sense, I think that the duty 
of mutual respect would be most suitable to adapt because it already shares 
                                                 
22 Another option which I do not pursue is to expand on the notion of good faith as an 
aspect of Rawlss duty of civility. Although Rawls (1999: 312) does not explain the notion of 
good faith in any detail, he does claim that we have a natural duty of civility not to invoke 
the faults of social arrangements as a too ready excuse for not complying with them, nor to 
exploit inevitable loopholes in the rules to advance our interests. The duty of civility imposes 
a due acceptance of the defects of institutions and a certain restraint in taking advantage of 
them. This is what McKinnon (2000: 147) refers to as good faith, which means acting in 
the spirit of the law: If, in her judgement, her proposed course of action would be ruled out 
by a perfectly just system of law, she will not pursue it Defining good citizenship in terms 
of action in good faith means that in the ideal society the choices of the good citizen are 
restricted not only by law, but also by her conscience. Acting in good faith would cover 
some of the same behaviour expected of the individual by social equality; this duty, at least as 
McKinnon interprets it, is the only one of Rawlss duties which seems to bear directly on the 
informal. 
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some of the (very broad) content needed for both respect-for-persons and 
civility. Besides the duty of mutual respect, I also think it is important that the 
principles for individuals should express the relationship between justice and 
personal choice, and specify that this relationship demands both formal and 
informal justice. For this purpose, the duty of justice needs adapting to state 
explicitly that individuals should help to establish informal justice and 
conform to informal justice when it exists.  
 
3.1. The duty of mutual respect  
 
Rawlss duty of mutual respect demands showing a person the respect which 
is due to him as a moral being.23 In adapting this duty to the demands of 
social equality, I would revise it by making it more specifically aimed towards 
achieving the values of social equality. The revised duty of mutual respect 
would read like this:  
 
As a requirement of justice, individuals should fulfil the duty of 
mutual respect, meaning that they are required to uphold respect-for-
persons, civility and toleration.  
 
Upholding respect-for-persons, civility and toleration would mean the 
following:24 
 
                                                 
23 Rawls (1999: 297). 
24 I am not going to present a complete list of the precise scope and content of these 
requirements; indeed, I have no such list, and thus this discussion will not provide a 
comprehensive description. I think that what should be included under these requirements is 
open to debate, a debate for which this thesis does not have sufficient scope. For now, I aim 
only to provide a start to understanding the duties of social equality. 
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(1) Upholding respect-for-persons: This has two components: (i) individuals 
should not treat others according to arbitrary hierarchies of worth and (ii) 
individuals should not dehumanise others.  
 
Upholding the first component of respect-for-persons, which forbids 
devaluation (and over-valuation), would mean that individuals would not treat 
others (or themselves) as inferiors or superiors based on their social group 
membership. In chapter II, I claimed that treating someone as a lesser person 
is both a mode of valuing, devaluing, and a mode of expressing that devalue, 
while treating someone as superior is a mode of over-valuing and of 
expressing that over-value. This component of upholding respect-for-persons 
would mean that individuals should neither (i) devalue or over-value others 
according to social group membership nor (ii) express that devalue or over-
value. 
 
Modes of expressing devalue that this duty would condemn are, for example, 
discrimination against any person arbitrarily on the basis of her race, gender, 
and so on, whether they occur privately or within an institutional role, or 
denying any person equal opportunities for education or jobs on this basis. An 
employer thus who does not hire a Muslim because she is Muslim, or parents 
who do not provide their daughter with the same opportunities for education 
as their son, simply because she is a girl, have violated respect-for-persons.  
 
Upholding the second component of respect-for-persons, which forbids 
dehumanisation, would demand a basic standard of treatment for all by ruling 
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out certain extreme forms of behaviour which are difficult to reconcile with 
the notion that everyone has moral worth. I would imagine that this should 
include forbidding torture, slavery, violence, and verbal, emotional and 
physical abuse, violating freedoms and rights, and denying people the right to 
make their own autonomous choices. By demanding a basic standard of 
treatment for all, forbidding dehumanisation helps to ensure that justice and 
equality are not aims to be achieved at any costs, such as through human 
rights violations. A society of equals, then, and justice in choice need to 
satisfy both components of respect-for-persons.25   
 
Upholding respect-for-persons would help to prevent or diminish the 
prevalence of these harms: violations (1) of equal moral worth and (2) rights, 
and interferences with (3) self-respect and identity, (4) preferences and 
conceptions of the good, (5) opportunities and life-chances, (6) physical and 
psychological health, and (7) co-operation. 
 
In chapter II, I described an ethos as a set of values which is translated into 
norms or principles and these, in turn, are applied in the form of (1) 
motivation for behaviour and (2) an assessment of behaviour. We can call 
respect-for-persons a value of an egalitarian ethos necessary for a society of 
equals. The duty of mutual respect and its subsidiary, this duty to uphold 
respect-for-persons, are principles of this ethos. In application to individual 
                                                 
25 Perhaps priority rules can be developed to settle conflicts between the two conditions of 
social equality. I think it is unlikely that in cases where they conflict that one of the two 
should always take precedence over the other. So, for example, I do not believe that a 
prohibition on dehumanising should always take precedence over a prohibition on 
devaluation. It is more likely that particular examples of dehumanising, such as torture or 
violence, would take precedence over (particular examples of) devaluation. 
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behaviour this duty is a motivation for behaviour: individuals should act from 
respect-for-persons. The duty is also a standard with which we can judge 
behaviour: behaviour which conforms to respect-for-persons would be 
encouraged and behaviour which violates respect-for-persons would be 
discouraged or sanctioned. So, for example, a music group whose songs 
lyrics violate respect-for-person by using derogatory language, stereotypes 
and verbal abuse directed at gays, could be sanctioned as part of fulfilment of 
the duty of mutual respect, by being condemned in the press or by being 
refused airplay on radio stations.   
 
Besides respect-for-persons, an egalitarian ethos would encourage at least two 
further important values, civility and toleration, and two further principles 
which make up the duty of mutual respect: a duty to uphold civility and a duty 
to tolerate difference. 
 
(2) Upholding civility: This would mean that individuals should extend basic 
courtesies to all others. These courtesies would include a willingness (i) to 
listen, (ii) to provide others with an opportunity to present their own views 
and (iii) to debate reasonably about issues.  
 
Unlike respect-for-persons, I do not think that civility is required under all 
circumstances. If respect-for-persons is not fulfilled, incivility should be 
allowed. If someone does not uphold respect-for-persons, an individual should 
be allowed (i) not to have to uphold civility if she is personally affected by the 
violation and (ii) to treat the person who does not uphold respect-for-persons 
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uncivilly as a means of showing disapproval for the violation. Someone who 
is not treated respectfully should not have to act civilly towards the person 
who treats them without respect, otherwise this may only reinforce the 
devaluation as civility may be mistaken for subservience. Furthermore, if 
rational debate has failed or cannot be expected, such as in the case of a 
stranger who shouts racial abuse in the street, the only way in which to treat 
someone who violates respect may be with incivility, and this would apply 
even if you are not the person directly affected by the violation of respect.     
 
(3) Upholding toleration: This would mean individuals should refrain from 
trying to prevent or inhibit differences even though they disapprove of these 
differences. Thus differences should be allowed to exist without interference. 
In this case, even if you dislike or disapprove of someones behaviour or 
beliefs, you should still respect their right, as a moral equal, to differ from 
you. For example, you may believe that homosexuality is morally 
unacceptable but you must tolerate it by, for example, not lobbying or 
pressurising government to ban gay and lesbian unions.  
 
Like civility, this requirement is dependent on respect-for-persons being 
upheld.26 This means that individuals should not have to, indeed might be 
required not to, tolerate conceptions of the good, behaviour or beliefs which 
violate respect-for-persons. So, for example, a racists claims about the 
superiority of the white race do not need to be tolerated. Practically, what this 
                                                 
26 Not only are both civility and toleration dependent on the fulfilment of respect-for-persons, 
the institutional principles also take precedence over these values. So, for example, on the 
level of policy, toleration of violations of equal liberty, and such, are not only not required, 
they are unacceptable. 
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could mean is that it should be acceptable to exclude the racist from certain 
social situations or to publicly condemn her beliefs. Exactly what lengths, 
however, one can go to in not tolerating someones beliefs is controversial and 
open to debate: denying a racist the freedom to express her racist views in a 
public forum, for example, could be said to interfere with freedom of speech.  
 
As we need to ensure that both formal and informal social equality are 
established, it is essential to specify the scope of mutual respect. Individuals 
should uphold respect-for-persons, civility and toleration in any situation, 
whether in a public or private forum, whether fulfilling a formal institutional 
role or making a personal choice. There is no limit to the type of situation to 
which these requirements could apply.  
 
Although these are principles for individuals it also needs to be specified that 
this duty applies to individuals as rule-makers of and decision-makers in 
associations. The rules of an association, such as for example a country-club 
which bans black members, can be said to be in violation of the duties of 
social equality if they violate respect-for-persons, civility or toleration, 
although it is the responsibility of the individuals who establish or maintain 
the rules of the association to change them to make them compatible with the 
demands of social equality. If these individuals set up or maintain rules that 
do not fulfil the demands of social equality, we can say that both they and the 
association have violated social equality.  
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3.2. The duty of justice  
 
The duty of justice demands that individuals (1) comply with fair institutions 
and (2) help to establish just arrangements. In order to demonstrate the link 
between mutual respect and justice, this duty should include a requirement for 
individuals to establish fair informal arrangements and not merely to help 
establish formal justice. I take it that helping to establish formal justice might 
include such things as voting for a political party with policies which conform 
to the requirements of the institutional principles of justice or undertaking 
civil disobedience in order to influence a government to amend unjust 
policies.  
 
As informal justice is also necessary, this duty should include a requirement to 
(1) comply with informal justice when it exists and (2) establish informal 
justice where it does not, by fulfilling the requirements of mutual respect. The 
duty of justice thus requires the duty of mutual respect. This does not add any 
new content to the requirements for social equality different from the duty of 
mutual respect; however it explicitly demands mutual respect as a requirement 
of justice. It thus demonstrates that the duty of mutual respect is not merely a 
general moral duty: it is a requirement of social justice; without its fulfilment 
we cannot guarantee a fair distribution of social goods such as (the social 
basis of) self-respect or opportunities.  
 
The original duty of justice looks like this: 
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This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institutions 
that exist and apply to us. It also constrains us to further just 
arrangements not yet established27 
 
The revised duty of justice should look like this: 
 
This duty requires us to support and comply with just institutions and 
an egalitarian ethos that exist and apply to us. It also constrains us to 
further both formal and informal just arrangements not yet established 
 In order to support and comply with an egalitarian ethos and in 
order to establish informal just arrangements, we are required to fulfil 
the duty of mutual of respect.   
 
3.3. Justice in personal choice and the duties of social equality 
 
The revised Rawlsian duties would censure certain forms of individual 
behaviour and certain rules of associations which have previously been left 
uncensured by both Rawlss institutional principles and his principles for 
individuals. More specifically, if individuals fulfilled the duties of social 
equality, many of the socially imposed injustices, reflected and reinforced in 
personal choice, that have been identified would not occur. The unfair 
distribution of the informal basis of self-respect and informal fair equality of 
opportunity would be prevented. Informal harms to self-respect and 
opportunities, among others,28 in personal choice, such as through 
stigmatisation, marginalization or exclusion, biased stereotyping, unfair 
                                                 
27 Rawls (1999: 99). 
28 I emphasise these as they correspond to Rawlss notion of distributive justice. In chapter II 
and the previous section, however, we identified other harms associated with violations of 
social equality, such as harm to the development of a conception of the good. 
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discrimination, cultural imperialism, humiliation, hate-speech or the use of 
derogatory language, harassment or intimidation and physical or emotional 
abuse, would not occur or be minimised if individuals upheld respect-for-
persons, civility and toleration. As the duties apply to any individual 
behaviour, individuals would also be motivated by the duties to comply with 
fair laws.  
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that we need a revised version of the 
personal choice argument, which claims that the solution to injustices in 
personal choice is to apply principles of social equality to choice. How do 
these principles, the duties of social equality, fare when it comes to Cohens 
criticism of Rawls? These duties would accommodate at least one of the two 
primary cases Cohen uses as examples of the need to be able to judge personal 
choice as just or unjust. The gendered division of household labour, where 
women are expected to bear the greater burden for household responsibilities, 
could be said to violate the duty of mutual respect on both counts of respect-
for-persons. Firstly, we could say that such a division of labour treats women 
as if they have lower moral worth than men because it provides them with 
fewer opportunities than men. Secondly, it could also be condemned as 
dehumanisation because it does not take proper account of how women 
choose to live their lives: we could say that the commonly-accepted 
expectations that they are primarily responsible for child-rearing and 
household duties pressurises them into fulfilling household roles without 
taking account of their choices, or what might be their choices if they had not 
been pressurised. 
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Cohens principal example of the need to apply principles of justice to 
personal choice is that of incentives. His claim is that the talented should be 
motivated by the difference principle; if they were motivated as such they 
could not justify incentives as incentives are not necessary to benefit the 
worst-off. However, from the perspective of the revised duties, demands for 
incentives are not evidently ruled out. Perhaps one could argue that demands 
for incentives do violate these duties but, unlike examples of social group 
discrimination, it is not immediately apparent how a demand for incentives 
would violate respect-for-persons, civility or toleration.  
 
One of the reasons why the link between incentives and the argument of social 
equality is not apparent is because of my emphasis on informal social 
equality. I have argued that if Rawlss justice does address social equality, it is 
most likely to address the formal equality and the fair distribution of material 
goods required by social equality. What it clearly seems to neglect is the 
informal. Injustices in the informal often have to do with peoples attitudes to 
each other rather than the distribution of income and wealth. This, however, 
means that (1) informal injustices could still be economic and (2) Rawlss 
justice could still be found wanting economically, both institutionally and 
individually. It is simply, however, not part of the focus of my argument to 
determine whether this is the case. 
 
Thus while Cohens application of the institutional principles to personal 
choice does not seem to provide the most feasible solution to the problem of 
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accommodating social equality, it seems that achieving social equality would 
not have the clear implications for incentives which Cohens argument has. If 
one wanted to establish the injustice of incentives one would either need to 
devise an argument to demonstrate that social equality does rule out incentives 
or use an entirely different basis for this claim, such as relying on Cohens 
original argument. This does not mean, however, that social equality cannot 
rule out incentives; I am merely highlighting that an argument against 
incentives is not an evident implication of the duties of social equality. 
 
3.4. Compliance with the duties of social equality 
 
the real question for any instrumental theory of virtue is why people 
would choose to exercise these virtues when they conflict with other 
preferences or goals Why engage in civility when one benefits from 
the current patterns of discrimination and prejudice against minority 
groups?29 
 
My argument is that if we want to describe what a fair society would be like 
we would need to include a requirement of social equality, and as, in Rawlss 
conception of justice, informal social equality is not required by the 
institutional principles or the principles for individuals, we would need to 
revise the principles for individuals to accommodate the informal. As such, 
my claims are concerned with establishing a more accurate abstract notion of 
social justice; thus it is primarily concerned with describing an ideal society.  
 
                                                 
29 Kymlicka (2000: 310-1). 
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The more practical question remains, however, how and why individuals 
would come to comply with these duties under non-ideal circumstances. There 
are two issues here: (i) where and how do individuals learn the values of 
social equality and (ii) why would they choose to be motivated by these 
values? Many of the answers to these questions are at least partially empirical 
so I cannot answer them with much confidence: a more complete answer 
would require some empirical research. I do feel, however, that it is necessary 
to at least briefly consider these issues. 
 
(1) A preliminary answer to the question of how individuals develop the 
values of social equality is that they do so under the influence of an egalitarian 
ethos. A fair society would have prevalent norms of justice for personal 
choice and thus norms of social equality which would influence behaviour at 
the level of motivation; a fair society would have what we can thus call an 
egalitarian ethos. So, individuals would develop the values of social equality 
and be motivated to fulfil the duties of social equality because of an 
egalitarian ethos which influenced them to fulfil its norms. I am assuming that 
the values of an egalitarian ethos are learnt in the same places that any values 
would be learnt: in the family, through formal education, in civil society, and 
so on, although this would also be where inegalitarian values are learnt, so 
there is nothing specific to these schools of value that ensure that they will 
promote egalitarian values. This is only a preliminary answer, however, 
because it raises at least two further questions.  
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It seems that the stronger an egalitarian ethos, the greater compliance will be 
as the greater the pressure will be to follow its norms. What can be done, 
however, to make it stronger if its norms are not yet prevalent? I would 
assume that in a liberal or social democracy there is already some sort of 
egalitarian ethos because the values underlying these democracies resemble or 
match the values of social equality. But is there something that can be done, 
by the government for example, to further encourage such an ethos to make 
compliance more likely? Or is there something that can be done to further 
encourage egalitarian values in a society in which inegalitarian values are 
predominant? The answer to these questions would require empirical research. 
Perhaps, however, if it became clear that formal education or public 
awareness campaigns were able to strengthen egalitarian values, then it seems 
likely that they should be so strengthened, to encourage greater compliance 
with the duties of social equality and thus to encourage greater justice in 
personal choice.30    
 
This, however, still does not answer a second question, the question raised by 
Kymlicka in the introductory quote to this section, why would people choose 
to exercise these virtues when they conflict with other preferences or goals? 
Even if there is an egalitarian ethos that promotes fair personal choice, choice 
remains legally open to the individual and thus unjust choices can be made. 
An individual could even agree that it is better for society as a whole to be fair 
without agreeing that she should make fair choices. Why would the rich and 
                                                 
30 Formal education is seen by some liberals as a necessary or potentially acceptable means 
of encouraging values such as toleration and autonomy. See, for example, Amy Guttmann 
(1987: 14-5), on conscious social reproduction through schooling and Harry Brighouse 
(1998: 719-745) on autonomy-facilitating education.  
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privileged agree to act in ways which do not benefit them, indeed may 
interfere with the hierarchies of status and wealth which make them 
privileged?  
 
(2) A Rawlsian answer is that individuals possess a sense of justice which is 
the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from (and not merely in 
accordance with) the principles of political justice that specify the fair terms 
of social cooperation.31 Having a sense of justice implies that individuals 
would act against their own self-interest for the sake of justice because they 
are motivated by justice. According to Rawls the sense of justice seems to 
result from natural moral development within a formally just society; as long 
as an individual has undergone basic moral development, she will develop a 
sense of justice because she will recognise that fair institutions benefit her and 
her friends and family (and such).32 Rawlss answer seems to be missing 
something however: the implication seems to be that formal equality or justice 
in the public rules of institutions is all that is required for the development of a 
sense of justice. The institutionalisation of justice is not the most salient point, 
however. I would claim that it is more likely that the stronger the general 
prevalence of fair and egalitarian values, the stronger the sense of justice 
would be (meaning the greater the likelihood that individuals would act from 
a sense of justice), and thus that it is important that these values are 
institutionalised and also that these values are embedded in a strong 
egalitarian ethos which influences choice. How likely then an individual is to 
                                                 
31 Rawls (2001a: 18). See Rawls (1999: 397-449) for a more detailed description of the sense 
of justice and how it develops.  
32 See Rawls (1999: 405-419) for a description of overall moral development and the three 
moral laws. For a description of the development specifically of the sense of justice according 
to the third moral law, the morality of principles, see Rawls (1999: 414-419). 
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act from a sense of justice would be a function not only of the strength of 
institutional justice but also the strength of the egalitarian ethos.  Again, we 
can say that if empirical research demonstrates particular ways in which such 
an ethos can be strengthened, then the need for compliance with the values of 
social equality may provide justification for strengthening that ethos.33  
 
4. The demandingness and consistency of the duties of social 
equality  
 
The justification for why a demand would be made seems as if it would be all-
important in determining whether an action or trait is considered part of 
political morality. However, the justification for why demands on individuals 
would be relevant to political morality, although clearly important, is often not 
where debate lies, as it is not so much the case that there is disagreement 
about whether an action helps to achieve a political ideal or whether it is 
intrinsically valuable. Two factors often play a more significant role than 
justification in determining the demands of political morality that can be 
placed on the individual: (1) the demandingness of political morality, i.e. 
whether the demands placed on individuals are excessive (or perhaps in some 
cases, whether they demand enough), and (2) the consistency of the demands 
with the overarching political context. It may be accepted that a political ideal 
                                                 
33 There is some debate as to whether a sense of justice is a sufficient explanation for why 
individuals would forgo their own interests for the sake of justice. There are claims that a 
sense of national identity or a common good are necessary to inspire justice in choice (See, 
for example, Kymlicka (2000: 252-261; 311-312). See, for example, Miller (1995) for an 
explanation of the importance of a sense of national identity and Kymlicka (2000: 261-8) for 
a description of liberal nationalism. This could provide further reason for why solidarity may 
also need to be included as part of an understanding of a society of equals, and seemingly 
here, possibly also for justice. 
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would be better achieved if individuals complied with certain requirements. 
However, if the demands placed on individuals are too excessive or if those 
demands are inconsistent with the rest of the overarching political theory, then 
they could be rejected. In this section I consider questions raised by or 
objections to the duties of social equality due to their demandingness and their 
consistency with liberalism and Rawlss justice.  
 
4.1. The demandingness of social equality 
 
Adapting the duties for individuals to accommodate social equality has meant 
extending them: if we include the revised duties as demands on individuals, it 
seems we will be demanding more of individuals. In this sense, the costs 
associated have increased, not necessarily because what is demanded of 
individuals is particularly costly, but because more is expected of them than 
with the original Rawlsian duties.34 As is, this cannot provide an objection 
against accepting these revised duties; simply requiring more does not 
demonstrate that we require too much. However, how much these duties 
demand may cause some concern. I will address concerns raised by (1) the 
claim that the duties of social equality are too demanding because they imply 
radical and costly changes and (2) the argument from virtue ethics, which 
could claim something like the reverse: these duties do not demand enough.   
 
                                                 
34 The comparison is quite difficult to make however because what exactly Rawls demands 
of individuals is not entirely clear due to the brevity and somewhat vagueness of his 
descriptions of the principles for individuals. Despite this, it does seem clear that by adapting 
the principles to accommodate social equality we are expecting more of individuals, as the 
revised duties are not substitutes for Rawlss duties; individuals are thus expected to comply 
with the original demands, whatever these may be, as well as the additions to the duties. 
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4.1.1. Describing a fair and equal society  
 
Besides expanding the principles for individuals, the duties of social equality 
seem to imply radical and costly changes to ways of life, which may be 
deemed unacceptably demanding. Consider the implications of the duties of 
social equality on the Christian church, for example.35 These are some 
potential examples of violations of social equality which either seem to defy 
respect-for-persons by assuming hierarchies of value based on social group 
membership or seem to dehumanise by violating moral or legal rights or 
denying the autonomy of choice: 
 
 not ordaining women or gays as priests; 
 quoting or referring to passages in the bible or other religious texts 
which disparage or treat as inferior women, gays, members of other 
religions, atheists, or anyone else; 
 banning the use of contraception and prohibiting abortion. 
 
Although social equality would demand freedom of religion, aspects of 
religions could violate social equality and these are seen to be wrong. It is no 
excuse thus to devalue or dehumanise women, or gays, or other religions, to 
say, it is part of my religion. Claiming, however, that the Christian church is 
doing something wrong by positing a hierarchy of value between Christians 
and other religions, or Christians and atheists, for example, seems to question 
                                                 
35 There is nothing particular about Christianity as a religion that would make it likely to 
violate social equality in contrast to any other religions. Islam, Judaism and so on, would all 
be likely to come under similar criticism. 
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some of the basic tenets of Christianitys existence. Thus insisting that the 
church fulfils the duties of social equality would imply fundamental change. 
This seems much more demanding than Rawlss justice. Norman Daniels 
would probably claim that this is too demanding: 
 
To suggest that the demands of justice  must outweigh the moral 
and religious commitments within my life is to pit justice against 
reasonable pluralism. It is to invoke a substantive conception of how 
individuals must weigh their moral commitments that goes beyond 
making justice the prime virtue of institutions and makes it the prime 
virtue of individual motivations and behaviour. It no longer simply 
constrains individual pursuit of the good; it defines it.36  
 
How can associations like churches and individuals who choose to express 
their religious beliefs be expected to uphold respect-for-persons and 
toleration? This seems to ask too much. 
 
The perceived excessive demandingness of the duties of social equality is a 
function, however, of the assumption that they are prescriptive. As 
prescriptive prohibitions that cannot be over-ridden, they seem particularly 
costly and may imply radical changes to certain ways of life. They may even 
threaten religions.  
 
This is not the way, however, that they are meant to be understood. Like 
Rawls, I am interested in describing a fair society. The duties of social 
equality are meant to be descriptive, thus I am not claiming that they must be 
                                                 
36 Daniels (2003: 268). 
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fulfilled. I am merely describing how people would act in a society of equals 
and in a fair society: in such societies, these are the duties with which people 
would, not should, comply. This does not mean then that churches and 
Christians have to make radical changes to their doctrines and actions. It does 
mean, however, that in a society of equals, Christian doctrines and actions 
would not violate respect-for-persons, and thus in a description of a society of 
equals, Christianity, and a number of other religions and ways of life, might 
take a different, possibly radically different, shape, from what they are now.  
 
4.1.2. Actions vs. virtues 
 
The duties are expressed in terms of actions; what is fair is the action that 
upholds social equality. However, what is required of individuals need not, 
and according to many virtue ethicists, should not, be expressed in terms of 
actions: they should be expressed in terms of character traits instead.37 Justice 
is performed not through isolated actions or by fulfilling moral duties but by 
having the virtue of justice. To some extent then, virtue ethicists would say 
that the duties of social equality do not demand enough, although more 
importantly, they are saying that the demand is something entirely different: 
we should not demand that individuals fulfil duties of justice, we should 
demand that individuals should be just.   
 
                                                 
37 See, for example, Solomon (2001: 169-186). For a more specific criticism related to 
descriptions of toleration, see Newey (1999: 38-64). Newey is likely to accuse me of 
reductivism as I claim that describing the values of social equality in terms of character would 
not add anything substantial. He might call this a reductivist approach because I reduce 
character to motivation (38-9).  
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This seems to be a relevant criticism of the duties of social equality 
particularly. Social equality, I have argued, is not about obeying the law or 
doing your duty through gritted teeth: it demands that individuals treat each 
other as equals even in what are traditionally considered to be private 
interactions. As such it seems to ask more from individuals than that they 
should act according to the demands of equality; it appears to demand that 
they agree with social equality and are motivated by it. It thus seems more 
accurate to say that they need to be fair, rather than merely that they need to 
act justly.   
 
I have three responses to this, however, to demonstrate that it is appropriate to 
express what social equality demands in the form of actions and duties. 
Firstly, I aim to accommodate social equality within Rawlss justice. As such, 
duties appear to be the most appropriate way of describing what social 
equality demands of individuals because the structure of Rawlss principles 
for individuals seems best suited to accommodating social equality.  
 
Secondly, I do not believe that expressing what is required of social equality 
in terms of virtue will provide any new content to what social equality 
requires of the individual. If anything, it is the actions that demonstrate what 
being a fair person means not the other way around: we need to know 
precisely what it is that social equality demands and the duties provide us with 
these details. Claiming that individuals need to be fair seems to make no 
substantial difference to what it is that we require.  
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Lastly, however, I believe it is problematic to express violations of social 
equality in terms of unjust individuals. An emphasis on individuals as unjust, 
rather than actions, seems to blame and chastise individuals excessively. 
Although an egalitarian ethos would create a framework of approval and 
disapproval for judging others behaviour, more importantly, its aim is for 
individuals to internalise justice, to affect them at the level of motivation, by 
creating a social environment more conducive to fair choice and behaviour. It 
should not be viewed as something that directs and constrains the individual 
as if it were an independent entity assigning blame and praise for certain 
choices. The aim is not to reproach individuals for specific choices made, and 
to classify them as fair or unfair but to reduce or eradicate inegalitarian norms 
that encourage individuals to make unjust choices. I agree with the way in 
which Cohen describes the issue of blame in this case: 
 
people do have choices: it is indeed, only their choices that reproduce 
social practices  But one also must not say: look how each of these 
people shamefully decides to behave so badly  since, although there 
exists personal choice, there is heavy social conditioning behind it  
So, for example, a properly sensitive appreciation of these matters 
allows one to hold that an acquisitive ethos is profoundly unjust in its 
effects, without holding that those who are gripped by it are 
commensurately unjust.38 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Cohen (2000; 143). 
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4.2. Consistency and the duties of social equality  
 
The duties of social equality could seem feasible on their own but they could 
still be problematic because they could be inconsistent with the greater 
political theoretical framework of which they are supposed to form a part. I 
will address three concerns of consistency. The first is whether the duties of 
social equality are consistent with the broader liberal framework of which 
Rawlss theory of justice forms a part. The second and third concerns are 
more specifically whether these duties are consistent with Rawlss justice: I 
consider their compatibility with (i) political liberalism and (ii) the 
institutional principles. 
 
4.2.1. Social equality and social tyranny 
 
John Stuart Mills claim that tyranny occurs even in democracies might seem 
initially to support my argument from social equality. Mill argues that 
although democracies avoid political tyranny they can still stifle freedom 
through social tyranny.39 Translated into an argument about social equality 
one could argue that an inegalitarian ethos which reinforces violations of 
respect-for-persons is a form of social tyranny and in order to counteract this 
tyranny, an inegalitarian ethos needs to be replaced by an egalitarian ethos.  
 
However, Mills claims are more likely to be used as a counter-argument: we 
should not try to replace one set of norms with another. Any ethos is a form of 
                                                 
39 See Mill (1991: 61-3).  
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social tyranny which compels conformity, dissuading individuals from 
making autonomous choices. I think something like this idea is quite prevalent 
in real-life politics in which some violations of respect-for-persons, such as 
the use of derogatory language, are dismissed as political correctness gone 
mad or as a violation of freedom of speech.  
 
Furthermore, it is true that although the duties of social equality are moral 
duties, as opposed to legal duties, and thus they have no legally coercive 
force, they can be as, at times more, coercive than legal duties. The shame or 
stigmatisation that can occur if social norms are violated can be said to coerce 
compliance. In this sense, the fact that violations may constitute legally 
acceptable behaviour does not necessarily make it any easier to perform these 
actions and thus, at least in some sense, one could say that our freedom in 
choosing to perform them is restricted. On an extreme view of this, arguing 
for the duties of social equality implies arguing for a form of thought control. 
Fraser, for example, argues against focusing on the subjectivity of the 
oppressed or the oppressor claiming that if we construe misrecognition as 
damaged identity, it emphasises psychic structure over social institutions and 
social interaction. Thus, it risks substituting intrusive forms of consciousness 
engineering for social change.40  
 
                                                 
40 Fraser (2003: 89). Also, see her claims that her approach to recognition adopts a status 
model which avoids the problem of focusing on the psychic damage (92) suffered by targets 
of racism (92-93). Fraser presents this as an either/or, as if we cannot acknowledge distortions 
of identity as well as externally manifest and publicly verifiable impediments to some 
peoples standing as full members of society (93), but does not provide reason as to why 
they should be exclusive. It is very difficult to deny that pervasive and systematic injustices to 
social groups distort identity, self-esteem, self-respect and so on, and Fraser does not 
explicitly deny this. Yet, as such, a notion of justice which ignores this harm I believe must be 
insufficient, just as it would be insufficient if it ignored other harms and the institutional 
causes of distorted identity. 
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The norms demanded of social equality, however, can be interpreted as 
consistent with Mills claims because violations of social equality cause harm 
and thus expecting compliance with the duties of social equality could be 
defended under the harm principle.41 Furthermore, although I think there is 
reason to be concerned about censorship and the curbing of freedom of 
speech, I do not think that the problem lies with the claim that we need to 
prohibit or discourage violations of respect-for-persons but rather with 
determining what constitutes a violation of respect-for-persons, or how best to 
discourage or sanction these violations. Many claims that violations of 
respect-for-persons have occurred, such as not interviewing someone for a job 
because they are Muslim or not allowing black people to be members of a golf 
club, seem uncontroversially unacceptable in a fair and equal society.  
 
There are contexts, however, where it is not clear whether respect-for-persons 
has been violated or where it is not clear what should be done about violations 
of respect-for-persons. I think that comedy, popular music and art provide 
some of the trickiest examples. Is it a violation of justice to use stereotypes 
and insults of social groups during a stand-up comedy routine or in a novel or 
in the lyrics of a song? I believe that in many cases it would not be. However, 
I also believe that violations of justice can occur even in such a context. For 
example, lyrics which encourage listeners to murder dem [gays] fast 
                                                 
41 Mill (1991) argued that the only justifiable reason for restricting freedom is preventing 
harm to others: the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection (68). Whether 
this principle could defend all aspects of the duties of social equality, including restrictions on 
the use of derogatory language and hate speech, for example, would mainly depend on how 
harm is defined. Mill seemed to believe that freedom of speech should not be curbed under 
any circumstances (75-118), with the implication that speech cannot cause harm, although he 
does admit that speech which is a positive instigation to some mischievous act can be 
censored (119).  
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clearly violate social equality as they violate both conditions of respect-for-
persons, devaluing and dehumanising, as well as toleration.42 What is likely to 
cause controversy, however, is which sanctions should be imposed and 
whether this song should be officially censored is. From the viewpoint of 
social equality both censoring and not censoring such songs could be justified: 
the former because they violate respect-for-persons; for the latter an argument 
could be made that curbing freedom of speech is dehumanising.43 Difficulties 
in establishing when the duties of social equality have not been upheld or in 
how to react to those violations, however, should not make us abandon a 
notion of informal social equality. Rather, on a practical level, it demonstrates 
that what social equality is would at times need to be decided on a case-by-
case basis and, on a theoretical level, it demonstrates a need for the refinement 
of the notion of social equality.  
 
Furthermore, the general objection from Mills notion of social tyranny to the 
duties of social equality, would apply to any type of ethos whether egalitarian 
or not, and thus it seems only to work if we can achieve an ethos that is 
neutral about equality or where we have no ethos at all. It seems virtually 
impossible, if not impossible, to imagine a real-life society in which there is 
no ethos or in which there are no values which influence equality. There will 
always be norms of behaviour and values which society expects individuals to 
uphold; it is thus preferable that these values be fair rather than unfair.  
 
                                                 
42 These lyrics have been cited from an online BBC news article (18/09/2003), which did not 
identify the artist.  
43 A way of resolving this case could be to deny a right to freedom of expression when that 
expression advocates hatred because of sexuality, race, gender, and so on. 
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4.2.2. A political conception of justice? 
 
Although the duties of social equality seem to be somewhat consistent with 
justice-as-fairness because they do not apply the institutional principles of 
justice directly to individual behaviour, there is some question as to how they 
fit in with the notion of political liberalism and with its corresponding 
political conception of justice. The question is, are the duties of social equality 
duties of political justice? If not, how do they correspond to the rest of justice-
as-fairness? Are they inconsistent with Rawlss conception of justice if they 
are not part of a political conception of justice?  
 
Seemingly, per definition, the duties of social equality as applied to informal 
individual behaviour cannot be part of a political conception of justice unless 
they are part of the basic structure. As the basic structure appears to include 
the public rules of institutions but not personal choices within those 
institutions, then these duties are not political.  
 
What is difficult to understand is what the implication of this might be. A 
Rawlsian might be tempted to respond by claiming that this means that the 
duties of social equality are inconsistent with political justice, and are thus 
inconsistent with Rawlss justice, and should be abandoned. I argue, however, 
that no implications of inconsistency seem to follow necessarily from the 
claim that the duties of social equality are not part of a political conception of 
justice.  
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Two primary characteristics of a political conception of justice are: (1) it is 
not tied to any comprehensive moral or philosophical doctrine and (2) it is not 
general, meaning its scope is limited to the basic structure.44 Rawls claims that 
reasonable pluralism demands that justice should not be tied to any 
comprehensive doctrine; it needs to be justified by reasons which will be 
acceptable to anyone, no matter to which particular comprehensive doctrines 
they subscribe. In this sense, there is no inconsistency between the duties of 
social equality and a political conception of justice because the duties are no 
less tied to any comprehensive doctrines than the institutional principles: the 
same values and ideals underlie both. However, the duties of social equality 
are ruled out of being part of a political conception of justice by the second 
characteristic. Rawls claims that a political conception is not general: it is a 
moral conception worked out for a specific kind of subject, namely for 
political, social, and economic institutions.45 As informal social equality 
applies to personal conduct and associations, which Rawls describes as being 
part of background culture46 and which he precludes from the basic 
structure, this means that the duties of social equality, at least where they 
apply informally and not formally, cannot be part of a political conception of 
justice and are rather part of general justice:  
 
                                                 
44 Rawls (1993: 11-15; 175; 2001h: 389-390). For an explanation of a political conception of 
justice from a secondary source, see, for example, Burton Dreben (2003). Many find fault 
with political liberalism. Dworkin (2000), for example, claims that a theory of political 
morality should be located in a more general account of the humane values of ethics and 
morality (4)  See also Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swifts (1996: 167-246) detailed and 
critical assessment of political liberalism, which can be summarised as the charge that 
Rawlss anti-perfectionism seem[s] vulnerable to a charge of circularity, and (even by his 
own admission) appear to violate the limits of the purely political (250). 
45 Rawls (2001h: 389). 
46 Rawls (2001g: 576). 
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This is not to deny that there are appropriate conceptions of justice that 
apply directly to most if not all associations and groups as well as to 
the various kinds of relationships among individuals. Yet these 
conceptions of justice are not political conceptions.47 
 
The implications of this, however, are not entirely clear. If one wanted to 
formulate some sort of objection from the fact that the duties of social equality 
cannot be part of a political conception of justice, then the implication would 
be that there is something wrong with any form of justice besides the 
political. This does not clearly follow however.  
 
It seems apparent that Rawls believes that conceptions of justice which are 
tied to comprehensive doctrines are problematic because they do not respect 
reasonable pluralism. However, not being part of a political conception of 
justice does not necessarily mean being tied to comprehensive doctrines: the 
point is that the duties of social equality are sought for the same reasons as the 
institutional principles, which are part of a political conception of justice.  If 
the institutional principles are not tied to a comprehensive doctrine then the 
same should apply to the duties of social equality. Rawls does say that what 
distinguishes background culture from the public forum in terms of 
comprehensive doctrines is that within background culture it is permissible to 
justify choice on comprehensive doctrines, while this is not permissible within 
                                                 
47 Rawls (2001a: 164). That the duties of social equality, or duties of such kind, would 
necessarily be excluded from a political conception of justice is not always clear. Indeed, at 
times Rawls includes individuals characters and attitudes in a political conception of justice: 
The focus of a political conception of justice is the framework basic institutions as well as 
how those norms are expressed in the character and attitudes of the members of society who 
realize its ideals (Rawls 2001f: 423). Also: a political conception covers the right to vote, 
the political virtues, and the good of political life (Rawls 2001c: 617; my emphasis). A case 
could probably thus be made that individual choice and duties for individuals are part of a 
political conception of justice. 
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a public forum.48 It does not follow from this however that all choice within 
background culture has to be tied to comprehensive doctrines, and, from the 
perspective of social equality, the argument could be that when justice is 
violated within background culture, choice cannot be justified with reference 
to comprehensive doctrines, thus, a violation of justice is not made acceptable 
by culture or religion, for example. The duties of social equality are thus not 
inconsistent with political justice; they are merely not a part of political 
justice, because they are general and thus do not apply to the basic structure. It 
seems that all that follows from this is a difference in description which 
demonstrates a distinction between different principles of justice applied to 
different subjects.  
 
4.2.3. A conflict of principles? 
 
According to the extensive view of the principles of justice, there could be 
principles of distributive justice that differ from the institutional principles. 
Thus there could be principles which aim at, or partially aim at achieving 
distributive justice, which are not the institutional principles. The duties of 
social equality are such principles. Although their primary aim is to achieve 
informal social equality, they can be conceived of as principles of distributive 
justice because, if fulfilled, they would help to achieve a fairer distribution of 
social goods. In chapter I, I claimed that from the way in which Rawls 
describes different principles and different subjects of justice, the extensive 
view seems consistent with his conception of justice. I did, however, add a 
                                                 
48 Rawls (2001g: 576). 
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caveat claiming that whether such principles actually are consistent is 
something to be seen because it would depend on their content. In this section 
I will explore the notion that the duties of social equality are inconsistent with 
Rawlss justice because they conflict with the institutional principles.  
 
According to the exclusive view, only the institutional principles of justice 
can achieve distributive justice; duties for individuals such as the duties of 
social equality are moral duties which may be necessary for a complete theory 
of the right but which are not related to achieving a fair distribution of social 
goods. By arguing that justice in personal choice is a necessary requirement 
for distributive justice, and then by arguing that the institutional principles 
applied to the basic structure or to personal choice, or to both, will not achieve 
justice in personal choice, I am claiming that the exclusive view is wrong. We 
need justice in personal choice to achieve a fair distribution of opportunities 
and self-respect and as the institutional principles are insufficient, some other 
principles must be required for distributive justice.  
 
There is a way that proponents of the exclusive view could try to incorporate 
the duties of social equality, however. They could argue that these duties are 
subsidiary principles of justice, subsidiary to the fundamental principles, i.e. 
the institutional principles. Of course, they could argue, the institutional 
principles are not the only principles necessary to achieve justice but any 
other principles are merely subsidiary: they aim at achieving what it is that the 
institutional principles are trying to achieve by supplementing them at a local 
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or individual level where the direct application of the institutional principles 
would be inappropriate.  
 
If the only relationship between distributive justice and the duties of social 
equality was in achieving a fair distribution of opportunities I would agree 
with this assessment: the duties would be supplements to achieving the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity. As the duties also aim at establishing 
the informal social basis of self-respect, and as there is no principle of self-
respect among the institutional principles, however, it cannot be true that the 
duties are only subsidiary. Perhaps one could argue that there are some more 
fundamental principles or ideals, such as that of self-respect, which both the 
institutional principles and the duties of social equality aim to achieve, 
however, this does not change the point at hand which is that even if this were 
the case, the duties of social equality and the institutional principles are thus 
somewhat independent and the duties cannot be reduced to supplements for 
the institutional principles.  
 
A similar argument from the exclusive view could draw a distinction between 
background justice and other forms of justice. Insisting on a requirement for 
justice in personal choice, this objection could go, misses the point of Rawlss 
justice. Rawls is concerned only with background justice and the duties of 
social equality or justice in choice do not influence background justice. Pogge 
advocates this understanding of Rawls: 
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The crucial point, then, is that Rawls focuses on the fundamental rules 
of the game, and not on what moves players are morally free or 
constrained to make within a particular game in progress.49  
 
Injustices in choice can occur; moreover, there may be other injustices which 
are not included in Rawlss justice: Convicting an innocent person of murder 
is a very grave injustice, even if it occurs within a just basic structure.50 
Although other injustices can occur, so this view goes, these are not injustices 
within the background institutions of society and are thus irrelevant to 
Rawlss justice. When Rawls claims, for example, that a limit would need to 
be set which inequalities of wealth could not exceed, he maintains, however, 
that On this sort of question theory of justice has nothing specific to say. Its 
aim is to formulate the principles that are to regulate the background 
institutions.51 If then the duties of social equality can be incorporated into 
Rawlss justice, they would be some sort of general principles of justice or 
morality, but they are unlike the institutional principles. They cannot achieve 
the same kind of justice as the institutional principles.  
 
I do not find this interpretation of the exclusive view convincing either. It is a 
mistake to believe that personal choice occurs only within social and 
institutional strictures. Choices reinforce or undermine the structures in which 
they occur and thus constitute that structure.52 Thus when the claim is that 
personal choice influences distribution, this does not mean that individual 
                                                 
49 Pogge (1989: 26). The game Pogge is referring to here is a poker game. As I explained in 
chapter I, he draws an analogy between the choice to play poker and background justice, as 
opposed to the choices made within a poker game which are analogous to personal choice. 
50 Pogge (2000: 164). 
51 Rawls (1999: 246). 
52 This, as I explained in chapter IV, is Cohens argument (2000: 137-8). 
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choices sporadically influence the distribution of goods. The claim is that 
unjust choices help to sustain unjust social structures and norms which 
pervasively and systematically devalue and disadvantage certain social 
groups. As such, a concern with the justice of choice is also a concern with 
the ground rules, with background justice, even if it is not a concern with 
formal or legally coercive institutional structure.  
 
Neither the claim that the duties of social equality are subsidiary or that they 
are not principles of background justice is convincing. For this reason, I 
cannot accept the exclusive view and thus believe that in order to 
accommodate justice in personal choice in Rawlss justice, the extensive view 
should be adopted.  
 
By insisting, however, that the duties of social equality are not merely 
subsidiary but also by insisting that they are not different types of principles 
from the institutional, I am opening my argument to a problem of the 
consistency of the duties with the institutional principles. What would happen, 
I could be asked, if the institutional principles and the duties of social equality 
conflict? If the duties were merely subsidiary, then any clash would be 
resolved by saying that the institutional principles must take precedence, for if 
the duties aim at achieving only what the institutional principles aim at and 
these principles are the more fundamental, then if a choice needs to be made it 
must be made on the side of the institutional principles. If the duties of social 
equality have value independent of the institutional principles then that option 
is not open, however, and the question remains, what would happen if they 
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clash?. If then there are times where the duties of social equality should be 
chosen above the institutional principles, and thus if the duties can violate the 
principles of justice, how then can I argue that they are consistent with the 
greater framework of Rawlss justice? Before attempting to answer this 
challenge, lets consider how these principles could come into conflict. 
 
Where conflict could occur is when it comes to the distribution of resources 
required to achieve justice. Aiming to achieve informal social equality and 
adhering to the institutional principles could clash if resources are required to 
achieve social equality. I claimed in an earlier section that the policy 
implications of social equality would not be clear without empirical research. 
Let us say for arguments sake, however, that it is proven that the best way to 
achieve informal social equality is by teaching school children citizenship 
theory and let us say that in order then to achieve a fairer distribution of self-
respect, the government decides to implement citizenship education. In order 
to do so, however, funds from welfare schemes which would have benefited 
the worst-off need to be diverted. Here we could say that the duties of social 
equality conflict with the difference principle. In such a case, we need to ask, 
which should take priority? And if social equality should take priority, how 
can the principles of social equality be consistent with Rawlss justice, if it 
implies a violation of Rawlss justice.  
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Another example of a clash could be between social equality and the priority 
of liberty.53 If liberty is always prioritised, then it seems that freedom of 
speech, for example, should always be defended against the claim that hate 
speech should be prohibited, and yet one could argue from the principles of 
social equality that hate speech should not be tolerated because it violates 
respect-for-persons.54  
  
A way of resolving this which seems to make sense is to make an appeal to 
the fundamental values or ideals underlying both the institutional principles 
and the duties of social equality. Let us say then, for example, we agree that 
the notion that all individuals are equal moral beings and thus should be 
treated with equal respect and concern is the fundamental ideal underlying 
both sets of these principles.55 The institutional principles and the duties of 
social equality are thus complementary principles which aim to capture this 
ideal, or something like it. If, however, these principles clash, the solution to 
choosing which should take precedence would then be solved by appealing to 
which best fulfil the more fundamental ideal. Probably in these cases, the 
answer is unlikely to be straight-forward and often arguments could be made 
either way through an appeal to this ideal. This would, however, provide us 
                                                 
53 The principle of equal liberty is lexically prior to fair equality of opportunity and the 
difference principle (Rawls 1999: 214-220), and so liberty can be restricted only for the sake 
of liberty (220). See Hart (1975: 230-252) for his well-known criticism of this priority. 
54 This could also be a clash between the two components of respect-for-persons, as I 
explained in section 5.2.1. I mentioned a possible way out of this clash, however, and that is 
to say that certain liberties are precluded by justice. Just as there should be no liberty to harass 
or assault, there should also be no liberty to propagate racial hatred, for example. Thus if we 
are to accept this argument, there is no clash between the principles of social equality and the 
priority of the liberty principle (or between the two requirements of respect-for-persons) 
because there is no such liberty. 
55 Dworkin (1975) claims that the highly abstract right to equal respect and concern 
underlies Rawlss justice (50). As it is so abstract, it can be expressed in different ways. The 
original position, Dworkin claims, is a means to test which principles best express this right. 
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with at least some standard against which to measure conflict. This standard 
would also address the problem of consistency. Even if the duties of social 
equality could violate the principles of justice, this we can argue is only to 
better achieve the ideal underlying the institutional principles. Understood in 
this way, the duties are not inconsistent with Rawlss justice as even if it is 
possible for them to violate the institutional principles, they conform to the 
more general ideal underlying these principles.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the introduction, I claimed that my aim in this chapter was to answer two 
primary questions. The first question is whether Rawlss principles for 
individuals address informal social equality (or even justice in choice). I have 
argued that these principles do not: (1) they primarily tend to provide support 
for formal institutional justice, and not for informal justice, and (2) where they 
seem similar to social equality or justice in choice, they are too brief and 
imprecise. These principles seem much more of a promising solution to the 
problem of justice in choice, however, because they are principles for 
individual behaviour. As they share a structure and broad content sympathetic 
to the demands of social equality, it seems appropriate to adapt them as a 
solution to accommodating justice in choice in Rawlss justice. 
 
This leads to the second question this chapter aimed to answer: how can we 
adapt Rawlss principles for individuals to fulfil the demands of social 
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equality? I have argued that Rawlss duties of mutual respect and justice could 
be revised:  
 
1. the duty of mutual respect would demand that individuals uphold respect-
for-persons, civility and toleration and;  
2. the duty of justice would, among others, demand that individuals should  
comply with informal justice when it exists and help to establish fair informal 
arrangements when they do not exist, by fulfilling the duty of mutual respect.  
 
I claimed that in the broader context of this thesis, this chapter would aim to 
provide an alternative to the original PCAs claim that the institutional 
principles should be applied to choice. I have argued that the duties of social 
equality are a better solution: they are principles designed to apply to 
individuals, and although their direct aim is to achieve social equality, they 
will also help to uphold justice in choice because when the values of respect-
for-persons, civility and toleration are upheld by individuals, the informal 
social basis of the primary goods of opportunities and self-respect would be 
more fairly distributed.  
 
Although the duties seem to imply extreme changes to religions and certain 
ways of life which violate respect-for-persons and toleration, I have 
emphasised that they are not meant to be prescriptive. I aim to describe a fair 
society and a society of equals; my claim is that in such societies, individuals 
would fulfil the duties of social equality. Furthermore, although these duties 
depart from Rawlss original justice, they can be defended as an extension of 
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his theory as they can be reconciled with (i) liberal notions of harm, (ii) 
political liberalism and (iii) the ideals underlying the institutional principles.  
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General Conclusion 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
In my introduction I asked the question what type of equality would a fair 
society require? Among other forms of equality, my answer is that a fair 
society requires informal social equality, which includes equality and justice 
in personal choice. If informal social equality is achieved, justice in choice 
would also be upheld, as the primary social goods of opportunities and the 
social basis of self-respect would be distributed fairly. Although a fair society 
clearly requires fair institutions, it seems then that it also requires fairness and 
equality in personal choice. Rawlss conception of justice primarily only 
recognises institutional justice. To extend his description of a fair society to 
include justice in choice, the thesis I have argued to support is that Rawlss 
principles for individuals should be revised to incorporate the values of social 
equality.  
 
For Rawls, justice is primarily a function of the application of the institutional 
principles to the main institutions of society, or as he refers to them, the basic 
structure. Although there are different ways in which to understand the basic 
structure, I have argued that a feasible interpretation is that the basic structure 
is limited to political form, the economy, the constitution and legislation 
where these are relevant to distribution, and through these institutions, the 
basic structure includes the public rules of other institutions and associations 
and the public rules applicable to individual behaviour. Basic structure does 
not include individual behaviour, at least where this behaviour is not subject 
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to public rules, thus the institutional principles, which are meant to evaluate 
and regulate basic structure, do not apply to personal choice. Injustices in 
choice, such as interferences with the development of self-respect through 
systematic and pervasive devaluation, thus remain unaddressed by Rawlss 
institutional justice.   
 
This neglect of justice in choice seems to pose a problem for Rawlss 
conception of justice as described according to the fair distribution of primary 
social goods. Justice in the distribution of goods such as opportunities and the 
social basis of self-respect is affected by choice and convention, such as, for 
example, through private racial discrimination, exclusion, stereotyping and 
verbal harassment. If we are going to describe a fair society according to a fair 
distribution of these goods, we should include a description of justice in 
choice. A description of a fair society thus cannot rely solely on Rawlss 
institutional justice. How then do we describe a fair society which includes the 
requirement of justice in choice?  
 
If we aim to expand or revise Rawlss conception of justice to include justice 
in choice, we are presented with two primary alternatives based on two 
different interpretations of the status of principles and subjects of justice. 
According to the exclusive view, the only (direct) subject and principles of 
broad distributive justice are the basic structure and the institutional 
principles. According to the extensive view, principles besides the 
institutional could apply to subjects other than the basic structure in order to 
achieve distributive justice. If we aim to incorporate a requirement for justice 
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in choice into Rawlss justice, in keeping with the exclusive view, we would 
have to make choice part of basic structure and apply the institutional 
principles to choice, or, in keeping with the extensive view, we could design 
or adapt principles other than the institutional to apply to choice.  
 
A solution consistent with the exclusive view is the solution proposed by 
advocates of what I have called the personal choice argument. According to 
this argument, the justice of choice should be judged according to how well it 
conforms with the institutional principles. Cohen, who promotes this 
argument, claims that demands for material incentives are unjust if measured 
according to the difference principle. In response to the objection that the 
principles of justice cannot be applied to individuals, Cohen argues that 
choice, such as the demand for incentives, could be subject to the principles of 
justice because (1) choice is constitutive of the noncoercive structure of 
institutions, which it would be arbitrary not to include within the scope of 
justice, and (2) choice has profound and pervasive effects on individuals 
lives. 
 
This solution, I have argued, is unconvincing. We could design principles of 
justice specifically for choice, which would negate the need for applying the 
institutional principles to choice. Indeed, there are good reasons not to apply 
the institutional principles to choice because, among others, they can be self-
defeating when applied to individuals and they do not address the injustices of 
unfair distributions of the informal basis of self-respect. Instead of adopting 
the exclusive view and forcing the application of the institutional principles, 
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as the only principles of distributive justice, to choice, we could instead adopt 
the extensive view, recognising that principles designed to be applied to 
choice, and thus individual behaviour, could help, in conjunction with the 
institutional principles, to capture broad distributive justice.  
 
Rawlss institutionalism does not mean that he focuses exclusively on 
institutions. Rawls recognises that principles for individuals, such as the 
natural duties of justice and mutual respect, would also be chosen in the 
original position. These principles are described only briefly and where they 
do seem to correspond to something similar to justice in choice, they do not 
do so explicitly. Mainly these principles demand that individuals support fair 
institutions rather than demanding that individuals themselves act justly.  
 
Thus although these principles seem to be the right kind of principles we are 
looking for as opposed to principles designed to regulate institutions, their 
content does not address the justice of choice, so we would need to adapt them 
if we wanted to use them to describe justice in choice. If neither the 
institutional principles nor the principles for individuals can capture the notion 
of justice in choice convincingly, what can? I have argued that social equality, 
which illustrates what a society of equals would be like, would also result in a 
fair distribution of goods such as opportunities and the social basis of self-
respect. Social equality is, at a minimum, respect-for-persons, civility and 
toleration upheld in informal and formal spheres, thus both in the realm of 
choice, and through rights and legislation. If social equality is upheld by 
individuals then justice in choice is also likely to be upheld. A means then of 
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including justice in choice within Rawlss conception of justice is to adapt the 
principles for individuals according to the values of social equality. I have 
argued that in order for Rawlss justice to express justice in choice as a 
requirement of a fair society, we could: 
 
1. adapt the duty of mutual respect to state a requirement to uphold respect-
for-persons, civility and toleration, and; 
2. adapt the duty of justice to state a requirement for individuals to establish 
and uphold informal as well as formal institutional justice.  
 
The scope of this thesis has been limited. The limits of this thesis mean that 
we still do not have answers to some of the questions raised as part of the 
argument about personal choice and, furthermore, a number of new questions 
about social equality have been raised which still need answering. One of the 
most important questions, a question which helped inspire the debate about 
personal choice, whether demands for incentives are fair, remains 
unanswered. The implications of my argument for the justice of incentives 
might be a worthwhile topic to explore as an extension of my argument. 
Moreover, my focus in this thesis has been on the distribution of non-material 
goods. A further important issue which needs to be explored in greater detail 
is the relationship between social equality and economic equality, or, if not 
economic equality, exploring what type of distribution of material goods is 
consistent with a society of equals.  
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Furthermore, although I have provided something of a description of a society 
of equals, I have done so only as a function of exploring justice in choice. 
How to model a society in which people can be said to be treated genuinely as 
equals can be explored in much more depth. My descriptions of the values of 
respect-for-persons, and especially civility and toleration of difference could 
be expanded to be more detailed and nuanced, and perhaps stronger 
definitions of these values are required. For example, in chapter II, I 
mentioned that my description of toleration might need to be revised to 
include a requirement not merely of accepting difference but of encouraging 
difference, if it could be demonstrated that this is indeed what a society of 
equals requires. I also claimed that further values of social equality, such as 
solidarity, may need to be included: a society of equals seems as if it might 
need a description of a shared commitment and affiliation which individuals 
have towards each other and their society. 
 
Although there are thus limitations to the scope of this thesis and much further 
research is needed, what I have aimed at is providing a solution to the problem 
of justice in choice within Rawlss conception of justice. In order to provide 
this solution, I have argued that if we include a requirement for individuals to 
uphold informal social equality, thus respect-for-persons, civility and 
toleration, within Rawlss justice, we will achieve a fairer distribution of 
social goods. Thus, to improve our model of a fair society, we could include 
as requirements for justice (1) institutional justice, achieved through the 
application of the institutional principles to basic structure, and (2) justice in 
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personal choice, achieved through individuals upholding the duties of social 
equality. 
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